Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Steak ’n Shake filed a complaint seeking a reduction for tax year 2009 from the auditor’s valuation of a Steak ’n Shake restaurant. The Warren County Board of Revision retained the auditor’s original valuation for the property. Stake ’n Shake appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). At the BTA hearing, the property owner presented an appraisal report and testimony from a longtime state-certified appraiser, while the county presented an appraisal prepared by an employee of the county’s valuation consultant. The BTA adopted the county’s valuation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Steak ’n Shake’s objections to the competency and lack of independence of the county’s appraiser are rejected; but (2) the BTA erred in its acceptance of the county appraiser’s reliance on encumbered comparable properties in determining the value of the subject property, which is occupied by its owner. Remanded. View "Steak 'n Shake, Inc. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2011, Donald Beck filed complaints against the auditor’s tax-year-2010 valuations of three two-family residential rental properties in Columbus. The Franklin County Board of Revision approved a reduction in the auditor’s original valuation based upon an unspecific sales-comparison and income approach. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the reduction. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed, arguing that the BTA improperly affirmed the reduced valuation when the evidence for the reduction was not in the record. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding that the BOE waived its claim of error because it presented neither argument nor evidence before the BTA. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course of his employment with Precision Steel Services, Inc. Employee received compensation for his medical expenses and lost wages. Two years after the accident, Employee applied for an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR). The Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award to Employee, determining that Precision Steel violated the safety regulations in Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1) and 4123:1-5-15(B) and that those violations proximately caused Employee’s injury. Precision Steel then filed this mandamus action. The court of appeals issued a limited writ, concluding that Precision Steel violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-15(B) and ordering that the Commission readjudicate Employee’s claim based on Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1). The Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to vacate its order and to issue a new order denying Employee’s application for an additional award for VSSR, holding (1) neither Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G) nor 4123:1-5-15(B) establishes a specific safety requirement in the context of this case; and (2) therefore, the Commission’s decision that Precision Steel violated the rules was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee, an ironworker, was injured in a fall while working for Employer, a subcontractor on a bridge project. Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for multiple injuries sustained in the fall. Two years after the incident, Employee applied for an additional award for Employer’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that his fall was caused by Employer’s violation of numerous specific safety regulations. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award. Employer filed a complaint and an amended complaint in mandamus, seeking a writ that would compel the Commission to vacate its order and to refund all additional compensation that had been paid by Employer as a result the VSSR award. Employer asserted that the Commission abused its discretion by finding that Employer violated a specific safety requirement because Employee’s injuries were the result of his failure to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it issued a VSSR award, and therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Employee’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued property owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company at $8,323,000 for the tax year 2005 and for tax years 2006 through 2010. Sears filed a complaint seeking a reduction of value. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Sears’s claims for reduction. Sears appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), where Sears presented an appraisal determine the value to be $6,300,000 for 2005 and $6,550,000 for 2008. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education presented data as rebuttal evidence. The BTA adopted the Sears appraisal valuations. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the BTA’s decision was not unreasonably or unlawful on account of alleged formal inadequacies; and (2) the BTA was justified in concluding that the appraiser’s opinion was supported by a viable theory of property value. View "Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Amber Risner was killed in a collision with a tractor-trailer at the intersection of State Route 220 and State Route 332. Appellees, Amber’s parents, filed a complaint as the administrators of Amber’s estate against the Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”), alleging negligent design and maintenance of the intersection. The court of claims granted summary judgment in favor of ODOT, concluding that ODOT was performing maintenance, rather than highway improvement, when it installed flashing lights in the intersection, and therefore, ODOT did not have a duty to upgrade the intersection to current design standards. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ODOT is immune from liability with respect to its decisions whether to improve an existing highway and what type of improvements it will make; (2) however, in executing its decisions to improve a highway, ODOT may be subject to liability if it fails to act in accordance with current construction standards; and (3) applying the discretionary-function doctrine to the facts of this case, ODOT is immune from liability for damages resulting from its decisions at issue here. View "Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Platinum Lodging, LLC, the former owner of the property at issue in this appeal, was a party throughout proceedings challenging a real property valuation for the tax year 2008. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the valuation. Platinum Lodging and the current property owners appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court remanded the matter to the BOR. On remand, the BOR dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the complainant lacked standing. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education and Platinum Lodging appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed the appeals on the grounds that, because the first appeal had been filed in the common pleas court, the BTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the BOR’s dismissal order on remand. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s order or dismissal as to Platinum Lodging, holding that Platinum Lodging acted properly in filing its notice of appeal at the BTA instead of in the common pleas court. Remanded to the BOR with instructions that it determine the value of the property in accordance with the earlier remand order issued by the common pleas court. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After a pretermination hearing, the Lockland School District Board of Education terminated Appellant’s contract of employment. Appellant appealed, arguing that Lockland had violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to hold the pretermination hearing in public. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lockland. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a public employee can require that a hearing about his employment status be held in public under Ohio Rev. Code 121.22(G)(1) only when he is otherwise entitled to a public hearing; and (2) Appellant in this case was not otherwise entitled to a public hearing. View "Stewart v. Lockland Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellee submitted a disability-retirement application to the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and its board of trustees (together, “the Board”). The Board rejected Appellee’s claim for benefits. The Board also rejected Appellee’s appeal, finding that she was not permanently disabled. Appellee then filed suit for a writ of mandamus. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and ordered the Board to award benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by independently reevaluating the medical evidence and substituting its judgment regarding weight and credibility for that of the Board. View "State ex rel. Woodman v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law