Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In proceedings involving divorce and domestic-violence-civil-protection-order (DVCPO) cases that had been pending for more than five years the Supreme Court denied M.D.'s motion to enforce this Court's writ of procedendo but granted his alternative request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D. had persistently engaged in frivolous conduct in the Supreme Court without reasonable cause.Previously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted M.D. a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Reeve Kelsey to rule on pending motions and to proceed promptly to final hearings in the underlying cases. M.D. moved to enforce the writ or, alternatively, to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the motion to enforce but granted M.D.'s request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Rule 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D.'s filings were calculated attempts to prevent Judge Kelsey's compliance with the previously-issued writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition against the Logan County Common Pleas Court and Judge Natasha Kennedy, a judge of the Logan County Common Pleas Court, Family Court Division, holding that Relators, Josephine Davis, John Doe, and Jane Doe, were entitled to the writ.Davis, the biological mother of H.P., consented to the placement of care, custody, and control over H.P. to John and Jane Doe for purposes of adoption. The Does then filed an adoption petition for H.P. Thereafter, Kaidin Whitrock, H.P.'s biological father, filed a complaint to allocate parental rights and responsibilities. The probate court determined that Whitrock's consent to the adoption was not required under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(B)(1) because he failed to register as the putative father. The district court reversed, but the Supreme Court reversed. At issue was whether Judge Kennedy could continue to exercise juvenile court jurisdiction without interfering with the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the probate court. The Supreme Court granted Relators' requested writ of prohibition, holding that Judge Kennedy may not continue to exercise jurisdiction over Whitrock's petition to allocate parental rights and his request for a temporary order of parenting time. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Deena Calabrese from exercising jurisdiction in the underlying matter brought to enforce a divorce decree, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.In 2016, the divorce decree at issue was entered dissolving the marriage of Neil and Erica Heyside. Erica later sued Neil in the general division of the common pleas court alleging that Neil owed her thousands of dollars in spousal support and seeking to enforce the property division under the decree. Neil filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Neil then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition seeking to have Judge Calabrese barred from continuing to exercise judicial power over Erica's lawsuit. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the general division of the common pleas court did not patently or unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Erica's lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Karen Michael held an equitable lien on David Miller's Ram Sensors, Inc. stock shares securing David's current obligation to pay monthly spousal support to Karen, holding that an equitable lien did not exist on the stock to secure the current obligation.When Karen and David divorced, the separation agreement incorporated into their final judgment entry of divorce provided that David would pay Karen $15,000 per month in spousal support for twenty years. Karen agreed to relinquish all rights she may have had in Ram Sensors, and David agreed to secure his spousal support obligations. Later, Karen filed a postdecree pleading against David and Cody seeking a declaration that David's ownership of the Ram Sensors stock secured his obligations under the divorce decree and requesting that the court order Cody Miller, the parties' son, to transfer David's stock to her. The court granted partial summary judgment to Karen, concluding that she held a perfected lien in the Ram Sensors stock and an equitable lien on the stock. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the separation agreement and erred when it recognized an equitable lien securing David's current support obligation. View "Michael v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding to the probate court this matter involving a biological father (K.W.), who wanted to parent his child but did not preserve his right to do so under Ohio's adoption laws, holding that K.W. was not entitled to relief.Appellants, a married couple, filed a petition for legal adoption of H.P., K.W.'s biological child. The probate court determined that the adoption could proceed without K.W.'s consent because K.W. had failed to register with the putative father registry within fifteen days after H.P.'s birth. The court of appeals remanded the matter, holding that the probate correctly determined that K.W.'s consent to the adoption was not necessary but that K.W. had a "second status" as the biological father of H.P. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that K.W. could not be a legal father to H.P. under the plain language of the applicable statutes. View "In re Adoption of H.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking an order prohibiting the general division judge from exercising further authority over some of the claims in the underlying case, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint.Appellant brought an action against the estate of his ex-wife in the general division of the court of common pleas seeking to recover funds to which Appellant claimed he was entitled under the former spouses' separation agreement. The state filed a counterclaim against Appellant. The trial court ruled (1) Appellant was entitled to $15,353, but there were genuine issues that precluded summary judgment on his remaining claims; and (2) the estate was entitled to partial summary judgment on its counterclaims. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the judge from taking further action on the estate's counterclaim. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the general division did not patently or unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction, and Appellant had an adequate legal remedy by way of direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of three children to the Butler County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division (the agency), holding that the current challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata.The dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case occurred more than ninety days after the filing of complaints for temporary custody. The juvenile court then granted permanent custody to the agency. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency because the temporary-custody judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if no motion to dismiss has been filed, under the plain language of former Ohio Rev. Code 2151.35(B)(1), the juvenile court is required to dismiss the complaint after ninety days; (2) a juvenile court's failure to dismiss the complaint is an error in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, not one that deprives the court of jurisdiction; and (3) the judgments granting temporary custody of the children to the agency were valid, and the parents' challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. View "In re K.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking a writ of procedendo against the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of procedendo.M.D., the defendant in a divorce case, commenced this procedendo action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of procedendo compelling the domestic relations court to proceed in the divorce case and a domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) case, both of which had been pending since May 31, 2017. The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the divorce and DVCPO cases far exceeded the time frames stated in the guidelines set by the Rules of Superintendence for the Court of Ohio. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of procedendo to compel Franklin County Probate Court Judge Jeffrey Mackey to lift a stay in a probate case and proceed with Relators' adoption petition, holding that the court abused its discretion by allowing the adoption proceeding to languish in this case.In July 2019, Relators filed a petition to adopt Z.W.D., identifying K.T. as the minor child's biological mother. After the Supreme Court held in 2020 that indigent parents have a constitutional right to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court K.T. asked the probate court magistrate to appoint counsel to represent her because she was indigent. The probate court stayed the matter and then, in October 2021, determined that K.T. was indigent. In April 2022, Relators filed this complaint alleging that the probate court's stay to allow K.T. to apply for indigent representation was unreasonable and unconscionable. The Supreme Court granted a writ and ordered the probate court to appoint counsel for K.T. within thirty days of this decision, holding that the probate court should take all reasonable steps to identify potential counsel. View "State ex rel. T.B. v. Mackey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition against Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).Appellant, a defendant in a divorce case pending before Judge Paschke, brought this petition alleging that Judge Paschke's procedure for issuing orders in his case violated Civ.R. 53 and seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the judge from issuing entires in violation of Civ.R. 53. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a valid claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the petition was based on an alleged error in Judge Paschke's exercise of jurisdiction and not a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, prohibition was not an appropriate remedy. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke" on Justia Law