Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court related to Appellant’s second application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.71 through 2953.81, holding that Appellant may appeal the trial court’s determination of what constitutes “the results” of the DNA testing.Appellant, who was sentenced to death for first degree murder, sought postconviction DNA testing. The trial court ordered the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) to collect DNA evidence from a cigarette butt and, later, to determine the quantity and quality of biological material on ring boxes and shell casings. On appeal, Appellant argued that the State was required to provide him with all documentation relating to the DNA testing of the cigarette butt and that his objection relating to the BCI’s selection as the testing authority and to its preliminary determination as to the scientific suitability for DNA testing of the shell casings and ring boxes should have been upheld. The Supreme Court held that Appellant was entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court failed to provide him with “the results of the testing” as required under section 2953.81(C) and dismissed Appellant’s remaining propositions of law. View "State v. Noling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for three counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted murder. The court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of three sentences of death but vacated Defendant’s sentence for his noncapital convictions, holding that the sentencing hearing and entry in this case were insufficient to satisfy State v. Bonnell, 16 N.E.3d 659 (Ohio 2014) and that a nun pro tunc entry did not suffice to cure the error. The Supreme Court remanded the cause to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a new sentencing hearing consistent with this decision. View "State v. Beasley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals granting a writ of habeas corpus to Appellee and ordering his immediate discharge from the Ross Correctional Institution. In his petition, Appellee, who was seventeen years old at the time of the offense for which he was convicted, argued that the general division of the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to try him as an adult because the juvenile court had failed to meet the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2152.12(G) before transferring his case. Specifically, Appellee argued that the failure to notify his legal custodian, his grandmother, of the transfer hearing was a violation of the statute, and therefore, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court satisfied the statutory requirements by serving notice on Appellee’s biological mother. View "Turner v. Hooks" on Justia Law

Here, the Supreme Court withdrew its prior opinion affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, which referred this case to a magistrate, who then purported to dismiss the petition sua sponte. Upon further consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide this case, which Appellant filed in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority. Under Ohio R. Civ. P. 53, a magistrate’s decision, standing alone, is not a final, appealable order, and because the court of appeals did not adopt the magistrate’s decision, Appellant never received a final, appealable order. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency’s policy that an arrestee’s personal effects must accompany the arrestee to jail, on its own, cannot justify the warrantless retrieval of an arrestee’s personal effects from a location that is protected under the Fourth Amendment. Further, a search of personal effects obtained as a result of following such a policy is not a valid inventory search.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her purse, and vacated Defendant’s convictions for felony possession of drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and drug-abuse instruments. The court held (1) the removal of Defendant’s purse from a car in which Defendant was a passenger and the subsequent search of the purse was unlawful; and (2) the exclusionary rule applied to require the suppression of the evidence obtained during the unconstitutional search. View "State v. Banks-Harvey" on Justia Law

Pountney was indicted for theft, identity fraud, and two counts of drug possession—one involving fentanyl and one involving acetaminophen with codeine. Pountney stipulated to the charges of theft, identity fraud, and possession of acetaminophen with codeine. Count 4 alleged that Pountney knowingly obtained, possessed or used at least five but not more than 50 times the "bulk amount" of fentanyl, R.C. 2925.11(A), a second-degree felony under R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c). The “bulk amount” of a Schedule II opiate or opium derivative, like fentanyl, is an amount equal to or exceeding 20 grams or five times the maximum daily dose in the usual dose range specified in a standard pharmaceutical reference manual. Pountney stipulated that he knowingly obtained 10 three-day transdermal fentanyl patches; each delivered 50 micrograms of fentanyl per hour. If the state proved that 10 patches equaled or exceeded five times the bulk amount of transdermal fentanyl, Pountney would be guilty of a second-degree felony; otherwise, he would be guilty of a fifth-degree felony. The court found Pountney guilty on all counts, including second-degree-felony aggravated possession of fentanyl. The Eighth District reversed with instructions to enter a finding of guilty on Count 4 as a fifth-degree felony. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Although there is no usual dose range of fentanyl, the state may not rely upon the usual dose range of morphine, the prototype opiate, to establish the bulk amount of fentanyl under R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(d). View "State v. Pountney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which concluded that Defendant forfeited her right to challenge the trial court’s policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in adopting a blanket policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas but found that Defendant did not preserve the error for appeal. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred by adhering to such an arbitrary policy but held that Defendant preserved the error for appeal. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Defendant to enter a new plea in accordance with Ohio R. Crim. P. 11. View "State v. Beasley" on Justia Law

A juvenile who is bound over to adult court must wait to appeal until the end of the adult-court proceedings.D.H. was a juvenile at the time he was charged with robbery. The juvenile court determined that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and transferred jurisdiction to the adult court. D.H. then pled no contest to the charges in adult court. The court of appeals concluded that because the juvenile court had not articulated the reasons that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the court erred in transferring D.H. On remand, the juvenile court once again found that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation. D.H. immediately appealed the juvenile court’s transfer orders rather than wait until the end of the adult-court proceedings. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the juvenile court’s orders transferring jurisdiction to the adult court are not final orders under Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B)(4). View "In re D.H." on Justia Law