Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Tracy Davis was indicted under Ohio Rev. Code 2921.04(B) for witness intimidation based on a threat he made to his ex-wife after police began investigating the underlying crime but before any charges had been filed. Section 2921.04(B) prohibits the intimidation of a person who observes a crime after the initiation of proceedings flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice. The trial court convicted Davis for witness intimidation. The court of appeals reversed, finding that no "action or proceeding" existed at the time of the threat, and therefore, the victim of the threat was not a witness under section 2921.04(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that insufficient evidence existed to convict Davis for witness intimidation based on his threat to his ex-wife because a police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice and does not invoke the protection of section 2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The trial court appointed a receiver for Sager Corporation for the purpose of accepting service of process and marshaling assets consisting of unexhausted liability-insurance policies for asbestos-related claims filed against Sager. Sager was an Illinois corporation that filed for dissolution in 1998 and, pursuant to Illinois law, was no longer amenable to suit after 2003. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, in conformity with the constitutional requirements of due process and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, claims filed against the dissolved Illinois corporation more than five years after dissolution were barred, and therefore, the appointment of the receiver was barred. View "In re Sager Corp." on Justia Law

C.P. was fifteen years old when he was charged with two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation. The juvenile court found C.P. to be a delinquent child and designated him a serious youthful offender in relation to each offense. Further, the court classified C.P. a public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant (PRQJOR) and a Tier III sex-offender/child-victim offender pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2152.86. At issue on appeal was the constitutionality of section 2152.86, which created the new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants, PRQJORs, who are automatically subject to mandatory, lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements without the participation of a juvenile judge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to the extent that it imposes such requirements on juvenile offenders tried with the juvenile system, section 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

Appellant Roland Nickleson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) notwithstanding Nickleson's claims, his sentencing entry was a final, appealable order because it contained a full resolution of all the counts of his indictment for which there were convictions; and (2) Nickleson had an adequate remedy by appeal from his sentencing entry to raise his other claims contesting the validity of the indictment, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. View "State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and kidnapping. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant was notified of postrelease control, but the language indicating notification had been made was inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry that resulted from that hearing. When the omission came to light, the trial court corrected the sentencing entry through a nunc pro tunc entry that stated that the notification had been made and denied Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court upheld the trial court's actions as a permissible use of a nunc pro tunc entry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's use of a nun pro tunc entry was appropriate in the specific circumstances of this case. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

Gerald Strothers requested that East Cleveland Mayor Gary Norton provide access to review, inspect, and copy at cost various public records. A week after Strothers's public-records request was received by Norton, Strothers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Norton to provide access to the requested records. Norton subsequently made available to Strothers all of the requested records. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus but awarded Strothers $1,000 in statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment denying the writ of mandamus and reversed the portion awarding statutory damages, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Norton's evidence established that Strothers had been given access to all of the requested records, which rendered his mandamus claim moot; and (2) abused its discretion in granting statutory damages to Strothers, as Norton produced the records within a reasonable period of time. View "Strothers v. Norton" on Justia Law

After receiving a dispatch that a male driving a tow truck was armed and planned to kill himself, two police officers stopped the driver, Richard Dunn. Because they were dealing with an allegedly suicidal person, they handcuffed Dunn and placed him in a police cruiser. The officers subsequently found a loaded gun in the truck's glove compartment. Dunn was indicted on one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Dunn filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court overruled the motion, holding that the stop was a legitimate response to an emergency situation. Dunn then pleaded no contest to the charge. The court of appeals reversed and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the officers in this case were authorized to stop Dunn because the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a low-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop. View "State v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Watson, who was serving a custodial sentence, filed a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, various correctional officials and employees, to provide certain public and nonpublic records directly related to Watson. The court of appeals conditionally granted the writ, stating that Watson must pay for the copies. After Appellees failed to provide the copies to Watson, Watson requested statutory damages in connection with his mandamus case. The court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson's request, as (1) the court did not conclusively determine that Watson had submitted the applicable cost for the copies; (2) the court did not specify that Appellees had breached any duty owed to Watson; and (3) Watson's mandamus claim was based in part on his request for nonpublic records, which claim was not authorized by Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, and therefore, Watson could not be awarded statutory damages for that claim. View "State ex rel. Watson v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Smith pleaded guilty to forgery. The trial court sentenced Smith to five years of community control and required him to pay court costs, the fee for his court-appointed attorney, and $4,857 in restitution. Smith appealed, asserting that the trial court erred when it did not inform him that if he failed to pay court costs, the court could require him to perform community service. The court of appeals refused to consider this assignment of error on its merits, holding that the issue was not ripe for review because Smith had not yet failed to pay court costs. Smith filed a motion in the court of appeals to certify a conflict, alleging that the court's holding conflicted with the Fourth District Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Moss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to precedent, the court's failure to provide Smith the community-service notice required by Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(A)(1) was ripe for review regardless of whether Smith had failed to pay costs. Remanded. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

This was an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer, to provide to Relators, private companies that store and index electronic images of records and officials representing those companies, copies of electronic images of all documents recorded in the Cuyahoga County Recorder's Office for two months in 2010, to provide those copies based on their actual cost rather than $2 per electronic image of each page, and to amend the office's public-records policy to comply with the law. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ to compel the fiscal officer to provide the requested electronic copies at actual cost, as the requested electronic images constituted records subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act and Relators were entitled to copies of those records at actual cost rather than at the higher statutory charge for photocopying documents; and (2) denied the writ insofar as it sought to amend public policy, as the policy it sought to amend was no longer effective and the county's existing public-records policy did not violate the requirement to charge the actual cost of the records. View "State ex rel. Data Trace Info. Servs., LLC. v. Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer " on Justia Law