Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.

Defendants-Appellants Dantae Chambliss, James Bennett and Travis Saunders were indicted on drug related offenses. Each defendant retained his own attorney, plead not guilty, and filed requests for discovery. After defendants' motions for separate trials were denied, they filed motions to continue based on the fact that they had not yet received the search warrant affidavit despite repeated requests. The parties arrived at a plea bargain and defendants plead guilty, but the trial court refused to accept the plea. The trial court vacated the pleas, set trial, and granted a motion to unseal the search warrant affidavit. At a hearing at trial, it became apparent that the defense attorneys had not received the search warrant affidavit, and claimed that if they were required to proceed at trial without the necessary information, they would be ineffective as counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The trial court removed all three retained counsel, remanded the defendants to the custody of the sheriff, and ordered the defendants to retain new counsel and be ready for trial in two weeks' time. The defendants retained new counsel, and filed motions with the court of appeals to stay execution of the trial court's order. On appeal, the county court of appeals vacated the trial, and concluded that the removal of retained counsel was not a final and appealable order. Accordingly the court dismissed the appeal as to that issue. This appeal was filed to decide whether the denial of retained counsel is an appealable order. The Supreme Court noted the quandary left by the county appellate court by its decision: "[b]y asserting that this is not a final, appealable orderâ¦the state was left in a position where, should it obtain a conviction at trial, that conviction would be subject to automatic reversal. Further, defendants could not lose, since they would either win the case or it would be reversed due to structural error. ⦠this court's decision in State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese warranted a conclusion that the order removing appellants' retained counsel was not a final, appealable order. We not conclude that it is a final, appealable order."