Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, where he was serving the remainder of an indeterminate sentence since the Adult Parole Authority (APA) revoked his parole in 2014. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus against Warden Terry Tibbals and the APA. Appellant requested an order requiring Tibbals to immediately release him from prison under the same conditions of his original parole; alternatively, an order compelling the APA to credit his time served from 2001 to 2011; and an order compelling the APA to grant him a new mitigation/revocation hearing with the appointment of counsel. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Tibbals and the APA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had not served his maximum sentence and failed to show that he was being held unlawfully, the court of appeals correctly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to prove his entitlement to a writ of mandamus by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals" on Justia Law

In State v. Gonzales (Gonzales I), the Supreme Court determined that, in prosecuting cocaine-possession offenses under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(C)(4)(b) through (f) involving mixed substances, the State must prove that the weight of the actual cocaine, excluding the weight of any filler materials, meets the statutory threshold. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Gonzalez I was based on inconsistent application of the principles of statutory construction. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gonzalez I, and held that the entire mixture or compound, including any fillers that are part of the usable drug, must be considered for the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty for cocaine possession under section 2925.11(C)(4). View "State v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In 1986, Appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of rape and six counts of complicity to rape. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four terms of life imprisonment and ordered that Appellant serve each of the life sentences consecutively. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction and improperly imposed the life terms because of errors in the sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s habeas petition was properly dismissed because Appellant did not set forth a valid challenge to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to raise his sentencing errors. View "Dunkle v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) of a drug of abuse. After a trial, Defendant was convicted. The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s OVI conviction because there was no evidence to connect Defendant’s use of hydrocodone, a widely known drug of abuse, with his impairment. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that expert testimony was necessary to support the OVI conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the OVI conviction and that no expert testimony was required to link the ingestion of hydrocodone with Defendant’s impairment. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of violating Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13. The statute makes it illegal for a person to possess firearms when the person is under indictment for or has been convicted of certain felonies. During trial, Defendant sought to limit how much the jury could learn about his underlying offenses upon which the weapons charges were based. A jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it did not require the State to stipulate to Defendant’s indictment and prior convictions and by admitting the full record of his prior offenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing Defendant’s stipulation offer, and the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Defendant to stipulate to his prior convictions and indictment. View "State v. Creech" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging three civil claims brought under Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60. Plaintiff sought recovery for damages arising out of Defendants’ alleged violation of a criminal statute. The trial court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling that civil actions for damages may not be predicated upon an alleged violation of a criminal statute. The Ninth District Court of Appeals then certified a question to the Supreme Court as to whether the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60 independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts unless otherwise prohibited by law. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Jacobson v. Kaforey" on Justia Law

As part of an independent investigation into the murder conviction of Adam Saleh, Donald Caster, an Ohio attorney engaged by the Ohio Innocence Project, requested police records related to the arrest and investigation of Saleh. The Division of Police of the City of Columbus rejected the request, stating that no records could be produced until the “completion” of Saleh’s criminal case. By the time Caster made his request for public records, Saleh’s direct appeals had been exhausted for more than four years. Caster then filed this original action in mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the specific-investigatory-work-product exception from required disclosure of public records set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(2)(c) does not extend beyond the completion of the trial of the underlying criminal case at issue. View "State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on eight counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Appellant pleaded no contest to all nine counts. Appellant was sentenced to a separate term of imprisonment on each count, the longest being eleven years, with the terms to be served concurrently. At issue on appeal was whether controlled substance analogs were criminalized at the time Appellant allegedly committed the offense of aggravated trafficking of such substances. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that controlled substance analogs were criminalized at the time Appellant was arrested and indicted for selling them. View "State v. Shalash" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine. The jury found that the amount of cocaine involved equaled or exceeded 100 grams. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of eleven years pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(C)(4)(f) because the amount of cocaine was 100 grams or more. The appellate court reversed the judgment and vacated the mandatory prison sentence, holding (1) in prosecuting cocaine offenses under sections 2925.11(C)(4)(a) through (f), the state is required to prove that the weight of the actual cocaine possessed by the defendant met the statutory threshold; and (2) the state did not offer any evidence on whether the weight of the baggie’s contents in this case included ingredients other than cocaine, and therefore, the penalty enhancement under section 2925.11(C)(4)(f) must be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state, in prosecuting cocaine offenses involving mixed substances under sections 2925.11(C)(4)[(b)] through (f), must prove that the weight of the cocaine meets the statutory threshold, excluding the weight of any filler materials used in the mixture. View "State v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In 1988, Father was ordered to pay child support for his two children until the children were emancipated. In 2006, judgment entries were issued stating that the children were emancipated and ordering Father to pay arrearages owed. In 2009, an indictment was handed down containing nine counts related to Father’s failure to pay the ordered child support. The indictment was not served on Father until 2013. Father filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on due process and speedy trial grounds and because the six-year statute of limitations for felonies had run. The court dismissed all counts but two related to Father's failure to pay support from 2007 through 2009. Father then moved to dismiss those remaining counts, arguing that because his daughters were emancipated as of 2006, he had no duty to provide support to them after that date, and therefore, he was not obligated to pay support from 2007 through 2009. The trial court granted Father’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Father was not subject to prosecution under section 2919.21(B) for his failure to make payments on the child-support arrearage established in the 2006 order when he had no current legal obligation to support his emancipated children. View "State v. Pittman" on Justia Law