Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus requested by Jason Stevens to compel the Fairfield County Board of Elections to issue a certificate of nomination to certify Stevens’s name for placement on the May 8, 2018 primary-election ballot as a candidate for election to the Ohio Democratic Party State Central Committee.Stevens filed a petition to appear on the May 8 primary ballot as a Democratic candidate. The Board voted to deny Stevens access to the ballot because his voting history did not show he was a member of the Democratic Party. The Supreme Court granted the relief requested by Stevens, holding that, based on the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 3513.05, Stevens satisfied the statutory requirements to stand for election to the Ohio Democratic Party state Central Committee, and the Board thus abused its discretion and acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it disallowed his candidacy. View "State ex rel. Stevens v. Fairfield County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) vacating the decision of the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR), which partially reduced the value of certain property for tax year 2012. The BOR partially reduced the value of the property based on a sheriff’s-sale appraisal. The BTA concluded that this evidence was unreliable and that the record contained no other evidence from which a value could be determined. The BTA vacated the BOR’s decision and remanded the case to the BOR with directions to determine a value based on competent and probative evidence. The Supreme Court reinstated the county auditor’s original valuation, holding that that BTA erred in remanding the case to the BOR. View "South-Western City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in adopting the Franklin County Board of Revision’s (BOR) determination of value of Appellee’s property for tax year 2011.For tax year 2011, the Franklin County auditor valued the property at issue at $328,700. Appellee filed a complaint against the valuation, seeking a reduction to $165,000. The BOR reduced the value to $272,000. The BTA adopted the BOR’s valuation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA erred in its application of the rule set forth in Bedford Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 875 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio 2007); and (2) the county auditor’s valuation should be reinstated, rather than the case remanded to the BTA for an independent determination of value. View "South-Western City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to the chief of the oil-and-gas resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), the director of ODNR, the state, and the governor of Ohio (collectively, Appellees) on the grounds that Food and Water Watch (FWW) and FreshWater Accountability Project (FWAP) lacked standing to bring this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to promulgate rules relating to the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of waste substances associated with oil and gas drilling. The court held (1) because FWAP did not demonstrate that its individual members would have standing in their own right, its claim for associational standing failed; (2) this court declines to extend State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); and (3) FWAP waived other arguments regarding standing and did not otherwise demonstrate that it had standing to proceed in this mandamus action. View "State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluding that Taxpayer’s challenge to the taxable value assigned to its property for tax year 2012 was barred because taxpayer waited too long to notify the Board of Revision (BOR) that it wished to pursue a continuing complaint for tax year 2012. Taxpayer did not file a new complaint for the 2012 tax year but, rather, relied upon the continuing-complaint jurisdiction provided for in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D). The Supreme Court held that the time limitation imposed by the BTA was contrary to the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D) and that, under the statute, the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to consider Taxpayer’s request for tax year 2012. View "MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law