Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During Greg Zeigler's tenure as Stark County treasurer, his chief deputy pleaded guilty to stealing almost $2.5 million from the treasurer's office, after which the county prosecutor instituted an recoupment action under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.37. The board of commissioners then voted to remove Zeigler from office pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 321.38, which permits the removal of the county treasurer by the board of commissioners upon institution of a suit under Section 321.37. Zeigler then filed an action for a writ of quo warranto to oust the current treasurer and to be reinstated as treasurer, arguing that Section 321.38 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the writ of quo warranto, holding (1) that because Section 321.38 does not require a complaint and hearing before authorizing a board of county commissioners to remove a county treasurer, it is unconstitutional; (2) the removal of Zeigler violated Ohio Const. art. 2, 38; and (3) Zeigler was entitled to serve the remainder of his elected term. View "State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar" on Justia Law

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.