Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jason Carrick was charged with and convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2917.11(A)(2) after the police department received complaints about the loud music coming from Carrick's property during a Halloween party Carrick hosted in a building he owned. The court of appeals held that section 2917.11(A)(2) was not unconstitutionally vague but thereafter found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Compher and certified the record to the Supreme Court for review. At issue was whether section 2917.11(A)(2) provides sufficient notice for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what he or she is required to do under the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the statute does provide sufficient notice and thus is not void for vagueness, and (2) therefore, Carrick's due-process rights were not violated. View "State v. Carrick" on Justia Law

Paul Palmer pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995 and served an eighteen-month sentence. Based on Palmer's conviction, the Adam Walsh Act of 2007 automatically imposed a sex-offender classification, requiring registration with authorities. Palmer filed a petition challenging the application of the new registration requirements to him. Meanwhile, Palmer was indicted for violating his registration requirements under the Act. The trial court (1) ruled that Ohio's sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer and granted his motion to dismiss the indictment, and (2) ordered the removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment in light of the Act's explicit retroactivity, and (2) because the Act did apply to Palmer, the court erred in requiring removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) State v. Bodyke did not invalidate the statutory petition process for challenging a reclassification under the Act; and (2) a trial court may dismiss an indictment alleging violations of the Act based on the retroactive application of the Act because, after State v. Williams, duties under the Act may not be imposed retroactively. View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law

This was an original action in which Relators, thirty-six electors living in various districts for the Ohio House of Representatives as reapportioned by the Ohio Apportionment Board on September 30, 2011, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Respondents, the four republic members of the five-member Ohio Apportionment Board. Relators sought (1) a declaration that the apportionment plan adopted by the Board was invalid because the Board failed to comply with Ohio Const. art. XI, which governs the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly and the Open Meetings Law, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22; and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing those Board members from calling, holding, supervising, administering, or certifying any elections under their apportionment plan. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Relators' open-meetings claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) denied Relators' Article XI claims based on laches insofar as they attempted to challenge the use of the apportionment plan for the 2012 election cycle; and (3) held that Relators' remaining Article XI claims were not barred by laches. The Court stated that it would issue a separate order for further briefing and oral argument on those claims. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

After Jose Agosto was convicted and sentenced on criminal charges, Agosto unsuccessfully sought resentencing by raising claims for writs of mandamus and procedendo. Agosto again petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellees, a judge and the county court of common pleas, to resentence him to a lawful sentence that constitutes a valid final judgment. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that res judicata barred Agosto from instituting a successive writ action for the same relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err where (1) res judicata barred Agosto's claims, and (2) some of Agosto's claims were not cognizable in an extraordinary-writ action. View "State ex rel. Agosto v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Employee alleged that his political-subdivision Employer committed an intentional tort against him and engaged in negligent conduct. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims, alleging immunity from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed, and (2) the express exception to immunity contained in the Act did not apply because Employee's claims did not arise out of the employment relationship. The appellate court affirmed and concluded that the express exception to immunity in the Act prevented Employer from raising immunity pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exception to the Act removed the protection of immunity for a political-subdivision employer for injuries to its employees that arise out of the employment relationship, and a political subdivision was at risk for liability in intentional-tort suits that satisfied the terms of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01. View "Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Appellant, Marquise Jones, petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, Sandusdy County Court of Common Pleas Judge Barbara Ansted, to issue a new sentencing entry in Jones's criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Jones appealed, arguing that the entry issued in his case was not a final, appealable order because it failed to dispose of every firearm specification of which he was found guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing entry constituted a final, appealable order because it set forth the fact of Jones's convictions, the sentence, the judge's signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk; and (2) Jones had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Ansted" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Dennis Gould of rape, gross sexual imposition, pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, all based on images located on the hard drive of Gould's computer. The court of appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court should have excluded all evidence that resulted from the warrantless search of Gould's hard drive. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court, holding (1) because Gould had abandoned the hard drive, Gould did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive; and (2) therefore, the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Gould" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Waters filed a petition to be a candidate for the Warren County Republican Party Central Committee for the 15th Precinct of Lebanon at the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election. Respondent Warren County Board of Elections voted to not certify Waters's candidacy. Waters then filed an expedited-election action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board and its members to certify his candidacy. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Waters was barred from candidacy in the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election because he voted in a primary election as a member of a different political party within the preceding two calendar years. View "State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

Terrance House filed complaints for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel a court of common pleas judge to issue final, appealable orders on the judge's denial of Hough's motion for the judge to recuse herself and his motion to supplement his petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals denied the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hough was not entitled to a final, appealable order on the judge's denial of his motion to recuse herself because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review those decisions; and (2) the judge had no duty to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying Hough's motion to supplement his previously denied, untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief. View "State ex rel. Hough v. Saffold" on Justia Law