Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sonya Jackson, an inmate, was represented by Assistant State Public Defender Dennis Pusateri when she filed a complaint for writ of mandamus alleging that she was entitled to parole. Pusateri allowed the magistrate to dismiss the action and then refiled the complaint. Because Pusateri erroneously believed that the court had dismissed the second complaint, he filed a new mandamus petition raising the same issues. Pusateri then voluntarily dismissed the second complaint in order to proceed with the third action. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Defendants under the “double dismissal” rule. Pusateri filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, arguing that the voluntary dismissal was the product of “excusable neglect.” The court of appeal denied the motion. Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jackson failed to establish excusable neglect.View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of tampering with evidence in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2921.12(A). The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) for a defendant to be guilty of violating section 2921.12(A)(1), the defendant must impair evidence in an investigation that is ongoing or likely to occur by tampering with evidence related to the investigation; and (2) the record did not support a finding that Defendant acted with purpose to impair the value of evidence of any ongoing investigation or of any likely investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for tampering with evidence requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the value or availability of evidence related to an existing or likely official investigation; and (2) in this case, the record did not support conviction for tampering with the evidence.View "State v. Straley" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to two counts on which he was indicted. Appellant later filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court overruled the motion and then sentenced Appellant. The court of appeals affirmed. After Appellant’s second motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied by the trial court and the court of appeals, Appellant filed this action in mandamus requesting an order compelling the trial court to conduct a hearing on his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeals granted the court of common pleas judge’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ because he had and exercised an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way his motions and the appeal of the denial of those motions. View "State ex rel. Nickelson v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Erin McCardle and Leatrice Tolls, protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement in the Public Square area of Cleveland, were arrested and charged with a curfew violation under Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. The ordinance prevents any person from remaining in the Public Square area between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. without a permit. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants subsequently pled no contest to the curfew violation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because Cleveland’s interests were insufficient to justify its limit on speech, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the United States Constitution, as it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allowed alternative channels of speech.View "City of Cleveland v. McCardle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his former mother-in-law, his five-year-old daughter, and his three-year-old son. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each of the three aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue did not violate Defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (2) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in seating two jurors that Defendant claimed were unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of autopsy photos; (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (6) Defendant’s challenges to the death penalty failed; and (7) there was no error in the sentences imposed.View "State v. Mammone" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to the murders of two women and to two counts of abuse of a corpse. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder with death specifications for the deaths of two girls. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that (1) the State’s closing remarks in the penalty phase were “improper and substantially prejudicial,” but the Court’s independent evaluation and approval of the capital sentence cured the errors in the penalty-phase proceedings; (2) the trial court did not violate Ohio R. Evid. 404(B) by allowing a witness to testify that when she was thirteen years old Defendant exposed himself to her and offered her five dollars to engage in oral sex; (3) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of attempted rape or robbery in connection the murder of one of the girls; and (5) the sentence was appropriate.View "State v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under Ohio’s version of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for their involvement in the sale of drugs. The total amount of money involved in the sales attributed to each appellant was $460 and $250 respectively. Appellants appealed, arguing that the State failed to offer evidence demonstrating that either of them was involved in drug sales that totaled $500 or more, although the enterprise they were involved in profited significantly, and therefore, the $500 threshold set forth in Ohio’s RICO statutes had not been satisfied as to either of them individually. The Supreme Court overturned Appellants’ first-degree felony convictions under Ohio’s RICO statutes, holding that in order for a defendant to obtain a conviction for engaging in a patter of corrupt activity, Ohio’s RICO statutes must be construed so that the stated threshold amount applies to each individual and not to the enterprise as a whole. Remanded.View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant to wear leg restraints in the courtroom, and even assuming that the order was an abuse of discretion, the error was harmless; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of weapons and ammunition not used in the murders, but the error was harmless; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in introducing the former testimony of Dr. Delaney Smith, a psychiatrist, during the penalty phase, as defense counsel had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Smith; and (5) the trial court’s sentencing opinion was adequate. View "State v. Neyland" on Justia Law

While on parole from a prior conviction of murder, Appellant committed murder. After a trial in 1984, a three-judge panel found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder with a prior-conviction specification and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence, determining that the panel had improperly weighed a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors. On remand, the same three-judge panel that had originally sentenced Defendant conducted the resentencing hearing and again sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas relief and required that Defendant be resentenced on the ground that the panel on resentencing should have allowed Defendant to introduce mitigating evidence in addition to the mitigating evidence presented at his 1984 trial. By the time of the subsequent resentencing, none of the original panel members were on the bench. Accordingly, the trial court convened a three-panel consisting of three new members. The new panel again sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed, raising five propositions of law challenging his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that all five propositions of law lacked merit. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with aggravated murder, and his case was assigned to the docket of Common Plea Court Judge Thomas Nurre. A visiting judge, Judge Donald Schott, was assigned to preside over the trial. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after twenty years. The judgment entry was signed by Judge Nurre on behalf of Judge Schott. Appellant filed an original action in the court of appeals requesting writs of mandamus and prohibition and seeking to declare the entry of conviction void because it was not signed by the judge who presided over the trial. The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Appellant’s sentencing entry did not violate Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) because Judge Nurre’s signing the entry was proper, and the entry satisfied the requirements of Rule 32(C). View "State ex rel. Harris v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law