Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus to compel Karla Hack, the former Marion County Court Reporter, to inform him of the fee for a copy of the transcript of his 2009 sentencing hearing, holding that Relator established all three requirements necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus.Relator, an inmate in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, filed a motion to compel the court reporter to produce a copy of the sentencing transcript and inform Relator of the fee for a copy of it. Relator then filed a motion to add the county court reporter's office and the current county court reporter as respondents, stating that Hack had retired and that he was unable to determine who the current court reporter was. The Supreme Court granted the motion and the writ, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ. View "State ex rel. Newsome v. Hack" on Justia Law

In this certified-conflict case, the Supreme Court held that when an indigent defendant makes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to request a waiver of court costs, a reviewing court must apply the test in State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1989) for determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.Defendant was convicted of assaulting a peace officer. The trial court assessed court costs against Defendant, despite his indigent status. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request a waiver of costs and that the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such a waiver no longer exists. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when trial counsel fails to request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of an indigent defendant, a determination of prejudice for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis deeds on whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the request to waive costs had one been made; and (2) the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance of counsel analysis set forth in Bradley. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied relief.Appellant was sixteen years old when four delinquency complaints were filed in juvenile court. The cases were transferred to adult court where Appellant was convicted of five felony counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixteen years. Appellant later filed this habeas corpus petition alleging that the juvenile court did not fully comply with the procedures for transferring jurisdiction to the adult court because it did not timely notify his father of a hearing in one of the cases that led to the transfer of some of the charges. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court's failure to provide timely notice was not a defect that deprived the adult court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Smith v. May" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that Defendant did not suffer a manifest injustice when the trial court failed to tell him during his Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy that he would be subject to mandatory prison sentences for his second-degree felony sexual battery convictions.Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree felony sexual battery and other offenses. After a plea colloquy in which the trial court told Defendant that none of his prison sentences were mandatory the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and imposed an agreed-upon sentence. Defendant later filed a postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing mandatory sentences without first telling him that they were mandatory. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's error in failing to tell Defendant that part of his sentence would be mandatory did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Straley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals refusing to consider for the first time on appeal the State's argument that Defendant lacked Fourth Amendment standing to contest the admission of seized evidence, holding that when the State fails to dispute a defendant's standing in the trial court, it is foreclosed on appeal from attacking the trial court's judgment on these grounds.Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that a detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he detained Defendant. The State appealed, arguing that Defendant lacked standing to contest the admission of the evidence seized. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the State did not assert in the trial court that Defendant lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge his detention, the State was precluded from asserting that argument in its appeal from the judgment granting Defendant's motion to suppress. View "State v. Wintermeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that two sentencing statutes - Ohio Rev. Code 2925.041(C)(1) and 2929.14(A)(3)(b) - are in conflict and applying the rule of lenity to determine that Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(A)(3)(b) and its lesser maximum penalty applies to violations of section 2925.041(A) when the drug in question is methamphetamine and the defendant has committed certain prior offenses, holding that section 2925.041(C)(1) applied to the defendant in this case. Defendant was convicted of one count of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 2925.041(A). The trial court determined that section 2925.041(C)(1) applied and sentenced Defendant to a five-year prison term. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's sentence, holding that section 2929.14(A)(3)(b), the less punitive sentencing statute, applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a defendant is charged with a violation of section 2925.041(A) when the drug in question is methamphetamine and the defendant has committed certain prior offenses, the mandatory five-year sentence prescribed by section 2925.041(C)(1) is a special provision that prevails as an exception to the general statute, section 2929.14(A)(3)(b). View "State v. Pribble" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a criminal judgment the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision vacating some of Defendant's consecutive sentences and rendering Defendant's second assignment of error moot, holding that State v. Marcum, 59 N.E.3d 1231 (Ohio 2016), has no application to consecutive sentencing cases that are governed by Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2).Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offenses stemming from her act of stealing thousands of items from nursing home residents. Defendant waived her right to appeal including, but not limited to, the grounds listed in section 2953.08. The trial court imposed prison terms and ordered Defendant to serve the felony sentences consecutively. The court of appeals reviewed Defendant's sentence under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.11 and 2929.12 based on its reading of Marcum and determined that, while Defendant's consecutive sentences were appropriate and warranted the aggregate sentence was excessive and disproportionate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State forfeited its argument that Defendant waived her right to appeal her sentence when it did not raise the issue at the court of appeals; and (2) the court of appeals should have analyzed Defendant's consecutive sentences for compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4). View "State v. Gwynne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim for habeas relief and was barred by res judicata.Appellant was convicted of four counts of forgery and four counts of tampering with evidence. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court of appeals dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) none of Appellant's challenges to his convictions was cognizable in habeas corpus; and (2) the court of appeals also correctly determined that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata. View "State ex rel. Kerr v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the trial court's decision ordering Defendant, who pleaded guilty to cashing seven forged checks at branches of three different banks, to pay restitution to the banks in the amount of the forged checks, holding that a bank that cashes a forged check and then recredits the depositor's account is a victim to which the forger can be required to pay restitution.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that the banks were not "victims" for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.18, the statute authorizing a trial court to order an offender to pay restitution to a "victim" who suffers an economic loss, but were instead third parties who had reimbursed the account holders, who were the true victims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the banks were victims of Defendant's fraud that suffered an economic loss thereby, and therefore, the trial court properly ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the banks under section 2929.18. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that Appellant failed fully to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).In his petition, Appellant sought to compel a common pleas judge to hold a new sentencing hearing and to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim, concluding that the petition was procedurally defective because the affidavit of indigence did not contain a statement of the balance in Appellant's inmate account and because Appellant an adequate remedy by law by way of direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's failure to comply with the requirements of section 2969.25 required dismissal of his complaint. View "State ex rel. Sands v. Culotta" on Justia Law