Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this property-tax appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) arriving at an independent valuation of the subject property by using probative aspects of the two expert reports presented by the two parties, holding that the BTA’s determination was valid and did not violate constitutionally required uniformity.At the hearing before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR), the Property Owner presented appraiser testimony regarding the value for 2014 and 2015 of the property. Groveport-Madison Local Schools Board of Education presented testimony from a different appraiser, as well as a consulting report. The BOR adopted the Property Owner’s appraisal value. On appeal, the BTA arrived at its independent valuation of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA discharged its duty to perform an independent valuation of the property; and (2) the BTA’s independent determination of value did not violate the uniformity required by Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. View "Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this challenge brought by a property owner seeking a decrease in the valuation of its property, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting the value determined by the Montgomery County Board of Revision (BOR), holding that the BTA did not misapply the principles delineated in Bedford Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 875 N.E.2d 913.The Huber Heights City Schools Board of Education (BOE) objected to Globe Products, Inc.'s requested decrease, but the BOR lowered the property value in line with what Globe sought. On appeal, the BTA found the testimony presented by the BOE that was critical of Globe’s evidence lacking and adopted the value determined by the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA did not err in concluding that the Bedford elements were satisfied; and (2) because Globe presented competent and at least minimally plausible evidence to the BOR, the BOE could not invoke the auditor’s original valuation as a default. View "Huber Heights City Schools Board of Education v. Montgomery County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the 2014 value of a KeyBank branch located in Hilliard, The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting the appraisal presented on behalf of the Hilliard City Schools Board of Education (school board), holding that it was not legal error for the BTA to rely on this appraisal.In the proceedings below, two appraisals were presented, one of behalf of the landowner and building owner (collectively, Appellants), and the other on behalf of the school board. The board of revision adopted Appellants’ appraisal, but the BTA adopted the school board’s appraisal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to the arguments raised by Appellants on appeal, it was not legal error for the BTA to rely on the school board’s appraisal. View "Hilliard City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) remanding this cause to Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) with instructions for the BOR to dismiss the underlying valuation complaint, holding that there was no merit to Appellant’s arguments on appeal.The BTA found that where Appellant's complaint was prepared and filed by a nonlawyer, the complaint constituted the unauthorized practice of law and failed to invoke the BOR’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nonlawyers who are not specified by Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A) are not authorized to file on behalf of a property owner, and therefore, the complaint in this case failed to invoke the BOR’s jurisdiction; and (2) the BTA did not exceed its statutory authority by considering the board of education’s motion to dismiss, nor did the BTA violate Appellant’s right to due process by failing to hold a hearing on the jurisdictional issue. View "Greenway Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund to award Appellant on-duty-percentage disability benefits for injuries he alleged were sustained during the course of his employment, holding that the Fund’s board of trustees did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits.Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus challenging the board’s decision not to award on-duty disability benefits for his injuries. The court of appeals adopted the decision of the magistrate recommending denying the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because some evidence supported the board’s decision, the court of appeals did not err in denying the requested writ. View "State ex rel. Wegman v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

In this case concerning property that was the subject of a 2011 valuation complaint, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the Board of Revision’s (BOR) denial of the property owner’s request for a hearing for tax year 2012, holding that the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction under Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D).Appellant, the owner of the property at issue, filed a 2011 valuation complaint. The BOR issued its decision on the complaint more than ninety days after it was filed, and the matter was not finally resolved until after an appeal to the BTA. The next year, Appellant sought to invoke the BOR’s continuing-complaint jurisdiction for tax year 2012 pursuant to section 5715.19(D). The BOR denied the request, and the BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause to the BOR for a determination of the subject property’s tax-year-2012 value, holding that the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction under the facts of this case. View "Molly Co. v. Cuyaohga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal challenging the Public Utility Commission’s decision to allow Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L) to withdraw and terminate its second electric-security plan (ESP II), holding that the Commission’s approval of DP&L’s third electric-security plan (ESP III) rendered this case moot.The Commission allowed DP&L to withdraw and terminate its ESP II rate plan and service stability rider (SSR) charge. The ESP II rate plan and its SSR charge were then replaced by ESP III, which the Commission approved. Appellant’s appealed the Commission’s order regarding ESP II. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that because there was no remedy that the Court could legally order, the appeal constituted only a request for an advisory ruling, and the controversy was no longer live. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the Industrial Commission and granted Jackson Tube Service Inc.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its order that granted Chad Thompson’s application for an additional award due to the violation of a specific safety requirement (VSRR) and to issue an order denying the VSSR application, holding that there was no evidence to support the commission’s decision to grant the VSSR award.Thompson’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a femur fracture. Thompson also filed an application for a VSSR award. The commission granted the VSSR application and rejected Jackson Tube’s argument that it was impossible to comply with the specific safety requirement. On appeal, Jackson Tube argued that the court of appeals erred when it rejected Jackson Tube’s impossibility defense. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the commission abused its discretion in granting the VSSR award because it relied on speculative testimony regarding the existence of alternative means of performance proved nonexistent and that the evidence demonstrated that Jackson Tube established the defense of impossibility. View "State ex rel. Jackson Tube Service, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

In determining whether John Klein was entitled to continued temporary-total-disability compensation where he voluntarily left his position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, the Supreme Court overruled State ex. Rel. Reitter Stucco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 881 N.E. 2d 861 (Ohio 2008), and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 865 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2007), and applied the longstanding principles of voluntary abandonment to Klein’s claim for temporary-total-disability compensation.On Klein’s request for mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the Industrial Commission of Ohio abused its discretion in determining that Klein voluntarily abandoned his employment at Precision Excavating & Grading Company for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury without determining whether Klein was medically capable of returning to work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the writ of mandamus, holding that when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, he is not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation even if he remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment. View "State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s (PUCO) motion to dismiss LMD Integrated Logistic Services, Inc.’s appeal from a civil forfeiture order, holding that a party appealing an order of the PUCO pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4923.99 is not required to file a notice of appeal with PUCO to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.LMD initiated its appeal in this case by filing its notice of appeal with the court of appeals and serving a copy of that notice on the member of PUCO, in accordance with section 4923.99(D). PUCO, however, argued that the appeal should be dismissed because LMD did not file its notice of appeal with PUCO. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the appellate court did not err in ruling that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked. View "In re LMD Integrated Logistics Services, Inc." on Justia Law