Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this certified conflict, the Supreme Court considered whether a trial court's failure to impose the statutorily mandated fine required by Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(E)(1)(a) and 2929.18(B)(1) when no affidavit of indigency has been filed with the court prior to the trial court's journal entry of sentencing renders void the part of the sentence waiving the fine. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in resolving the certified conflict, holding that a trial court's failure to impose the required fine under these circumstances renders void the part of the sentence waiving the fine, and that resentencing of the offender is limited to the imposition of the mandatory fine. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a certified conflict between the fifth and second district courts of appeals on whether res judicata bars a criminal defendant from arguing that his plea is void due to an earlier postrelease-control sentencing error when the defendant has entered a plea of guilty to escape. The Supreme Court held that if a trial court improperly sentences a defendant to a term of postrelease control and the defendant subsequently pleads guilty to violating the terms of that postrelease control, the defendant is not barred by principles of res judicata from collaterally attacking his conviction as void. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the fifth district court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to escape on the theory that he had never been legally placed on postrelease control. View "State v. Billiter" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with one count of domestic violence. The domestic-violence charge was enhanced to a third-degree felony under the statute applicable to third-time offenders. A jury found Appellant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's domestic-violence conviction but as a fourth-degree rather than a third-degree felony because the state had not presented evidence of at least two prior domestic-violence convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while Ohio Rev. Code 2945.75(B)(1) permits the state to prove a prior conviction by submitting a judgment entry of the conviction, the statute does not restrict the manner of proof to that method alone; (2) when the state chooses to prove a prior conviction by using a judgment entry, that entry must comply with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C); (3) the appellate court in this case was correct in holding that the state proved only one, not two, prior convictions, and therefore the offense may be elevated only to a fourth-degree felony; but (4) the court of appeals was incorrect in holding that compliance with Rule 32(C) was not a prerequisite to proving a prior offense for purposes of increasing a subsequent charge. View "State v. Gwen" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder and tampering with the evidence. The trial court, however, granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated-burglary count. The Supreme Court accepted Appellant's appeal to review two questions of law: (1) does a person have standing to object under the fourth Amendment to the retention of a DNA profile by the state and its use in a subsequent criminal investigation when the profile was lawfully created during a previous criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted of the crime; and (2) does the state have the authority to retain a DNA profile that was created during a criminal investigation and use that profile in a subsequent investigation, when the person was acquitted of any crime following the first investigation? The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a person does not have standing to object to the retention of his or her DNA profile or the profile's use in a subsequent criminal investigation; and (2) the state is authorized to retain the DNA profile and to use it in a subsequent investigation even though the profile was obtained from a sample taken during the investigation of the crime of which the person was acquitted. View "State v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of felonious assault, aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-offender specifications. The court imposed a blended sentence of at least two years of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a stayed adult sentence of three years. Near the end of his sentence, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the stayed adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the stayed adult sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional; but (2) a juvenile court does not have the authority to impose criminal punishment, including post-release control, after the delinquent child turns twenty-one, and because the juvenile court imposed the adult sentence and added postrelease control after J.V. turned twenty-one, the court acted outside of its jurisdiction. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an indigent parent whose sentence for civil contempt at a previous hearing for failure to pay child support was suspended on condition that he comply with his child-support obligations for a year, has a right to appointed counsel at a subsequent hearing on a motion to impose the suspended sentence due to noncompliance with the conditions. The court of appeals (1) concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply at the hearing, as it was civil in nature, and (2) declined to create a categorical rule that indigent parties previously represented by counsel at a contempt hearing have a due process right to appointed counsel at later purge hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because a purge hearing does not amount to a new contempt proceeding, a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has purged himself of civil contempt is a civil proceeding; and (2) the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions do not guarantee an indigent parent the right to appointed counsel at a civil-contempt purge hearing. View "Liming v. Damos" on Justia Law

Defendant shot Ulysses Altizer. At issue on appeal was Ohio Rev. Code 2941.146, which states that if a defendant fires shots "from a motor vehicle," he is subject to a mandatory, five-year prison term. During trial, the prosecution stated to the jury that Defendant did not have to be in the vehicle for the specification to apply. The jury convicted Defendant on two counts of felonious assault with two firearm specifications each, including the specification set forth in section 2941.146. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; and (2) section 2941.146 covered Defendant's conduct since the statute did not limit its application to persons engaged in proscribed activity inside a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) section 2941.146 is not applicable when a defendant fires a weapon while standing with both feet planted on the ground with no substantial physical connection with a motor vehicle; and (2) therefore, the statute did not apply to Defendant, who discharged his weapon while standing outside his vehicle. View "State v. Swidas" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals affirming a trial court's judgment granting a motion to suppress. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to suppress after it determined that an officer knowingly and intentionally made false statements in his search-warrant affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court's ruling, holding (1) the officer's statements in his testimony did not amount to his knowingly and intentionally including false information in his search-warrant affidavit; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in its judgment. Remanded for a new suppression hearing. View "State v. Dibble" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a juvenile has a statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court. The juvenile in this case was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the police sergeant violated Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 in obtaining a written statement before giving the juvenile an opportunity to obtain counsel. The appellate court rejected the juvenile's claim, concluding that a juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint, and because no complaint had been filed against the juvenile at the time he was interrogated and gave the written statement, section 2151.352 did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 2151.352, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the juvenile court; and (2) thus, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant to section 2151.352 attaches when the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is properly invoked. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Appellant bound the Portage County prosecuting attorney regarding his prosecution of Appellant for crimes that Appellant committed wholly in Portage County. The trial court overruled Defendant's motion to enforce the plea agreement, finding that Defendant failed to prove that the Portage County prosecuting attorney, who was not a party to the agreement, authorized anyone in Summit County to negotiate or contract on his behalf. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county prosecuting attorney does not have authority to enter into a plea agreement on behalf of the state for crimes committed wholly outside the county in which the prosecuting attorney has been elected; and (2) because the Portage County prosecuting attorney had not granted the Summit County prosecuting attorney authority to bind him as to the prosecuting of Defendant for crimes committed in Portage County, the plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Defendant did not preclude the Portage County prosecuting attorney from prosecuting Defendant for crimes that he committed wholly in Portage County or from asking for consecutive sentences. View "State v. Billingsley" on Justia Law