Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, convicted of kidnapping, felonious assault, and two counts of rape, challenged the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief, contending that he was not served with an arrest warrant or initial charging papers prior to his allegedly unlawful arrest and thus, that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. The court affirmed the judgment because a challenge to the sufficiency or validity of an indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Furthermore, appellant was charged with the criminal offenses of which he was convicted by an indictment, and he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his convictions by raising the sufficiency of that indictment. View "Jury v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. A majority of this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence. Before that decision was released, appellant filed an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his direct appeal in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which was denied. Appellant then filed an appeal of right with this court. At issue is whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Based on State v. Maxwell, the court held that failure to challenge the state expert forensic pathologist's testimony or the autopsy report was not ineffective representation, because any such challenge would have failed as a matter of law. The court rejected the following six claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel: failure to object to the court's questioning of the state witnesses; failure to object to prejudicial comments made by a witness for the state; failure to make a record; failure to object to the removal of prospective juror Nos. 11 and 31; failure to present expert psychological testimony during the mitigation phase; and failure to object to the autopsy report or the testimony of the pathologist. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 1997, Aaron Von was convicted in Colorado of sexual assault of a child and sexual assault in the third degree. In 2011, Von moved to Ohio and registered as a sex offender. Von later moved to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2950.15. The trial court denied Von’s motion to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws because, at the time of his convictions, Megan’s Law was in effect in Ohio, and it contained no provision to terminate one’s status as a registered sex offender post-conviction. The court further concluded that later amendments were not retroactive. The appellate court reversed, concluding that offenders classified under Megan’s Law may avail themselves of the privilege legislatively granted to Adam Walsh Act offenders to terminate their registration obligations. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the registration termination procedure delineated in section 2950.15 does not apply to sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to January 1, 2008; and (2) the appellate court properly remanded this matter for a determination of Von’s sex offender classification pursuant to Megan’s Law. Remanded. View "In re Von" on Justia Law

In 2004, a jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder. In 2015, Appellant filed a motion to correct the judgment entry. The county court of common pleas judge denied the motion. Appellant subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals. The judge filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Appellant failed to meet the requirements for a late petition for postconviction relief and that his motion to correct the judgment entry was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted abduction and was sentenced to a term of community control. The trial court subsequently found that Defendant had violated the terms of his community control and extended the term of community control. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order declaring that the county probation department, rather than the county prosecuting attorney, represents the State in all community control violation proceedings and that the prosecutor would not be notified of any future hearings. The trial court then conducted a community control violation hearing in Defendant’s case. An assistant prosecuting attorney asserted the right to be present and heard. The trial court denied the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to speak. The court found that Defendant had violated the conditions of community control and imposed a fourteen-day jail sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously vested probation officers, rather than prosecutors, with the authority to represent the interests of the State, and therefore, as the State’s legal representative, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard at community control violation proceedings. View "State v. Heinz" on Justia Law

Appellee applied to the court of common pleas to seal his twenty-four-year-old third-degree-felony conviction for receiving stolen property. The State objected to the application, arguing that Appellee’s fourth-degree-misdemeanor conviction under Ohio Rev. Code 4503.11(A) for failing to register a motor vehicle must be counted as a conviction when determining eligibility. The trial court ordered sealed Appellee’s felony conviction for receiving stolen property. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a violation of section 4503.11 concerning failure to register a motor vehicle must be counted as an offense when determining eligible offender status for record-sealing purposes under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.31; and (2) the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that Appellee was an eligible offender for record-sealing purposes. Remanded. View "State v. J.M." on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to several offenses, including gross sexual imposition and three counts of rape. The sentence was memorialized in an entry that recognized 184 days of jail-time credit. Three years later, Appellant filed a motion seeking additional jail-time credit of eighty-seven days for the time he had been held prior to indictment. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that the entry appealed from was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial of a motion for jail-time credit pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) is a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to the common pleas court and indicted on four counts of aggravated murder, among related crimes. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as in this case, the interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are presumed to have been made voluntarily pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.81(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and therefore, the State retains the burden to prove a valid waiver; and (2) as applied to statements a juvenile makes during a custodial interrogation, the section 2933.81(B) presumption that such statements are voluntary is unconstitutional. Remanded. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of raping his minor biological daughter. The judge imposed the jointly recommended sentence of three eight-year prison terms to be served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals vacated Appellant’s sentence, holding that while a jointly recommended sentence that is “authorized by law” is not subject to review, Appellant’s sentence was appealable and must be vacated because the trial court did not make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) compliance with section 2929.14(C)(4) was not necessary because the consecutive sentences were jointly recommended and imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple counts of rape under Ohio Rev. Code 2907.02 is discretionary, not mandatory; and (2) therefore, Appellant’s sentence was “authorized by law” and not subject to review on appeal. View "State v. Sergent" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape. The sentencing entry stated that Appellant “shall be subject to post release control of up to three years.” The trial court later journalized a nunc pro tunc order correcting the 2003 order by stating that Appellant “shall be subject to post release control of up to five years.” After completing his term of incarceration, Appellant filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of common pleas found that the motion was actually a petition for postconviction relief and dismissed it as untimely. Appellant filed filed an action in mandamus and/or prohibition requesting a writ compelling the trial court to issue a valid final judgment in the underlying case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction to take action in the criminal case where Appellant had served the maximum prison term. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Appellant had an alternate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appealing the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to terminate his postrelease control. View "State ex rel. Rudert v. Collier" on Justia Law