Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

L.R. was the biological mother of six children, including her youngest children, Z.R. L.R.’s five older children were adjudicated dependent and neglected in the Summit County Juvenile Court, and L.R. never regained custody of those children. After L.R. gave birth to Z.R., Summit County Children Services (SCCS) filed a complaint in Summit Count Juvenile Court alleging that Z.R. was a dependent child. L.R. moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was combined with a motion to transfer the cases of Z.R.’s siblings to the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. The Summit County Juvenile Court denied the motion to dismiss, found Z.R. to be a dependent child, and transferred Z.R.’s case to Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. The appellate court reversed, concluding that SCCS had failed to establish proper venue in the Summit County Juvenile Court because Z.R.’s residence and alleged dependency occurred solely in Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute and rule governing venue do not control the jurisdiction of a juvenile court and that it is within a juvenile court’s sound discretion to remedy an alleged venue defect by transferring a case to a proper venue. View "In re Z.R." on Justia Law

The grandfather of J.B., filed a complaint for custody of J.B. V.K.B., J.B.’s mother, had legal custody over J.B. Sandusky County Juvenile Court Judge Bradley Smith allowed the complaint to proceed. Judge Smith subsequently recused himself from the case and retired judge David Allan Basinski was appointed in his place. Judge Basinski dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction but ordered V.K.B. to provide J.B.’s grandfather with an address he might use to contact J.B. V.K.B. filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition against Judge Smith and the the juvenile court after Judge Smith recused himself but before Judge Basinski dismissed the case. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition and (1) ordered the juvenile court to rescind the order that V.K.B. provide J.B.’s grandfather with an address, as the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to grant that form of relief; and (2) instructed the juvenile court to rescind Judge Basinski’s order to the child-support-enforcement agency, as the absence of jurisdiction was patent and unambiguous in this case. The Court did not grant the writ against Smith because he recused himself from the case before this action was filed. View "V.K.B. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant was found to have knowingly and voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to her child and to have agreed that it was in her child’s best interest that permanent custody be granted to the state. Four days after the child’s adoption by his foster family was finalized, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal, also determining that there was no authority for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights after the expiration of the deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due process does not entitle a parent whose parental rights have been terminated the right to a delayed appeal from the judgment of termination. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision.View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

In this divorce action, the trial court concluded that Husband’s unvested military benefits could not be divided because the military retirement benefits were a “mere expectancy.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no need to decide whether unvested pension benefits were a marital asset because there was insufficient evidence regarding Husband’s retirement benefits to require division of the asset. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the unvested military retirement benefits earned during the marriage fell within the definition of marital property in Ohio Rev. Code 3105.171(A)(3)(a) and must be considered for division under section 3105.171(C); and (2) the trial court had enough information in this case to make an equitable division of the benefits. Remanded.View "Daniel v. Daniel" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for felonious assault and domestic violence. During a bench trial, the victim testified that Defendant was her boyfriend and had lived with her for about a year. The trial court found Defendant not guilty of felonious assault but guilty of attempted felonious assault and domestic violence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversed his conviction for domestic violence, ruling that the state must prove the victim and Defendant shared living expenses in order to convict Defendant of domestic violence. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the state proved that the victim was a family or household member, Defendant’s crime fell within the purview of the domestic violence statute. View "State v. McGlothan" on Justia Law

Mother obtained sole custody of Child in a judgment issued by the juvenile court in 2009. Mother subsequently moved to Arizona with Child and made Arizona their permanent home. In 2012, while Mother left Child temporarily with her mother, Child's paternal grandfather filed a motion for emergency temporary custody of Child, which the juvenile court granted. Mother filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, contending that the Ohio court lacked jurisdiction because she and Child were residents of Arizona. The court of appeals dismissed the case after concluding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and that Mother had an adequate remedy by way of appeal if the juvenile court erred in its rulings. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ of prohibition, holding (1) if Mother could prove the allegations in her complaint, the juvenile court failed to follow the statute that creates its jurisdiction over Child; and (2) appeal was not an adequate remedy in this case because it was neither "complete," "beneficial," nor "speedy." Remanded. View "State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Wife was granted a domestic-violence civil protection order (CPO) against Husband. The trial court later dismissed the case and dissolved the CPO. Thereafter, Husband filed an application to expunge and seal the record of the CPO proceedings. The trial court denied the application. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked statutory authority to expunge the CPO records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in accordance with Pepper Pike v. Doe, a trial court has the inherent authority to grant an application to expunge and seal a record pertaining to a dissolved CPO in an adult proceeding when unusual and exceptional circumstances exist. View "Schussheim v. Schussheim" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Morrow and Sherri Becker had two children. Morrow was ordered to pay $2,198 in child support per month. Morrow later moved to modify his child support payment. A magistrate determined that Morrow would owe $2,085 in child support per month but concluded that since the difference between that amount and the amount Morrow was currently paying was less than ten percent, Morrow's child support obligation would not be reduced. Morrow appealed, challenging the trial court's decision to include certain employer-paid benefits, such as a company car and cell phone, in Morrow's gross income to calculated his child support obligation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in including the employer-paid benefits in Morrow's gross income when determining whether to modify Morrow's child support obligations. View "Morrow v. Becker" on Justia Law

Appellant filed writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Appellee, a county court of common pleas judge, from proceeding in an adoption case. In the alternative, Appellant sought the writs to require the judge to permit Appellant to appear as a party in the case. The court of appeals denied the requested relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly denied the request for extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus, holding (1) the judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the underlying adoption case; (2) Appellant's claims were not cognizable in an extraordinary-writ case; and (3) the fact that Appellant's attempts thus far to raise these issues on appeal had been unsuccessful did not entitle her to the requested extraordinary relief. View "State ex rel. Caskey v. Gano" on Justia Law