Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was Appellant’s failure to provide notice of a change of residence address. Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who was indicted for violating the address-notification requirements of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA) before State v. Bodyke was decided. Bodyke made the requirements of the AWA inapplicable to offenders such as Appellant. In addition, Appellant was charged with tampering with records because he filed an address-verification form with false information. The form was filed with a sheriff under the mistaken belief that it was required. Appellant pleaded guilty to the charges. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the charges against Appellant were based upon violations of the AWA, which, pursuant to Bodyke, did not apply to Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bodyke does not require the vacation of convictions where the conduct at issue was a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2950.05 both as it exists under the AWA and as it existed under Megan's law; and (2) regardless of whether a person has a duty to file an address-verification form, filing a form containing false information with the intent to defraud can be a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2913.42. View "State v. Brunning" on Justia Law

Appellee committed an act on September 1, 2007 that, if committed by an adult, would constitute rape. On May 19, 2010, the juvenile court classified Appellee as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10. Appellee appealed, asserting that he should not be classified as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his offense before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute. The First District Court of Appeals agreed and reversed. Noting, however, that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered by stating that S.B. 10's classification, registration, and community-notification provisions may not be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007 repeal of Megan's Law and the January 1, 2008 effective date of S.B. 10's aforementioned provisions. View "In re Bruce S." on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. After Appellant's convictions and sentence were affirmed, Appellant filed a pro se motion to order the preservation and listing of evidence pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.82. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) because section 2933.82 became effective in 2010, and Appellant was convicted in 1997, the statute would have to be applied retrospectively if it were to apply at all in this case; (2) because the statute did not contain an express, clear provision for retroactive application, it did not apply retrospectively; and (3) Appellant could not benefit from retrospective application of the statute. At issue on appeal was whether the obligation to preserve and catalog criminal-offense-related biological evidence imposed upon certain government entities by section 2933.82 applies to evidence in the possession of those entities at the time of the statute's effective date. The Supreme Court held that section 2933.82 is not retroactive, but it does apply to biological evidence in the possession of governmental evidence-retention entities at the time of its effective date. Remanded. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and two counts of rape. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder and to twenty years in prison for the two rape convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly excused two prospective jurors for cause who were not unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in the majority of its evidentiary rulings; (3) the erroneous admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence establishing Defendant's guilt; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the penalty phase; (5) Ohio's death-penalty was constitutional; and (6) Defendant's death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a "final verdict" as that term is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established caselaw, the court of appeals concluded in this case that the order purporting to acquit Defendant for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order. View "State v. Hampton" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an individual who is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant forfeits all expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant in this case moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine found in his possession. The trial judge denied the motion base solely on the notion that an arrest warrant "cleanses" any error by police in seizing an individual later found to be subject to the warrant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unlawfulness of an improper arrest or seizure cannot be purged by the fortuitous subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant. Remanded for a finding of whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the arresting officer's patdown of Defendant and whether the contraband seized could be justified. View "State v. Gardner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. The court of appeals vacated both convictions, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing Appellee knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Upon his release, Appellee filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellee was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by Appellee, or both. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) one who claims to be a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in section 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment; and (2) a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to section 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellee court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial. Remanded. View "Doss v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the court of appeals that affirmed his classification as a Tier I sex offender based on his guilty plea to one count of sexual imposition. At issue was whether the trial court retained authority to classify Defendant as a Teir I sex offender more than a year after the entry of a final judgment of conviction for a sexually oriented offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked authority to reopen this case to reconsider the final judgment it had entered, and the protections against double jeopardy barred it from classifying Defendant as a Tier I sex offender more than a year after it imposed sentence. View "State v. Raber" on Justia Law

A grand jury issued an indictment charging Appellee with two counts of trafficking in drugs. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the indictment did not sufficiently charge the two trafficking counts because neither count named the specific controlled substance involved. The trial court denied Appellee's motion, and Appellee pleaded no contest to the charges. Appellee appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it stated that the drug involved was a Schedule I or II drug instead of naming the specific drug involved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an indictment charging a defendant with trafficking in drugs under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.03 is sufficient if it names the schedule in which the drug appears; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case adequately informed Defendant of the charges pending against him. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, in general, cell-phone records produced by a cell-phone company constitute testimonial evidence that implicates a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Defendant here was convicted of murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by allowing cell phone records to be admitted into evidence without being properly authenticated in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The appellate court determined that the admission of the cell-phone records did not contribute to Defendant's conviction and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because cell-phone records are generally business records that are not prepared for litigation and are thus not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause does not affect their admissibility; (2) however, the hearsay rule barred the records' admission in this case because they were not properly authenticated; but (3) the admission of the cell-phone records did not contribute to Defendant's conviction, and their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Hood" on Justia Law