Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was indicted on twelve counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug. Appellant moved for intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC). The trial court ordered an intervention plan, and Appellant pled guilty to the charges, pending successful completion of her intervention program. After Appellant successfully completed the intervention program, the trial court dismissed the twelve pending charges against her. Appellant then filed an application for sealing of her record after dismissal of the proceedings. The trial court denied Appellant's application. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court has discretion to determine that successful completion of the ILC program entitles the defendant to immediate sealing of his or her record under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting period set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A)(1). View "State v. Niesen-Pennycuff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Maxwell White was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. White subsequently obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence him. Before the federal court invalidated White's death sentence but after White killed the trooper, the Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which requires the trial court, when resentencing a capital offender whose death sentence has been set aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death may be a penalty to be considered by the jury. The trial court held it could not retroactively apply the statute in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death sentence. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar the statute's retroactive application in cases where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment but the death sentence was set aside after its enactment; (2) the statute's application in this case does not violate the ex post facto clause; and (3) retroactive application of the statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Wayne Powell of the aggravated murder of four victims and of aggravated arson. The jury recommended the sentence of death for the aggravated murder of the victims. The trial court accepted those recommendations and sentenced Powell accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed Powell's convictions and sentences of death, finding no reversible error regarding (1) any pretrial and trial issues; (2) any penalty-phase issues; or (3) counsel's effectiveness during both phases of the trial. In addition, the court held that because Powell received a fair trial, the doctrine of cumulative error was not applicable to the present case, and Powell's death sentence was appropriate and proportionate. View "State v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant Carl Morris was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape involving a minor. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, in violation of Ohio R. Evid. 404(B). A divided appellate court vacated the conviction, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted other-acts testimony, that the court's error was not harmless, and that the error materially prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an appellate court is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when considering an assignment of error that claims the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, in violation of Rule 404(B); and (2) the appellate court erred when it applied a de novo standard of review to this matter. Remanded. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Donald Eafford guilty of permitting drug abuse and possession of cocaine. The court of appeals vacated Eafford's felony sentence for possession of cocaine and remanded for resentencing, holding that Eafford was convicted only of misdemeanor possession of drugs because the jury-verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in imposing sentence, as (1) the indictment charged Eafford with possession of cocaine, and the least degree of that offense is a felony of the fifth degree; (2) the evidence presented at trial proved Eafford possessed cocaine; (3) the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Eafford guilty only if it found the drug involved to be cocaine; and (4) the jury, which found Eafford guilty as charged in the indictment, thus found him guilty of possession of cocaine as a felony. . View "State v. Eafford" on Justia Law

Appellant Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of aggravated sexual assault. Lloyd subsequently moved to Ohio. Lloyd was later convicted of several charges relating to his failure to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense for which Appellant was convicted in Texas was a sexually oriented offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio offense, and therefore, Appellant's offense triggered a duty to register in Ohio; but (2) because the State failed to prove that at the time Appellant moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, Appellant's convictions must be vacated. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two criminal cases against Mario Harris. In Harris I, Harris pleaded guilty to two offenses with forfeiture specifications. After the trial court imposed a sentence, Harris filed a motion for resentencing, which the court denied. The appellate court held that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion was not a final, appealable order because the sentencing court had failed to include the terms of forfeiture in the judgment of conviction. In Harris II, Harris pled guilty to an offense with an automobile-forfeiture specification. The trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered the forfeiture. The court denied Harris's subsequent motion for resentencing. The appellate court held that the sentence was void because the trial court had failed to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of Harris's sentence. The Supreme Court consdoliated the cases and held (1) a journal entry of conviction need not include a related forfeiture in order to be a final appealable order; and (2) when a trial court fails to impose a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of an offender's sentence, that part of the sentence is void, and resentencing is limited to the imposition of the statutorily mandated term. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellee Tracy Davis was indicted under Ohio Rev. Code 2921.04(B) for witness intimidation based on a threat he made to his ex-wife after police began investigating the underlying crime but before any charges had been filed. Section 2921.04(B) prohibits the intimidation of a person who observes a crime after the initiation of proceedings flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice. The trial court convicted Davis for witness intimidation. The court of appeals reversed, finding that no "action or proceeding" existed at the time of the threat, and therefore, the victim of the threat was not a witness under section 2921.04(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that insufficient evidence existed to convict Davis for witness intimidation based on his threat to his ex-wife because a police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice and does not invoke the protection of section 2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant Roland Nickleson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) notwithstanding Nickleson's claims, his sentencing entry was a final, appealable order because it contained a full resolution of all the counts of his indictment for which there were convictions; and (2) Nickleson had an adequate remedy by appeal from his sentencing entry to raise his other claims contesting the validity of the indictment, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. View "State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison. View "State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law