Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue concerned whether a landlord or landlord's agent can prohibit a person from entering leased premises, even if that person has received permission from a tenant. The case arose when Antonio Randolph was banned from an apartment complex by the property manager and was then later arrested and charged with criminal trespass after he was discovered in his uncle's apartment at the complex, which his uncle had invited him to. The trial court found Randolph guilty of criminal trespass. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the city had to prove that Randolph had entered the premises without privilege, and that his uncle's invitation to the apartment contradicted this.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Sixth District's decision. The court held that a landlord or landlord's agent generally may not exclude a person from rented premises such that the excluded person is considered a trespasser when on the premises even if the person received permission to enter the premises from a tenant of the property. The court noted that Ohio law provides that a landlord cedes his or her possessory interests in leased property to the tenant and therefore may not prohibit the tenant from inviting guests onto the property.However, the court also highlighted that a landlord can maintain control over access to a property if the landlord so desires, provided that this authority is reserved in the lease agreement. In the absence of such a provision in the lease agreement, a tenant may invite onto the property a person whom the landlord has sought to ban from the premises. The judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law

In this case, an appellant challenged his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court had erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. The appellant's counsel had requested a competency evaluation prior to the trial, but the appellant refused to be transported to the treatment center for the evaluation. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that while the trial court should have held a competency hearing, the error was harmless because the record, when viewed as a whole, did not demonstrate sufficient indicia of incompetency. The court noted that the appellant had demonstrated understanding of the proceedings and had been able to articulate what his counsel had told him about the proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court, upholding the appellant's convictions. View "State v. Mills" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Michael Swazey Jr. was indicted for failing to pay child support. He filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment under Rule 12(C)(2) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the statutes he allegedly violated did not apply to him. The trial court declined to consider Swazey's motion on the merits, holding that the arguments raised were not permitted under Rule 12(C)(2) but should instead be presented at the close of the state’s case at trial. Swazey subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts.On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that Swazey’s Rule 12(C)(2) motion was proper and should have been considered on the merits. It also held that by entering a guilty plea, Swazey did not waive his right to raise a constitutional challenge on appeal.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, stating that Swazey's motion to dismiss was appropriate under Rule 12(C)(2), and that his guilty plea did not waive his right to raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case back to the trial court to consider Swazey's pretrial motion. View "State v. Swazey" on Justia Law

In 2016, Brian N. Spencer was convicted of possession of heroin and marijuana with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability by a Franklin County Court of Common Pleas jury. On the day of the trial, Spencer requested a new attorney, claiming that his appointed counsel was colluding with the prosecutor. When the court refused, Spencer decided to represent himself, despite warnings about the risks. Following his conviction, Spencer appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his right to counsel was violated, but the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.In 2022, Spencer filed a habeas corpus complaint in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial court violated his right to counsel. The court dismissed the complaint and Spencer appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District's dismissal of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that even if the trial court had violated Spencer’s right to counsel, it did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. A violation of the defendant’s right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence that is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court further noted that Spencer had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal of his convictions and sentence, which he had already pursued. Thus, his convictions and sentences were not void and he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue was the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the probable-cause standard for determining whether a juvenile-court offender may be bound over to adult court. The case arose from an incident where a juvenile, E.S., was in a stolen car during a police chase, with his friend E.M., who was driving. After the car crashed, E.M. was found dead from a gunshot wound. A gun was found under the car’s passenger seat where E.S. had been seated, and E.S.'s DNA was found on the trigger and the grip of the gun. A bullet that had been fired from the gun was found in the driver's side front door. E.S. was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses relating to the stolen car, the gun, and E.M.’s death.The juvenile court found probable cause for some charges but not for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The state appealed the juvenile court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the state had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that E.S. had committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the state’s evidence, both circumstantial and direct, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court held that the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals had erroneously held the state to a higher burden than required for establishing probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The case was remanded back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re E.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, DRC) to calculate his minimum sentence to be fifteen years, holding that the court of appeals did not err.In 1996, Appellant was convicted on three counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to three life sentences and two sentences of ten to twenty-five years, to be served consecutively. DRC calculated Defendant's sentence to be forty-five years to life. Appellant later brought this mandamus action, arguing that DRC erroneously calculated his minimum sentence by adding three ten-year minimum sentences associated with his life sentence. The court of appeals granted DRC's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in deciding that DRC correctly calculated Appellant's parole eligibility under Ohio Rev. Code 2967.13(F). View "State ex rel. Stokes v. Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Warden Tom Watson of the North Central Correctional Institution, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.Appellant was convicted on sixty-one counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor and sentenced to thirty-six and one-half years in prison. Appellant later filed this habeas petition alleging that he was being unlawfully imprisoned. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motion for judicial notice, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because he did not show that his maximum prison sentence had expired or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later resentence him. View "State ex rel. King v. Watson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite that he alleged he had exchanged with the "cashier" of the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), where Relator was incarcerated, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.According to Relator, an NCCC inspector denied Relator's kite request on the ground that she was not responsible for printing kites. After the department denied Relator's grievance Relator brought this mandamus action seeking production of the kite. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) Relator showed that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the department had a clear legal duty to provide it; and (2) Relator was not entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this criminal case, holding that it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine to tie the judge's ability to reduce the registration period for a person convicted of arson to a recommendation from executive branch officials.In 2012, the General Assembly passed a law codified at Ohio Rev. Code 2909.13(A) establishing a registry of people convicted of arson-related crimes that applied to those convicted of arson or aggravated arson, as well as those convicted of a related attempt or conspiracy or complicity offense. At issue was Ohio Rev. Code 2909.15(D)(2)(b), which provides a limited exception for the lifetime-registration requirement. Defendant in this case pleaded guilty to a single count of arson, for which he was required to register annually for life. At sentencing, challenged the constitutionality of the reduced-registration provision. The trial court denied the challenge, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no separation of powers violation within Ohio's arson offender registration scheme. View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's writ of habeas corpus arguing that the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's case after it issued a final judgment in 2007, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Appellant agreed to testify against a potential codefendant, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder with a firearm specification and aggravated robbery. The convictions were vacated based on Appellant's failure to cooperate with prosecutors. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary and three-year firearm specifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case pursuant to State v. Gilbert, 35 N.E.3d 493 (Ohio 2014), after it issued final judgment in 2007. The court of appeals agreed but dismissed the petition because Appellant's 2007 convictions and sentence were still valid and his maximum sentence had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing the petition because Appellant was not subject to immediate release from prison or confinement. View "Driggins v. Bracy" on Justia Law