Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled no contest to domestic violence. Defendant was later indicted on three counts of felony abduction and one count of domestic violence stemming from the same incident. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abduction. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's guilty plea. On remand, the case went to trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of one count of abduction. Once again, the court of appeals reversed, and Defendant was ordered discharged. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint requesting that he be declared a wrongfully imprisoned person, a declaration required by statute before damages may be sought against the State. The trial court found that Defendant's prior guilty plea did not disqualify him from recovery under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 and declared Defendant a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who has pled guilty to an offense is not eligible to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual for that offense, even if the plea is later vacated on appeal. Remanded. View "Dunbar v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants were five upper-level employees of the Ohio Department of Natural Resource's Division of Wildlife (DOW). The Ohio inspector general (OIG) asked a deputy inspector to investigate alleged misconduct of a DOW wildlife officer. The inspector interviewed Appellants. The OIG's subsequent investigative report concluded that Appellants failed to report the wildlife officer's criminal conduct to the appropriate authorities. A grand jury later indicted each appellant on obstructing justice and complicity in obstructing justice. Appellants filed motions to suppress or, alternatively, dismiss, on the ground that their statements to the investigator were coerced by threat of job loss and were therefore inadmissible under Garrity v. New Jersey. The trial court suppressed Appellants' statements as compelled and therefore inadmissible under Garrity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Appellants' statements during the OIG investigation required suppression because Appellants answered questions after receiving a warning that they could be fired for failing to do so, and statements extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary within the meaning of Garrity. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

Maria Marusa was driving her car when it was struck by a police cruiser driven by a police officer (Officer). Marusa and her daughter (collectively, Appellants) were injured in the accident. Appellants filed suit against Marusa's insurer (Insurer), seeking damages to compensate for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Insurer answered that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy included uninsured-motorist coverage and the officer was an uninsured motorist, Appellants were not "legally entitled to recover" because Officer was immune under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law (OPSTLL). The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the policy unambiguously provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured by an owner or operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. View "Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, speeding, and failing to reinstate his driver's license. Rather than participate in discovery pursuant to Ohio R. Crim. P. 16, Defendant submitted a public records request directly to the Highway Patrol. After the Highway Patrol provided Defendant with numerous records, the State successfully moved the trial court to compel Defendant to provide discovery, asserting that the public records request amounted to a demand for discovery and triggered a reciprocal duty of disclosure pursuant to Rule 16. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a public records request is not a demand for discovery, and therefore, Defendant owed no duty of reciprocal disclosure to the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an accused makes a public records request for information that could have been obtained from the State through discovery, that request is the equivalent of a demand for discovery, and a reciprocal duty of disclosure arises in accordance with Rule 16; and (2) because Defendant received evidence from the Highway Patrol that could have been obtained from the prosecutor through discovery, he had a reciprocal duty to provide discovery to the State. View "State v. Athon" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. In his first postconviction application, Defendant sought DNA testing of a cigarette butt. The trial court rejected the application because it found an earlier DNA test to be definitive. Defendant subsequently filed a second application for DNA testing of the cigarette butt based on newly discovered evidence he asserted identified other suspects in the murders. The trial court again rejected the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.73(E)(1) is constitutional in conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Court from a trial court's denial of postconviction DNA testing in a case in which the death penalty was imposed; and (2) before dismissing a subsequent application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.72(A), a trial court must apply the definition of "definitive DNA test" set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.71(U) and the criteria of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.74. Remanded to consider whether prior definitive DNA testing, as defined in section 2953.71(U), precluded Defendant's second application. View "State v. Noling" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several felonies and sentenced to an aggregate total of ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. When no decision was made on that motion for several months, Defendant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and procedendo in an attempt to get the trial judge to rule on his motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's complaint for the writs on the basis that he had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his postrelease claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a writ of procedendo was appropriate in this case because the trial judge failed to rule on an uncomplicated motion for over a year. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Court of Common Pleas (Collier)" on Justia Law

At the end of his jury trial for attempted murder, Defendant requested an instruction on the lesser included offenses of assault and aggravated assault but opposed the state's request for an instruction on felonious assault. The trial court provided instructions on all lesser included offenses as requested by both parties. Defendant was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of felonious assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court correctly provided the jury with an instruction for felonious assault as a lesser included offense at the close of Defendant's trial, as a charge of attempted murder reasonably puts a defendant on notice that he may be convicted of felonious assault by causing physical harm. View "State v. Deanda" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, violating a protection order, and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish that at the time of the altercation he knew there was a protection order in place because the order was not delivered before the offense occurred. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant knew of the order, knew of the risk that his conduct would violate the order, and acted recklessly by disregarding that risk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to sustain a conviction for violating a protection order under Ohio Rev. Code 2919.27(A)(2), the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it served the defendant with the order before the alleged violation. Remanded. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to rape of a child under thirteen, gross sexual imposition on a child under thirteen, and two counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor. Appellant was sentenced to thirty-one years without the possibility of parole. After Appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2006, Appellant filed a second habeas petition in 2012. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law an that the petition was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding Appellant's petition barred by res judicata; but (2) the court of appeals acted properly when it concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law, refused to reach the merits, and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim for habeas relief. View "Billiter v. Banks" on Justia Law

Findlay Market was a public market historically owned and operated by the City of Cincinnati until 2004, when the City and the Corporation for Findlay Market of Cincinnati entered into lease and management agreements under which the Corporation was to manage the market for the city. In this public-records mandamus case, Appellant sought unredacted copies of the lease agreements between the Corporation and merchants who subleased retail space at the market. Appellant received copies of the leases, but the term and rent provisions were redacted by the Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish his entitlement to relief in mandamus for the unredacted leases, as they were trade secrets and not public records. View "State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay Market of Cincinnati" on Justia Law