Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Appellant was arrested and charged with the murder of Amber Zurcher. The trial court granted a mistrial on Appellant’s first trial. Several trials followed, and after a fifth trial, another mistrial was declared. When the trial court set a sixth trial date, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied the motion. The State moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals concluded that, in this situation where there had been multiple mistrials, the order was a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant stole $550 worth of merchandise from a department store. At that time, Ohio Rev. Code 2913.02 classified that theft offense as a felony. Prior to sentencing, however, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 86, which made theft of property valued at less than $1,000 a misdemeanor. Thereafter, the trial court convicted Defendant of a misdemeanor. The appellate court reversed, holding that nothing in H.B. 86 provided that Defendant was entitled to benefit from the decrease in classification of the theft offense and should have been convicted of a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial court properly convicted and sentenced Defendant for a misdemeanor conviction, as the Legislature intended to afford the benefit of a decreased theft offense classification to offenders like Defendant. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other offenses. Judge Patricia Oney sentenced Appellant was sentenced to seven years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a petition in mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals against Judge Oney regarding the legality of his sentence. The court of appeals granted Judge Oney’s motion to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had brought an earlier mandamus case raising the same sentencing issues, which was previously dismissed by the court of appeals, Appellant’s mandamus claim was precluded by res judicata and was properly dismissed; and (2) because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and Judge Oney had subject-matter jurisdiction to try Appellant and to sentence him, the court of appeals properly dismissed the prohibition claim. View "State ex rel. Harsh v. Oney" on Justia Law

In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravation with a firearm specification. The State and Defendant later agreed that Defendant could withdraw his guilty plea and instead plead guilty to aggravated robbery without a firearm specification and to one count of an attempt to have weapons while under a disability. The new agreement decreased Defendant’s sentence by six months. In 2009, Defendant pled guilty to attempted felonious assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence from the 2003 case. Defendant subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 2007 plea and resentencing were void and he was therefore entitled to immediate release. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Defendant had already unsuccessfully pursued an adequate legal remedy to challenge his 2007 conviction and could not use habeas corpus to try again. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s claim was barred by res judicata. View "Smith v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty a violation of Ohio’s RICO statute and a predicate offense of trafficking in marijuana. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence for the RICO offense and an eight-year sentence for the trafficking offense, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant asserted that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive prison sentences violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s separate sentences. Appellant appealed, arguing that the appellate court was required to apply the standard set forth in State v. Johnson in deciding whether the imposition of multiple convictions and sentences for a RICO offense and one or more of its predicate felonies violated the Allied Offenses statute and his rights under the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State v. Johnson is not applicable to a RICO violation and that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing. View "State v. Miranda" on Justia Law

In September 1991, Appellant was convicted in federal court of criminal offenses and sentenced to federal prison. Meanwhile, in January 1991, the Crawford County Sheriff’s Department served a warrant on Appellant for his arrest after his indictment in Crawford County. Appellant was arraigned in Crawford County then returned to federal custody. In April 1992, Appellant was returned to Crawford County, tried in a jury trial, and convicted of criminal offenses. On appeal, Appellant argued that his speedy-trial rights were violated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The court of appeals affirmed on appeal and dismissed Appellant’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) because Appellant was not returned to federal custody after April 1992 until his state court trial had been held, no violation of the IAD occurred; and (2) the court of appeal’s determination on appeal that no violation of the IAD occurred was res judicata as to Appellant’s claims in this case. View "State ex rel. Dye v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to serve twenty-five years to life. In 2012, the common pleas court judge overruled Appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment. In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of procedendo in the court of appeals, seeking to compel the common pleas court judge to rule on his motion in arrest of judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that the judge erred in denying his motion so it was incumbent upon the court of appeals to compel her to reconsider her decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy to correct any alleged error in the judge’s decision through a direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for felonious assault and domestic violence. During a bench trial, the victim testified that Defendant was her boyfriend and had lived with her for about a year. The trial court found Defendant not guilty of felonious assault but guilty of attempted felonious assault and domestic violence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversed his conviction for domestic violence, ruling that the state must prove the victim and Defendant shared living expenses in order to convict Defendant of domestic violence. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the state proved that the victim was a family or household member, Defendant’s crime fell within the purview of the domestic violence statute. View "State v. McGlothan" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a motion for reclassification of his sex-offender status based on the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Williams, which held that it was unconstitutional to apply sex-offender classifications under Ohio’s Adam Wash Act to defendants convicted prior to the effective date of that legislation. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of procedendo in the court of appeals to compel a ruling on his motion. The common pleas court subsequently issued a judgment granting Appellant’s motion and reclassifying Appellant’s sex-offender status. Thereafter, the court of appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of procedendo as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed because procedendo will not issue to compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed and because procedendo will not issue to address Appellant’s argument that the common pleas court judge failed to perform his duty. View "State ex rel. Clay v. Gee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony domestic violence, which contained an allegation that Defendant had been previously convicted of two offenses of domestic violence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic violence as charged. The appellate court reversed Defendant’s conviction, determining that the state failed to establish the necessary element of Defendant’s prior domestic violence convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that because, during trial, the defense stipulated to the authenticity of Defendant’s two prior first degree misdemeanor domestic violence convictions, the state did properly prove the instant conviction. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law