Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of rape, gross sexual imposition, kidnapping, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Curry, other acts evidence offered to show a scheme, plan, or system is inadmissible unless it shows the background of the alleged crime or proves the identity of the accused; and (2) under Curry, the admission of evidence of a prior sexual relationship Defendant had with a different minor was precluded because the sexual acts of that relationship had been "chronologically and factually separate occurrences" and the identity of the accused was not an issue at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Ohio R. Evid. 404(B), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to prove intent or plan, even if the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is not at issue; and (2) consequently, evidence that Defendant had engaged in sexual relations with a teenage boy could be admissible to prove Defendant had a plan to groom boys for sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of forcible rape of a child, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to life in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's judgment not to merge the kidnapping and rape offenses, holding that the convictions for rape and kidnapping were allied offenses of similar import that should have merged at sentencing. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court erred in applying a de novo review of the trial court's determination that Defendant's offense should merge, or whether the court should have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an appellate court should apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court's Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 merger determination. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who violated former Ohio Rev. Code 2950.99 by failing to give proper notice of an address change. At issue in this case was whether current section 2950.99 or former section 2950.99 governed the penalty for Appellant. The appellate court (1) reversed the sentence imposed by the trial court, and (2) applied the penalty provision in place when Defendant was classified rather than the penalty provision in place immediately before Megan's Law was replaced by the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), holding that current section 2950.99 does not apply to sex offenders originally classified under Megan's Law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan's Law, the penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former section 2950.05 that occurs after Megan's Law was supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of section 2950.99 in place just before the effective date of the AWA. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the city and two of its firefighters. The action arose out of the death of Plaintiff's husband and grandson, who died when a city fire engine operated and commanded by the defendant firefighters collided with Plaintiff's husband's vehicle. The trial court court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) the city had a full defense to liability pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(1)(b) because the operation of the fire truck did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct; and (2) the firefighters were entitled to immunity pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(b) because Plaintiff presented no evidence that the firefighters had acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. The court of appeals reversed, holding that reasonable minds court find that the firefighers' actions in this case were reckless and that the willful or wanton misconduct referred to in section 2744.02(B)(1)(b) was the functional equivalent of recklessness. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the willful or wanton misconduct and recklessness degrees of care have different meanings, involve different degrees of culpability, and are not interchangeable. After the Court's clarification of the terms, the matter was remanded. View "Anderson v. Massillon" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and two counts of rape. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder and to twenty years in prison for the two rape convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly excused two prospective jurors for cause who were not unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in the majority of its evidentiary rulings; (3) the erroneous admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence establishing Defendant's guilt; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the penalty phase; (5) Ohio's death-penalty was constitutional; and (6) Defendant's death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a "final verdict" as that term is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established caselaw, the court of appeals concluded in this case that the order purporting to acquit Defendant for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order. View "State v. Hampton" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an individual who is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant forfeits all expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant in this case moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine found in his possession. The trial judge denied the motion base solely on the notion that an arrest warrant "cleanses" any error by police in seizing an individual later found to be subject to the warrant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unlawfulness of an improper arrest or seizure cannot be purged by the fortuitous subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant. Remanded for a finding of whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the arresting officer's patdown of Defendant and whether the contraband seized could be justified. View "State v. Gardner" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice claim filed well after the statute of repose set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C). Timothy and Tracy Ruther sued a doctor and medical facility, claiming that the doctor had failed to properly assess, evaluate and respond to abnormal laboratory results including very high liver enzymes. The court of appeals held that section 2305.113(C), as applied to the facts of this case, violated the right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, relying in part upon Hardy v. VerMeulen. The Supreme Court overruled Hardy and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs, whose cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until after the statute of repose had expired, were not deprived of a vested right; (2) Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their claim; and (3) therefore, the medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 2305.113(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution. View "Ruther v. Kaiser" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 4509.05(A) and asserting that the amended statute violated Ohio Const. art XII, 5a. The statute provided that the registrar of motor vehicles shall collect a certified abstract with respect to any person's motor vehicle accidents and record of convictions for violation of motor vehicle laws. In addition, the statute directed the registrar to collect for each abstract a five dollar fee. The trial court agreed and granted injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, concluding that sixty percent of the five dollar fee collected under section 4509.0 as amended was money relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways in Ohio, but such funds were not being 'expended' consistent with the specific purposes enumerated in Article XII, Section 5a. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the money derived from certified abstracts was related to the process of certification, not to the registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways. View "Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law