Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the rape of three women, along with three associated aggravated burglaries. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the three aggravated burglary counts into the corresponding rape counts. The district court affirmed the trial court on the nonsentencing issues but vacated the sentences for the aggravated burglary and rape counts, concluding that because the conduct relied upon to establish the rapes was the same conduct used to establish the physical-harm element of the aggravated burglaries, the offenses were allied and subject to merger. At issue on appeal was whether the offenses in question were allied offenses of similar or dissimilar import within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) offenses with resulting harm that is separate and identifiable are offenses of dissimilar import; and (2) because the court of appeals in this case did not consider whether the import of the aggravated burglary and the import of the rape were similar or dissimilar in each of the three separate events, the cause must be remanded for consideration of these factors. View "State v. Ruff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to five years in prison and three years of postrelease control (“Sentencing Order 1”). The court of appeals vacated Sentencing Order 1 and remanded the cause for resentencing because, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court had failed to advise Defendant about the particulars of post release control. Upon resentencing, the trial court amended its sentencing entry (Sentencing Order 2), but the court of appeals remanded the case with instructions to clarify Sentencing Order 2. In response to the remand order, the trial court issued Sentencing Order 3. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant’s appeal for failure to file a transcript of the resentencing hearing. Defendant sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court, but his appeal was not accepted. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ compelling the trial judge to repentance him de novo, which he claimed was required by the appellate court’s decision in his appeal from Sentencing Order 1. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the trial judge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly declined to issue a writ of mandamus on the grounds that Defendant had an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

A reporter from The Cincinnati Enquirer submitted a public records request to the Butler County Sheriff’s Office for an outgoing phone call placed by a Butler County 9-1-1 dispatcher. The County denied the request, claiming that the return call was both a trial preparation record and a confidential law enforcement investigatory record and, thus, was exempt from the public records laws. The Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus ordering the County to release the recording. The County subsequently released the recording. Judge Sage and the County then filed a motion to dismiss the Enquirer’s mandamus complaint as moot. The court of appeals overruled the motion, granted the writ of mandamus, and awarded statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the outgoing 9-1-1 call was a public record and was not exempt from release, and therefore, the Enquirer was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering release of the record; and (2) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages but did abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage" on Justia Law

Lance Mason, a sitting Cuyahoga county Court of Common Pleas judge, was indicted on three counts of felonious assault, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of endangering children, and one count of domestic violence. Mason filed a pretrial motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office and appoint a special prosecutor. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Mason had not shown the requisite “actual prejudice” that would justify the disqualification of the entire prosecutor’s office and that there was no conflict of interest shown. Mason appealed. The Eighth District Court of Appeals issued a stay of the trial court proceedings to consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Timothy McGinty, the prosecutor, filed this original action in prohibition, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to issue the stay. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Court of Appeals patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to disqualify the prosecutor in a criminal case. View "State ex rel. McGinty v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. At the time, Defendant was being held in a county jail in Maryland. In 2012, the State re-indicted Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that his speedy-trial rights were violated because the applicable time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - codified in Ohio Rev. Code 2963.30 - were exceeded without resolution of the charges. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limits under the IAD did not apply because Black was incarcerated in an out-of-state county jail and not in a state penal or correctional institution. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two misdemeanor counts of theft and one felony count of breaking and entering. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the IAD applied to Defendant even though he was incarcerated in an out-of-state county facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “penal or correctional institution of a party state,” as it is used in section 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former police officer, was indicted on one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification arising from his shooting of Michael McCloskey Jr. during a traffic stop. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felonious assault and the accompanying firearm specification. The court of appeals reversed the felonious assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the firearm specification was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of deadly force and in not giving a mistaken-belief instruction, and by excluding testimony about the crimes Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the firearm specification did not apply in this case; (2) the trial court gave potentially misleading instructions to the jury regarding the use of deadly force and justification; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the offenses that Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

These three consolidated cases arose out of the same set of facts and raised identical issues. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a probate judge, which gave law enforcement permission to search a business for evidence of illegal gambling, more than thirty video slot machines were confiscated, giving rise to charges filed against Defendants, who were operating the business. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that the search warrant was void because probate judges do not have the statutory authority to issue a criminal search warrant. The trial court agreed with Defendants and granted the motions to suppress the evidence gathered to the tainted warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the probate judge did indeed lack authority to issue a search warrant; but (2) the police officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant under United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search warrants in criminal matters; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon applies in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(C)(2)(a), which defines “gross sexual imposition” and subjects an offender to a mandatory term of imprisonment when evidence other than the victim’s testimony is admitted corroborating the violation. Appellant in this case pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State introduced testimony regarding Appellant’s alleged confession to the offenses and argued that the confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required. The trial court concluded that application of section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated Appellant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2907.05(C)(2)(a)’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime’s activity; and (2) in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial. View "State v. Bevly" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer sought a warrant to search a house based on facts within the supporting affidavit. Among those facts were the results of a “trash pull” that detectives had conducted outside the house. Based on these facts, the officers obtained the search warrant and, upon executing the warrant, found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab. Defendant was indicted on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered through execution of the search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “one trash pull is not necessarily sufficient” to establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence seized from the single trash pull that corroborated tips and background information involving drug activity was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Governor granted a pardon to Appellant that extended to five convictions that occurred in several counties, including a felony conviction in Franklin County. Appellant subsequently applied to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court for an order sealing his conviction in that forum. The trial court granted Appellant’s application to seal. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no statute authorized the sealing of Appellant’s record based on a gubernatorial pardon. Subsequently, the Tenth District certified its decision as in conflict with the First District’s decision in State v. Cope, which provides that a trial court may seal the record of a conviction that has been erased by a pardon. The Supreme Court recognized the conflict, accepted Appellant’s discretionary appeal, and consolidated the causes. The Court then resolved the conflict by rejecting Cope and affirming the decision of the Tenth District, holding that a court lacks the authority to seal a criminal record of a pardoned offender who does not meet applicable statutory requirements for sealing the record. View "State v. Radcliff" on Justia Law