Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Barker pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully comply with the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C) when the judge told Barker that by entering the plea he was giving up the "right to call witnesses to speak on his behalf." The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's admonition to Barker was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the language employed by the trial court while addressing Barker was a reasonable explanation of Barker's right to compulsory process, and (2) other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving an alleged ambiguity such as the one here during the oral colloquy. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Thomas Dunlap was convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the age of thirteen, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating obscene matter to juveniles. The court sentenced Dunlap to two years in prison and found Dunlap to be a tier three sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (S.B. 10). Dunlap appealed the section 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification, arguing that (1) section 2907.05(A)(4) requires a men rea element of recklessness, and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to offenses committed before its effective date violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that section 2907.05(A)(4) requires no precise culpable state of mind. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the element of sexual contact in a section 2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose, but the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth the required mens rea; and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Remanded. View "State v. Dunlap" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Duane Short was found guilty of the aggravated murders of his wife and another man and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Short's judgments of conviction and sentence of death, holding (1) Short's contention that his waiver of the right to present evidence in the penalty phase was not knowing and voluntary and hence was invalid was overruled; (2) the trial court did not violate Short's right to present mitigating evidence by denying Short's request to present mitigating evidence to the judge alone after the penalty phase; (3) the trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing to inquire into Short's claim that the prosecutor's office unconstitutionally interfered with defense counsel's ability to interview state witnesses before trial; (4) Short did not establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) Short's claims attacking the constitutionality of Ohio's death penalty statutes were overruled; and (6) upon an independent review of Short's death sentence, the evidence supported the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was proportionate to those affirmed in similar cases. View "State v. Short" on Justia Law

George Williams pleaded guilty to sexual contact with a minor. Williams subsequently moved to be sentenced under the version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950 in effect at the time he committed the offense. The trial court denied the motion. At his sentencing hearing, Williams was informed he would be designated a tier II sex offender under the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2950, otherwise known as S.B. 10. On appeal, Williams argued that the provisions of S.B. 10 could not constitutionally be applied to a defendant whose offense occurred before the major changes to the law took effect. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that S.B. 10, as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violated the provision of the Ohio Constitution prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting retroactive laws. Remanded. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellee Timothy Rhodes mailed a public records request to the police department of the city of New Philadelphia requesting certain reel-to-reel tape recordings made by the police dispatch department. The department, however, had disposed of the recordings. Rhodes filed a complaint for civil forfeiture under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(B) after finding that the police department had unlawfully erased the records without the requisite approval. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhodes was actually aggrieved by the violations. At trial, the jury found that Rhodes had not been aggrieved by the unauthorized disposition of the requested public records. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have granted the portion of Rhodes's motion for summary judgment claiming he was an aggrieved party. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that a party is not aggrieved by the destruction of a record when the party's objective in requesting the record is not to obtain the record but to seek a forfeiture for the wrongful destruction of the record. View "Rhodes v. New Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Adkins was convicted of a violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OVI). The trial court found that pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) Adkins had been convicted of five or more OVI offenses within the previous 20 years, including a prior juvenile adjudication, making his conviction for an OVI a fourth-degree felony. Pursuant to R.C. 2901.08, effective January 1, 1996, a prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Adkins appealed, contending that his juvenile adjudication, which occurred before the effective date of Ohio Rev. Code 2901.08, should not be considered a prior conviction and that an application of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) to his case would require an unconstitutional retrospective application of Ohio Rev. Code 2901.08. The appellate court affirmed Adkins's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2901.18 is applied prospectively and is not unconstitutionally retroactive. View "State v. Adkins" on Justia Law

After being found guilty of domestic violence, appellant Mor Mbodji appealed, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the domestic-violence complaint and affidavit filed by appellant's wife were not reviewed by a reviewing official pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09. The court of appeals held the trial court had jurisdiction despite lack of review and later denied a motion for reconsideration. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a complaint that meets the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 3 invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court; (2) when a complaint and affidavit are signed by a private citizen but are not reviewed by a reviewing official before filing pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09, the defect is not jurisdictional but may be the subject of a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion before trial; and (3) because a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion was not filed in this case, the procedural defect was waived by appellant. View "State v. Mbodji" on Justia Law

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

Appellee Lynn was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary. The indictment contained a clerical error naming the underlying offense as theft. During the trial the trial court denied the state's request to amend the indictment to remove the word 'theft.' At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of assault and theft. The jury found Lynn guilty of aggravated burglary, concluding Lynn had committed the underlying offense of assault but had not committed the underlying offense of theft. Lynn argued that once the indictment stated the underlying offense as theft, a jury instruction on assault or any other predicate offense was error. The court of appeals held the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that when an aggravated burglary indictment incorrectly states the underlying criminal offense, the trial court does not violate defendant's due process rights by conforming the jury instructions to the evidence presented at trial and instructing the jury on the correct underlying offense.

Appellee Joseph Wilson was tried before a jury and found guilty on three counts of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping. Wilson appealed, arguing the three offenses for which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar import and should have been merged into one offense for sentencing. The court of appeals held that kidnapping and felonious assault were allied offenses and kidnapping and aggravated robbery were allied offenses. The court vacated Wilson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the state could elect which of the allied offenses it wanted to pursue for sentencing. The state appealed, arguing the scope of a resentencing judge's authority upon a remand to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error is limited to accepting the state's election among allied offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or offenses to pursue. The Court also held res judicata does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that arise at the new sentencing hearing.