Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Epic Aviation, LLC, a vendor of jet fuel, sold jet fuel to AirNet Systems, Inc., collected sales tax on it, and remitted the tax to the state. Epic, on behalf of AirNet, sought a refund of sales tax paid by AirNet on its purchases of jet fuel from Epic from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2009. The tax commissioner denied the claim for refund. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Epic appealed, arguing that AirNet’s jet fuel purchases were exempt from sales tax because AirNet purchased the fuel intending to use the fuel “directly in the rendition of a public utility service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(42)(a). The tax commissioner denied the exemption, finding that the business of AirNet, which does not hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the federal government, was not sufficiently regulated to qualify as a “public utility service.” The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded, holding that Epic should have an opportunity to present evidence to establish the portion of the jet fuel purchased by AirNet that is exempt from taxation under the common-carrier standard as clarified in this opinion. View "Epic Aviation, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

For tax years 2002 through 2007, Appellants filed no Ohio tax returns, contending that income was earned outside Ohio. The tax commissioner assessed Ohio individual income tax against Appellants for the tax years at issue but initially failed to give notice of his reliance on the unrebutted presumption that Appellants were, in fact, Ohio residents and domiciliaries. Appellants challenged the commissioner’s assessment. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate an error in the commission’s final determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all income of Ohio residents is taxable, regardless of where the income is earned or received; and (2) Appellants failed to prove that they do not have to pay the amounts assessed, despite the tax commissioner’s failure to give notice of his reliance on the presumption of Ohio residency. View "Krehnbrink v. Testa" on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued a two-story office building at $2,205,000. The property owner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented an appraisal valuing the property at $1,000,000. The BOR adopted the lower value. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the BOR’s valuation. BOE appealed, arguing that the appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of value, and therefore, the BTA should not have adopted that value for the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the plain applicability of the Bedford rule, the BTA did not err in its decision. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The FirstEnergy Companies Ohio Edison Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison Company (collectively, FirstEnergy) submitted an application for an electric-security plan (ESP). The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approved the application. After FirstEnergy began implementing the terms of the ESP, it filed an application to extend the plan and identified the changes it would make to the existing plan. The Commission approved the application. Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC) and the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient probative evidence to show that the Commission’s determination was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence or clearly unsupported by the record. View "In re Application of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

Cynthia Huntsman operated a farm on which she kept multiple species of wild animals that are regulated by the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Huntsman had no permit to possess “dangerous wild animals” under the Act. The Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) ordered the transfer of multiple dangerous wild animals found in Huntsman’s facility to a temporary holding facility established by the ODA. A Stark County Common Pleas Court judge granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order against the ODA and ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman. The director of the ODA sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding in the underlying case and ordered him to vacate his previous orders in the case, holding that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Huntsman and her farm. View "State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione" on Justia Law

Marcus Pryor applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment compensation. The director of ODJFS concluded that Pryor was ineligible for benefits. A hearing officer with the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The Commission denied Pryor’s request to review the hearing officer’s findings. Pryor filed an appeal in the common pleas court naming the director of ODJFS as the appellee but failing to name the Army, Pryor’s former employer, as a party to his appeal. The common pleas court dismissed the appeal, finding that because Pryor failed to name the Army was an interested party, his notice of appeal did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 4141.282(D), thus depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court’s dismissal of Pryor’s appeal and reinstated Pryor’s administrative appeal in the common pleas court, ruling that Pryor’s failure to name the Army was not a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the naming of interested parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under section 4141.282; but (2) the Commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements in section 4141.282(D), and therefore, Pryor’s time to appeal the Commission’s decision never started to run. Remanded. View "Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant, a nonresident taxpayer, filed a refund claim for an unpaid 2004 tax liability assessment. Appellant contested Ohio Rev. Code 5747.212’s imposition of income tax on a portion of the capital gain that he realized in 2004 when he sold his ownership interest in a limited liability company. The tax commissioner denied the refund claim. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that applying section 5747.212 to him was unconstitutional and that he should be permitted to allocate the gain entirely outside Ohio. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Ohio may levy income tax on Appellant’s capital gain as if it were income from the business itself. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding that section 5747.212, as applied to Appellant, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded to the tax commissioner to grant Appellant a refund. View "Corrigan v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Olentangy Local School District Board of Education amended a board policy to require that all communications between board members and staff first pass through the district superintendent or the district treasurer. Adam White, a board member, voted against the policy change. The Columbus Dispatch subsequently published an editorial praising White for his vote. In a series of e-mails between and among a majority of the board members, the board issued a response to the editorial on behalf of the board. The board later ratified that response at a public meeting. White filed this lawsuit alleging that the board violated the Open Meetings Act. The trial court granted the board’s motion for judgment in the pleadings, concluding that the Act does not apply to e-mails. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that serial e-mail communications by a majority of board members regarding a response to public criticism of the board may constitute a private, prearranged discussion of public business in violation of the Act if the communications meet the requirements of the statute. Remanded. View "White v. King" on Justia Law

In 2009, Spire Institute (Spire), a nonprofit corporation, entered into an agreement to lease land from Roni Lee, LLC, a for-profit company. By 2012, Spire had constructed Olympic-grade athletic facilities and related improvements on about a quarter of the property. In 2010, Spire sought a real-estate-tax exemption for the entire property under the charitable-use exemption. The tax commissioner denied exemption, finding that Roni Lee used the property for land development and commercial leasing and that Spire was not “engaged in charitable activity in any substantial way.” The commissioner also denied exemption of he undeveloped property under the prospective-use doctrine. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding that Spire failed to establish that any portion of the subject property qualified for a charitable-use exemption. View "Geneva Area Recreational, Educ. & Athletic Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law