Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relators compelling Respondents - the Ohio Secretary of State, the Medina County Board of Elections, and the City of Medina - to change the ballot language of a local issue on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.In this case arising out of the City's efforts to move the Medina Municipal Court to the Medina County courthouse building and citizen opposition to those efforts, Relators filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to amend the ballot language for Ordinance No. 222-20, as Relators requested. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Relators failed to show that the Secretary of State and the City were proper respondents for the relief they sought; and (2) the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in approving the ballot language. View "State ex rel. Walker v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling with Ohio Department of Commerce and the Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program (collectively, the Department) to approve or deny Fire Rock, Ltd.'s application to expand its marijuana cultivation area, holding that Fire Rock was entitled to the writ.Fire Rock submitted an application requesting approval to expand its Akron-based cultivation facility. When the Department took no action on the expansion request, Fire Rock filed a complaint for writ of mandamus ordering the Department to approve or deny Fire Rock's application. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ, holding (1) Ohio law does not prohibit a cultivator like Fire Rock from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative; (2) the Department had a clear legal duty to act on Fire Rock's application, and Fire Rock had a clear legal right to that relief; and (3) Fire Rock lacked an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Jerone McDougald to compel Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, the public-records custodian at Toledo Correctional Institution, where McDougald was an inmate, to make available for inspection a certain video, holding that Sehlmeyer presented evidence supporting her claim that allowing McDougald to inspect the video would create undue security risks.McDougald send a public-records request to Sehlmeyer asking to inspect video surveillance footage of a use-of-force incident involving him. Sehlmeyer did not provide the video to McDougald. McDougald then filed this original action asking the Supreme Court to compel Sehlmeyer to allow him to inspect the video. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Sehlmeyer did not have a clear legal duty to allow McDougald to inspect the video. View "State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus ordering the Public Employees Retirement Board to transfer Appellant from the "combined" plan in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System to the "traditional" plan, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.After the court of appeals denied the writ, Appellant appealed, asserting six propositions of law sounding in mandamus and in common-law tort. Appellant also filed a motion for oral argument. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the motion for oral argument, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish a clear legal right to relief or a clear legal duty on the part of the Board to provide it; and (2) this Court and the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over Appellant's common-law tort claims. View "State ex rel. Tarrier v. Public Employees Retirement Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the City of Akron and its police chief (collectively, the City) to inform Kimani Ware, the relator in this action, of the cost for copying the public records he sought, holding that Ware was entitled to the writ.Ware, an inmate, sent two letters to the Akron Policy Department requesting various public records. When he did not receive a response Ware filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. After receiving the complaint, the City responded to Ware with two letters. The City noted in an affidavit the total cost for copying the requested records and informed Ware that the records would be sent to him once he paid the requested amount. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) because the City was willing to provide copies of the records once Ware had paid for the copies, a writ compelling the City to provide the records was unnecessary; (2) this Court grants a writ ordering the City to provide the invoices to Ware so he may decide whether to pay for the copies; and (3) Ware was not entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Akron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing Defendant-doctor's convictions on the ground that the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating answers he gave during a medical board investigation, holding that the State may use incriminating answers given by a doctor during a medical board investigation in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the doctor.Defendant was convicted of three third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress statements he had made to the medical board investigator as having been illegally compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a medical license is a property right, the threatened loss of which is a form of coercion that can compromise the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (2) for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of statements made during a medical board investigative interview, the person making the statements must subjectively believe that asserting the privilege against self-incrimination could cause the loss of the person's medical license, and that belief must be objectively reasonable; and (3) Defendant's belief that he could lose his medical license if he refused to truthfully answer questions posed by the medical-board investigator was not objectively reasonable. View "State v. Gideon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) dismissing a complaint against a company that provided submetering services on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims, holding that PUCO inappropriately applied a jurisdictional test of its own making.The PUCO's jurisdiction is provided by statute, and the PUCO generally has jurisdiction over any business that is a public utility. In dismissing the complaint in this case, the PUCO did not look to the statutory scheme to determine whether Nationwide Energy Partners, LLC, the submeterer, was a public utility. Instead, the PUCO used a test set forth in a 1992 PUCO order and recently modified by the PUCO to determine the extent of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the PUCO's jurisdiction is established by statute, not an agency-created test; and (2) therefore, this case is remanded for the PUCO to determine whether it has jurisdiction based upon the jurisdictional statute. View "Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Omni Energy Group, LLC as to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management chief Eric Vendel ordering him to rule upon the validity of objections that were submitted concerning Omni's two saltwater injection well permit applications, holding that Omni was entitled to the writ.When the division chief did not render a decision on Omni's applications Omni filed a complaint against the division, Vendel, and department director Mary Mertz, sought a writ of mandamus compelling them to either issue or deny the permits. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, but instead of ordering Vendel immediately to render a decision on the applications, the Court ordered him to rule upon the validity of objections as required under Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c), holding (1) Omni had a clear legal right to, and Vendel had a clear legal duty to provide, a ruling on the validity of objections submitted against the applications; and (2) Omni did not suggest a basis for granting a writ of mandamus as to the division or to Mertz. View "State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, LLC v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the South Euclid Municipal Court asking the Supreme Court to compel the City of South Euclid to comply with a funding order issued by the municipal court judge, holding that the judge was not entitled to mandamus relief.The judge in this case requested that the City allocate thirty percent more money than allocated for the previous year for the municipal court's 2019 budget. The court then issued a funding order directing the city council to allocate the full requested amount. The city council did not give the court the full amount. The municipal court subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the city to comply with the judge's funding order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the municipal court failed to establish its entitlement to a writ. View "State ex rel. Williams-Byers v. City of South Euclid" on Justia Law

In this original action involving a dispute between two judges who sit on the Sandusky County Court the Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge John Kolesar's judgment entry vacating Judge Mary Elizabeth Fiser's judgment entries granting pay raises to certain personnel, holding that Judge Kolesar's vacating entry arose from an exercise of judicial power that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to exercise.Shortly after Judge Fiser issued entries granting pay raises to court personnel Judge Kolesar, who serves as the court's administrative judge, issued a judgment entry vacating Judge Fiser's entries and forbidding pay raises and the expenditure of court resources that did not have his approval. Judge Fiser sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Kolesar from enforcing his entry, and Judge Kolesar sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge Fiser from making future entries that infringe on his powers as administrative judge. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge Kolesar's vacating entry, holding that Judge Kolesar patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue his vacating entry. View "State ex rel. Fiser v. Kolesar" on Justia Law