Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cuyahoga County filed an exemption to a tract of real property it acquired in 2004. The property consisted of a marina/restaurant that operated in conjunction with an adjacent public park. The tax commissioner granted the application as to the the public park portion but denied the application as to the remainder constituting the marina and restaurant. In doing so, the Commissioner invoked his authority to order a split between the taxable and exempt portions. The County appealed, arguing that the Commissioner erred by finding that the property was not used exclusively for a public purpose. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed primarily on the ground that the marina and restaurant were operated “with a view to profit.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the marina and restaurant are considered separately from the park, the denial of the exemption was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. View "Cuyahoga County v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2010, New Thistledown, LLC, which owned Thistledown Racetrack, petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. Thistledown was purchased at an auction for $43,000,000. The bankruptcy court authorized the sale, stating that the sale price constituted reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration of the purchased assets. For tax year 2010, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer assigned a value of $14,264,000 to the parcels comprising Thistledown. The Board of Education of Warrensville Heights City School District filed a complaint with the board of revision (BOR) seeking an increase in valuation. The BOR retained the fiscal officer’s initial valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) rejected the 2010 sale price as evidence of value and valued the real property at $13,800,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably and lawfully determined that the 2010 sale did not establish the true value of Thistledown; and (2) the evidence supported the BTA’s finding that Thistledown was worth $13,800,000 as of the tax-lien date. View "Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (BOE) filed its application to exempt property located within the district. The tax commissioner granted an exemption for all of the property except for a parcel being farmed pursuant to lease, concluding that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from exemption because that portion was not used for school purposes. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) following its amendment in 2010, Ohio Rev. Code 3313.44 does not contain a restriction requiring that the property owned by the BOE be used exclusively for school purposes; and (2) the entire property described in the BOE’s application shall be exempt for the year at issue. View "Talawanda City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a 2010 assessment of personal property issued by the Pike County auditor against Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (LMES) for tax year 1993. The tax commissioner canceled the assessment. LMES prevailed before the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) on appeal. LMES prosecuted its appeal to the Supreme Court based on the BTA’s failure to address its contentions that the auditor issued the assessment frivolously and in bad faith. The county auditor cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA lacked the authority to make a finding of frivolous conduct or bad faith on the auditor’s part; (2) LMES had standing as an aggrieved party to prosecute its appeal to the Supreme Court; and (3) the tax commissioner properly canceled the assessment, as affirmed by the BTA, because LMES was never shown to qualify as a “taxpayer” as that term is statutorily defined for purposes of the personal property tax. View "Snodgrass v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 1994, Appellant was injured in the course and scope of his employment. In 2010, during the course and scope of his employment for a new employer, Appellant was injured. In 2012, Appellant requested temporary-total-disability compensation for the period beginning December 8, 2011. The Industrial Commission denied compensation, concluding that Appellant had not presented persuasive medical evidence establishing that Appellant’s 1994 industrial injury rendered him temporarily and totally disabled as of December 8, 2011. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus that would require the Commission to vacate its order denying compensation and to award temporary-total-disability benefits beginning December 8, 2011. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for compensation for the period beginning December 8, 2011. View "State ex rel. Ritzie v. Reece-Campbell, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ohio Republican Party (ORP) sent a public-records request to Cuyahoga County seeking the County’s key card swipe data for five individuals, including Edward FitzGerald, the County’s former county executive. At the time of the ORP’s request, the key-card-swipe data were security records exempted from release because FitzGerald had received threats and release of that data would have diminished the County’s ability to protect him and maintain the security of the office of the county executive. Subsequent to receipt of the public-records request, the County moved its administrative offices to a new building, FitzGerald’s term of office expired, and the County released the records to members of the media. The ORP filed this mandamus action alleging that the County had failed to respond to its public-record requests. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the release of the records, holding that FitzGerald’s key-card-swipe data were public records, and the County failed to demonstrate that they were exempt from disclosure. View "State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald" on Justia Law

Appellant participated in a program called the Percentage of Income Payment Plan (“PIPP”) that provided assistance to low-income residential customers. Most PIPP customers pay a fixed percentage of their monthly income rather than the actual cost of service. Appellant later left PIPP but continued to receive gas service from Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc. at the standard rate. Appellant was reinstated in PIPP seven months after her departure. Vectren subsequently informed Appellant that she had to pay the difference between the charges she paid during the time she was not in the program and the monthly PIPP installment payments that would have been due had she remained in PIPP. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission alleging that Vectren’s attempt to charge her for the missed PIPP installments was unlawful and unreasonable. The Commission found in favor of Vectren. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission’s orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "Toliver v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee challenged the auditor’s valuation of a parcel of residential real estate for tax year 2012. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (school board) sought retention of the auditor’s valuation. The Franklin County Board of Revision dismissed the complaint. Appellee appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) from the dismissal order. On the notice of appeal, Appellee marked “yes” in response to a question asking whether the case should be referred to the small-claims docket. Accordingly, the case was placed on the small-claims docket. The school board filed a motion to return the case to the regular docket. The BTA denied the motion. The Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction to review the interim order and affirmed the BTA’s denial of the school board’s motion, holding that the BTA did not err in denying the school board’s motion to have the case returned to the BTA’s regular docket. Remanded. View "Megaland GP, LLC v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a public-records mandamus case in the court of appeals to obtain records she had requested from the City of South Euclid. During the litigation, the City and its employee (collectively, Appellees) produced all of the requested records. The court of appeals granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s request for statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was entitled to damages and remanded with instructions to determine damages. On remand, the court of appeals awarded damages. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for sanctions against Appellees and their counsel. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion for sanctions was untimely and that the actions of Appellees and their counsel in defending the case were not taken in bad faith or with the purpose of delay. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

Relator requested public records from the City of South Euclid and its employee (together, South Euclid) for, inter alia, financial records associated with several city-owned properties. South Euclid sent some, but not all, of the requested records. Relator later filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus and statutory damages under the public-records act, alleging that South Euclid only partially responded to her requests and did not produce the records that she did receive within a reasonable period of time. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering that responsive records be produced if they exist and have not yet been produced and awarded costs and statutory damages in the amount of $600 to Relator, holding that South Euclid took an unreasonable amount of time producing some records responsive to Relator’s request. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law