Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal challenging the Public Utility Commission’s decision to allow Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L) to withdraw and terminate its second electric-security plan (ESP II), holding that the Commission’s approval of DP&L’s third electric-security plan (ESP III) rendered this case moot.The Commission allowed DP&L to withdraw and terminate its ESP II rate plan and service stability rider (SSR) charge. The ESP II rate plan and its SSR charge were then replaced by ESP III, which the Commission approved. Appellant’s appealed the Commission’s order regarding ESP II. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that because there was no remedy that the Court could legally order, the appeal constituted only a request for an advisory ruling, and the controversy was no longer live. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the Industrial Commission and granted Jackson Tube Service Inc.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its order that granted Chad Thompson’s application for an additional award due to the violation of a specific safety requirement (VSRR) and to issue an order denying the VSSR application, holding that there was no evidence to support the commission’s decision to grant the VSSR award.Thompson’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a femur fracture. Thompson also filed an application for a VSSR award. The commission granted the VSSR application and rejected Jackson Tube’s argument that it was impossible to comply with the specific safety requirement. On appeal, Jackson Tube argued that the court of appeals erred when it rejected Jackson Tube’s impossibility defense. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the commission abused its discretion in granting the VSSR award because it relied on speculative testimony regarding the existence of alternative means of performance proved nonexistent and that the evidence demonstrated that Jackson Tube established the defense of impossibility. View "State ex rel. Jackson Tube Service, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

In determining whether John Klein was entitled to continued temporary-total-disability compensation where he voluntarily left his position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, the Supreme Court overruled State ex. Rel. Reitter Stucco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 881 N.E. 2d 861 (Ohio 2008), and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 865 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2007), and applied the longstanding principles of voluntary abandonment to Klein’s claim for temporary-total-disability compensation.On Klein’s request for mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the Industrial Commission of Ohio abused its discretion in determining that Klein voluntarily abandoned his employment at Precision Excavating & Grading Company for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury without determining whether Klein was medically capable of returning to work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the writ of mandamus, holding that when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, he is not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation even if he remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment. View "State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s (PUCO) motion to dismiss LMD Integrated Logistic Services, Inc.’s appeal from a civil forfeiture order, holding that a party appealing an order of the PUCO pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4923.99 is not required to file a notice of appeal with PUCO to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.LMD initiated its appeal in this case by filing its notice of appeal with the court of appeals and serving a copy of that notice on the member of PUCO, in accordance with section 4923.99(D). PUCO, however, argued that the appeal should be dismissed because LMD did not file its notice of appeal with PUCO. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the appellate court did not err in ruling that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked. View "In re LMD Integrated Logistics Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without giving full consideration to the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not act reasonably and lawfully.At issue was the tax-year 2014 value of a single-tenant building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. Although, under the amended version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03 appraisal evidence is admissible and competent alongside sale-price in determining a property’s value, the BTA adopted the property’s sale price without giving full consideration to appraisal evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties in this case. View "GC Net Lease @(3)(Westerville) Investors, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without considering the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties.The property at issue was a single-tenant office building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. On appeal, the BTA noted that under the applicable version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03, the fee-simple estate must be valued as if unencumbered. Nonetheless, the BTA adhered to caselaw applying an earlier version of the statute that emphasized the use of the sale price to determine value. The BTA then adopted the November 2013 sale price as the property value for tax year 2013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that appraisal evidence is relevant and admissible, that no threshold showing was required before a tax tribunal must give full consideration to appraisal evidence, and that remand was required for further proceedings. View "Westerville City School District Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by six Columbus electors (Relators) to compel members of the Franklin County Board of Elections (Respondents) to place a proposed city ordinance on the November 6, 2018 ballot, holding that Respondents did not abuse their discretion in excluding the measure from the ballot.If adopted, the proposal would establish a “Community Bill of Rights” related to water, soil, and air protection and prohibit certain oil and gas extraction activities within the City of Columbus. Respondents found that the proposed ordinance was beyond the city’s legislative power because it would create new causes of action. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Respondents did not abuse their discretion in concluding that the proposed ballot measure was beyond the scope of the city’s legislative power. View "State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting the property value stated in an appraisal report presented by the Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education (BOE), holding that the property owner’s jurisdictional challenges to the decision below were unavailing.On appeal, the property owner argued (1) its withdrawal of the complaint it originally filed for tax year 2011 deprived the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) of jurisdiction to proceed on the BOE’s countercomplaint; and (2) the BOR’s jurisdiction was limited to consideration of the land value because the property owner’s original complaint contested the land value and not the value of improvements. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the voluntary dismissal of a complaint filed under Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A) does not retroactively invalidate a complaint filed under section 5715.19(B); and (2) the administrative tribunals’ jurisdiction under the BOE’s complaint was not limited to determining land value. View "Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) was how best to determine the true value of a low income housing property that is both rent restricted and rent subsidized.Appellant, the property owner in this case, argued that rents as derived from rent-restricted comparable should be used in determining the true value of such a property but that the property’s rent subsidies should be excluded from consideration. The board of education, however, argued that the property’s actual rents, which include tenant-paid rent and rent subsidies, should be used. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the BTA failed to weigh and analyze a potentially material piece of evidence presented by Appellant, and given the BTA’s failure to discharge its duty as the finder of fact, the case must be remanded with instruction that the BTA “explicitly account” for the evidence at issue, along with other evidence. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Parole Board to hold a parole hearing at which Appellant’s parole request would be given “meaningful consideration,” holding that Appellant did not demonstrate that the parole board failed to give his parole request meaningful consideration.On appeal, Appellant argued that the parole board did not give his parole request meaningful consideration as a result of materially false or misleading information in his parole record. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his parole record contained false or misleading information that might have adversely affected the board’s consideration of his parole request. View "State ex rel. Keith v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law