Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the civil case underlying this appeal, John Poss filed a motion for an order that Marilyn Morris transfer to him property that was the subject of a constructive trust. Before the court ruled on Poss's motion, Morris transferred the property to Skyway Investment Corporation. Poss then filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and to appoint a person to execute the conveyance of the property. The court of common pleas granted the motion. Skyway, which had been joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county court of common pleas, from proceeding to place the property in receivership and a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its orders concerning the property. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the conveyance of the property in the underlying case; and (2) Skyway had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims. View "State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Court of Common Pleas " on Justia Law

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants. View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Appellees, members of the Barbee family, were involved in an automobile accident. Appellant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, insured the automobile. The policy contained a provision that required an action for underinsured motorist coverage be brought against the insurer within three years of the date of the accident. After receiving a judgment against the tortfeasors and more than four years after the accident, the Barbees filed suit against Nationwide to recover the outstanding amounts on their judgments. Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Barbees' claims were barred for failure to bring the claims within the three-year period required by the policy's limitation period. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a conflict between Nationwide's limitation provision and other provisions in the policy, which required that proceeds from any other available insurance be exhausted, rendered the limitation provision unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the three-year limitation provision was unambiguous and enforceable, and (2) the provision did not conflict with co-existing policy provisions because exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability limits was not a precondition to filing suit by the insured against his insurer within the limitation period. View "Barbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose because the settlement of a personal-injury suit brought by a recipient of workers' compensation benefits against a third-party tortfeasor did not make any provision to repay the statutory subrogee, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The Bureau brought suit against both the recipient of the workers' compensation benefits and third-party tortfeasor under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.931(G) to recover the full amount of its subrogation interest. The trial court held that a two-year limitations period applied and that it had expired. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a six-year limitations period applied and that it had not yet run out. At issue on appeal was whether a claim under section 4123.931(G) brought by a statutory subrogee to recover its subrogation interest is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the same period applicable to the injured worker's personal-injury suit against the third party, or to a six-year statute of limitations for an action on a liability created by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the claim in this case was an action upon a liability created by statute and that the statute of limitations was six years. View "Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp. v. McKinley" on Justia Law

Appellants, PNH Inc. and Ronald Creatore, filed an action against Alfa Laval Flow, Inc., which manufactures equipment for sanitary processing of food and beverages, for abuse of process and tortious interference with a contract. Appellants asserted that Alfa Laval Flow misused an involuntary-bankruptcy case it filed against its distributor in an effort to eliminate Creatore as a competitor in the sale of equipment for sanitary processing of food and beverages. The trial court dismissed the claims. The Seventh District affirmed, holding that federal law preempts state-law causes of action alleging the abuse of bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States Bankruptcy Code preempts state-law claims that allow the recovery of damages for misconduct committed by a litigant during bankruptcy proceedings. View "PNH, Inc. v. Alfa Laval Flow, Inc." on Justia Law

Virginia King was injured in an automobile accident and was treated for her injuries at Toledo Hospital. Although King informed the hospital staff that she was covered by a health-insuring corporation, the hospital billed King's automobile insurer for the services rendered. King sued the hospital and ProMedica Health System (Appellants). Each of King's causes of action was based on the claim that Appellants violated Ohio Rev. Code. 1751.60(A) by billing the automobile insurer instead of the health-insuring corporation. Section 1751.60(A) stated that every provider that contracts with a health-insuring corporation to provide health-care services to an insured shall seek payment solely from the corporation. The trial court granted Appellants' motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether section 1751.60(A) prohibited a provider from seeking payment for medical treatment rendered to an insured injured in an automobile accident from the insured's automobile insurance medical benefits. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 1751.60(A) applies only when a health-care provider seeks payment from an insured, and (2) section 1751.60(A) does not conflict with Ohio's law on the coordination of insurance benefits. View "King v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Five companies entered into special contracts with the Toledo Edison Company for the sale of electricity. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) established February 2008 as the termination date for the contracts, basing its finding on the language of the special contracts and its orders in earlier electric-deregulation cases. Appellants challenged the decision, contending (1) Toledo Edison agreed in 2001 that the contracts would not terminate until Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges from its customers, and (2) December 31, 2008 was the date when Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PUCO ignored the plain language of the 2001 amendments to Appellants' special contracts, and accordingly, the PUCO unlawfully and unreasonably allowed Toledo Edison to terminate the special contracts in February 2008. View "Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Insured submitted a claim to Insurer after his house was damaged by a storm. Insured returned the payment tendered to him by Insurer, deeming the amount insufficient to cover the damage to his home. Almost two years after the house was damaged, Insured filed suit against Insurer. Insurer argued the lawsuit was barred by a clause in the insurance contract that stated that any action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage. The trial court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the policy language was ambiguous and that Insurer, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Insurer could enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its contract because (1) the policy language was not ambiguous, and (2) Insurer did not waive its right to enforce the clause. View "Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Michele Hobbs and Kelly Mullen decided to have a child together, Mullen became pregnant through in vitro fertilization procedure with donated sperm. Mullen executed a will in which she nominated Hobbs as the guardian of her child and a health-care power of attorney and durable power of attorney in which she gave Hobbs the authority to make decisions regarding the child. Hobbs and Mullen co-parented for two years, after which the women's relationship deteriorated. Hobbs then filed a complaint for shared custody in the juvenile court, alleging that Mullen had created a contract through her conduct with Hobbs to permanently share legal custody of the child. The juvenile court dismissed Hobbs's complaint for shared legal custody, concluding that a preponderance of the evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that Mullen's conduct created a contract that permanently gave partial custodial rights of the child to Hobbs. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent, credible evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Mullen, by her conduct, did not enter into an agreement with Hobbs through which Mullen permanently relinquished sole custody of her child in favor of shared custody with Hobbs. View "In re Mullen" on Justia Law

Gulf Underwriters Insurance issued a general liability policy to United Foundries with an endorsement for employer's liability coverage, known as a stop-gap endorsement. David Ward filed a complaint against his employer, United, alleging claims for employer intentional tort and seeking damages. While the case was pending, United filed an action against Gulf for a declaration that Gulf had a duty to defend and indemnify United for the claims asserted by Ward. The trial court granted summary judgment to United. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) an exclusion in a stop-gap endorsement stating that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury resulting from an act that is determined to have been committed by an insured with the belief that an injury is substantially certain to occur does not require a final determination by either a judge or jury before the insurer can refuse to defend a claim alleging a substantial-certainty employer intentional tort: and (2) that the claims stated in the underlying complaint were neither potentially nor arguably covered under the terms of the policy, and thus, Gulf had no duty under the policy to defend United. View "Ward v. United Foundries, Inc." on Justia Law