Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and two counts of rape. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder and to twenty years in prison for the two rape convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly excused two prospective jurors for cause who were not unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in the majority of its evidentiary rulings; (3) the erroneous admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence establishing Defendant's guilt; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the penalty phase; (5) Ohio's death-penalty was constitutional; and (6) Defendant's death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a "final verdict" as that term is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established caselaw, the court of appeals concluded in this case that the order purporting to acquit Defendant for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order. View "State v. Hampton" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an individual who is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant forfeits all expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant in this case moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine found in his possession. The trial judge denied the motion base solely on the notion that an arrest warrant "cleanses" any error by police in seizing an individual later found to be subject to the warrant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unlawfulness of an improper arrest or seizure cannot be purged by the fortuitous subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant. Remanded for a finding of whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the arresting officer's patdown of Defendant and whether the contraband seized could be justified. View "State v. Gardner" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice claim filed well after the statute of repose set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C). Timothy and Tracy Ruther sued a doctor and medical facility, claiming that the doctor had failed to properly assess, evaluate and respond to abnormal laboratory results including very high liver enzymes. The court of appeals held that section 2305.113(C), as applied to the facts of this case, violated the right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, relying in part upon Hardy v. VerMeulen. The Supreme Court overruled Hardy and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs, whose cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until after the statute of repose had expired, were not deprived of a vested right; (2) Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their claim; and (3) therefore, the medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 2305.113(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution. View "Ruther v. Kaiser" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 4509.05(A) and asserting that the amended statute violated Ohio Const. art XII, 5a. The statute provided that the registrar of motor vehicles shall collect a certified abstract with respect to any person's motor vehicle accidents and record of convictions for violation of motor vehicle laws. In addition, the statute directed the registrar to collect for each abstract a five dollar fee. The trial court agreed and granted injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, concluding that sixty percent of the five dollar fee collected under section 4509.0 as amended was money relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways in Ohio, but such funds were not being 'expended' consistent with the specific purposes enumerated in Article XII, Section 5a. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the money derived from certified abstracts was related to the process of certification, not to the registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways. View "Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. The court of appeals vacated both convictions, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing Appellee knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Upon his release, Appellee filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellee was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by Appellee, or both. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) one who claims to be a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in section 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment; and (2) a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to section 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellee court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial. Remanded. View "Doss v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the court of appeals that affirmed his classification as a Tier I sex offender based on his guilty plea to one count of sexual imposition. At issue was whether the trial court retained authority to classify Defendant as a Teir I sex offender more than a year after the entry of a final judgment of conviction for a sexually oriented offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked authority to reopen this case to reconsider the final judgment it had entered, and the protections against double jeopardy barred it from classifying Defendant as a Tier I sex offender more than a year after it imposed sentence. View "State v. Raber" on Justia Law

This was an original action by Relators, property owners, for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. On December 1, 2011, the court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of their taking of the property. Following failed settlement negotiations, the State filed appropriation cases for the property of two of the relators. All of the relators with the exception of the two then filed a motion for an order for Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ. The Supreme Court held that Relators established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ and ordered Respondents to file appropriation cases for Respondents' parcels. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zehringer" on Justia Law

A grand jury issued an indictment charging Appellee with two counts of trafficking in drugs. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the indictment did not sufficiently charge the two trafficking counts because neither count named the specific controlled substance involved. The trial court denied Appellee's motion, and Appellee pleaded no contest to the charges. Appellee appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it stated that the drug involved was a Schedule I or II drug instead of naming the specific drug involved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an indictment charging a defendant with trafficking in drugs under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.03 is sufficient if it names the schedule in which the drug appears; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case adequately informed Defendant of the charges pending against him. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law