Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who was convicted for criminal offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county common pleas court judge, to issue a new sentencing entry. Defendant asserted that his current sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not contain a disposition concerning specifications that he was charged with but not convicted of. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied the requested relief, holding that the sentencing entry for Defendant fully complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02 because it stated that he was convicted by a jury of specified crimes, set forth the sentence, was signed by a judge, and was entered upon the journal by the clerk of court. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. View "Moore v. Middletown" on Justia Law

Appellant pled no contest to burglary and was sentenced accordingly. Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arrest warrant pursuant to which Appellant had been arrested was invalid because the deputy clerk who issued the warrant impermissibly acted in a dual capacity; but (2) the invalid warrant led to no evidence subject to suppression. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) a person acting in the dual capacities of deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in the same county is not a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant; and (2) because the arrest was predicated primarily upon Appellant's pre-arrest confession, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for an invalidly issued arrest warrant was not properly before the Court. View "State v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function. View "Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r" on Justia Law

In July 2010, a grand jury returned a 73-count indictment charging several current and former public officials and three organizations with criminal charges. In December 2010, the county court of common pleas judge granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a bills of particulars and notices of intent to introduce "other acts" evidence. Relators, a newspaper and television station, filed this writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all records in the criminal case and a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 2010 order. The Cafaro defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In July 2011, the indictment was dismissed. In August 2011 the judge unsealed many of the sealed filings but granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a discussion of facts in the state's memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all remaining records that were sealed and granted the writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his December 2010 and August 2011 decisions and to prohibit him from issuing further orders presumptively sealing any documents or records in the criminal case. View "State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Wolff " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the petition of Appellant for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the court of common pleas judge and the common pleas court, to issue a valid, final judgment in one of his criminal cases and to vacate his sentence in another of his criminal cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's sentencing entries constituted final, appealable orders; (2) the sentences Appellant challenged complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) by specifying that Appellant was convicted upon his no-contest pleas; and (3) insofar as Appellant argued that one of his sentences was erroneous because there was no authorization for consecutive six-month jail sentences, Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Common Pleas Court (Kimbler)" on Justia Law

Appellee, together with four codefendants, was indicted for murder, aggravated robbery, involuntary manslaughter, and theft. The defendants' initial convictions were reversed due to a Batson violation. On retrial, the trial court declared a mistrial. The state proceeded to retry three of the defendants, including Appellant, and a third jury returned verdicts finding them guilty of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed their convictions. In Appellee's case, the court held (1) the trial court should have declared a mistrial after the second trial because a statement of a state's witness from a previous trial, which had not been admitted into evidence, had inadvertently been submitted to the jury; and (2) double jeopardy barred retrial because there had not been a manifest necessity for the mistrial declared at the second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial, holding (1) the trial judge erred during the second trial by improperly declaring a mistrial; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of Appellee. View "State v. Gunnell" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress by a co-defendant automatically tolls the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and felonious assault, concluding that Defendant was timely tried on those charges, as the time to bring Defendant to trial was tolled when his co-defendant filed a pretrial motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the time in which to bring Defendant to trial was not automatically tolled when his co-defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress. Remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time was reasonable. View "State v. Ramey" on Justia Law

This case was a public-records action in which relator, ESPN, Inc., sought certain records from respondent, Ohio State University. Ohio State rejected ESPN's requests because the university deemed them to be "overly broad per Ohio's public record laws." EPSN then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to provide access to the requested records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ for limited records that should have been disclosed because they were not exempt from disclosure based on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); but (2) denied the writ for the rest of the records because Ohio State established that FERPA and the attorney-client privilege prohibited the disclosure of the requested records. View "State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Maxwell White was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. White subsequently obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence him. Before the federal court invalidated White's death sentence but after White killed the trooper, the Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which requires the trial court, when resentencing a capital offender whose death sentence has been set aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death may be a penalty to be considered by the jury. The trial court held it could not retroactively apply the statute in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death sentence. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar the statute's retroactive application in cases where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment but the death sentence was set aside after its enactment; (2) the statute's application in this case does not violate the ex post facto clause; and (3) retroactive application of the statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. White" on Justia Law