Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Industrial Commission to vacate its orders rejecting a proposed settlement between Employee and Employer, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Employee suffered a work-related injury, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed. Employee applied for an award of additional compensation due to Employer's alleged violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs). Employer and Employee subsequently submitted a proposed settlement for approval by the Commission. A staff hearing officer rejected the settlement as neither fair nor equitable and then granted Employee's request for a VSSR award. Employer sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to vacate its orders and approve the settlement, but the court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer's three propositions of law are rejected. View "State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking an injunction halting their execution and a declaration that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's (DRC) written execution protocol was invalid, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs were two condemned inmates who challenged the DRC's written execution protocol setting forth the specific process by which DRC personnel are to carry out death sentences by lethal injection. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued (1) DRC may adopt the execution protocol only by following the procedures for promulgating it as an administrative rule, in accordance with Ohio Rev. Code 111.15(B); and (2) until these procedures were followed, the protocol was invalid and could not be used to carry out death sentences. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the execution protocol was neither a rule having a general and uniform application nor an internal management rule; and (2) therefore, the protocol was not subject to the rule-making requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 111.15. View "O'Neal v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) granting certification to FirstEnergy Advisors, a competitive retail electric service provider, holding that the order in this case fell short of the requirement set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09 that PUCO file "findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions arrived at."Two organizations in this case intervened in the PUCO proceedings and objected to the certification. Despite the objections, PUCO granted the certification request and issued a "barebones" order offering no explanation as to how FirstEnergy Advisors met the applicable legal requirements. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO's certification decision and remanded the matter to PUCO for further proceedings, holding that PUCO's order violated action 4903.09 because it failed to explain the reasoning and factual grounds for granting FirstEnergy Advisors' application. View "In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Electric Service Power Broker & Aggregator" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting temporary total disability (TTD) compensation to Bridget Moss and then granted a limited writ, holding that the Commissioner must reconsider this case under the proper standard, as articulated in this opinion.Moss's employer, Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. (Ryan) sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order and deny TTD compensation because Moss had refused an offer of alternative employment within her medical restrictions. The Tenth District granted the writ. At issue on appeal was whether the Commission may award TTD compensation if an employee refuses an offer of alternative employment in good faith based on family circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth district's judgment and granted a limited writ, holding that the Commission's orders exhibited confusion about the correct standard under which the employer's good faith standard was to be determined. View "State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal of a decision of the Ohio State Board of Education, holding that the state board's final determination that a charter school must repay approximately $60 million in excess funding could not be appealed under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119.In 2016, the Ohio Department of Education determined that the state had overpaid the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), formerly Ohio's largest charter school, approximately $60 million based on a review of the school's enrollment data. ECOT appealed under Ohio Rev. Code 3314.08(K)(2)(b), which allows a charter school to appeal such a decision to the board of education for an informal hearing. The state board confirmed the department of education's determination. At issue was whether ECOT could appeal the board of education's "final" decision where section 3314.08(K)(2)(d) provides that any decision made by the board on such an appeal is final. The Supreme Court concluded that ECOT had no right to appeal the decision under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119. View "Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot the writ of mandamus sought by Malcolm and Mary Wood seeking to compel Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals and its members (collectively, the zoning board) to stay their approval of a development plan and hear their appeals, holding that subsequent events had rendered the case moot.After the planning commission approved a proposed real estate development in Rocky River the Woods, who lived next to the site, filed an appeal. The zoning board declared the notice of appeal void on the grounds that the appeal was not completed or perfected within a timely fashion. The Woods subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the construction of the project was substantially underway. View "State ex rel. Wood v. Rocky River" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board granting Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to construct, operate, and maintain a natural-gas pipeline, holding that the Board's decision was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show a mistake or willful disregard of duty.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) assuming without deciding that the Board misapplied its filing requirements, the error was harmless; (2) the Board did not err in determining that Duke's proposal met the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A)(1); (3) the Board properly accounted for the interest of safety in evaluating Duke's proposal; (4) the Board did not err by not requiring Duke to evaluate the pipeline's impact against the City of Blue Ash's most recent comprehensive plan; (5) the Board did not err in evaluating the pipeline's estimated tax benefits; and (6) the Board did not deprive Blue Ash of due process of law. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allowing a gas company to charge its customers higher rates, holding that the PUCO erred by approving the rate increase.At issue was whether Suburban Natural Gas Company's customers must pay for a 4.9-mile extension of the company's pipeline. The PUCO determined that the pipeline extension met the "used-and-useful" test as of a specified date and approved the rate increase. See Ohio Rev. Code 4909.15(A)(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the PUCO looked beyond whether the entire 4.9-mile extension was used and useful on the applicable date and considered whether it was a prudent investment because it might prove useful in the future; and (2) therefore, the PUCO erred in evaluating the rate increase. View "In re Application of Suburban Natural Gas Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Relators in this expedited election case to bar the Clark County Board of Elections from placing a referendum on the November 2021 election ballot, holding that Relators were not entitled to the writ.Hillside Creek Farms filed an application to rezone its forty-two-acre parcel of real property from agricultural and rural residential to a Planned District-Residential classification. After the Clark County Board of County Commissioners approved the amended rezoning application a petition was filed requesting a ballot referendum on the Hillside rezoning resolution. Relators, including Hillside, filed a protest against the zoning-referendum petition. The denied the protest and placed the referendum on the November ballot. The Supreme Court denied Relators' requested writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections' decision to approve the zoning referendum for placement on the ballot was authorized by law. View "Hillside Creek Farms v. Clark County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus sought by Relators, four City of Cincinnati electors, to compel changes to ballot language for a proposed amendment to the Cincinnati City Charter, holding that Relators showed that they were entitled to the writ in part.At issue was an initiative petition proposing amendments to the Cincinnati City Charter. The Hamilton County Board of Elections certified ballot language to which Relators objected. Relators filed this original action against the Board and its members alleging that the certified ballot language misrepresented the proposed amendment and omitted material information. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part and denied it in all other respects, holding that Relators showed that the Board abused its discretion in preparing and certifying only certain ballot language for the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. Rhoads v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law