Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Edward Verhovec filed a public-records mandamus action against the City of Marietta after the City failed to respond to Edward's public-records request. After the City provided Edward with the requested records, the trial court dismissed Edward's action. Meanwhile, Dorothy Verhovec also filed a public-records action to compel the City to release requested records. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City after the City provided her with the records. The City sought sanctions against both Edward and Dorothy for frivolous conduct. Before the trial court ruled on the motions, Dorothy and Edward petitioned for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition actions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that because the Verhovecs each had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge any erroneous ruling in the trial court, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss both actions for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Verhovec v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 4301.69(A), which prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person. At Defendant's trial, the State had difficulty proving what Defendant sold to an informant was beer as defined by statute. The court then took judicial notice that Bud Light was, in fact, beer. Defendant was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact - the alcohol content by volume of Bud Light - that was not something that was "generally known." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that because there was no evidence admitted on the statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Defendant to the informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and double jeopardy barred a retrial. View "State v. Kareski" on Justia Law

Harper, a known drug dealer, was robbed and murdered in his Sandusky residence. Police learned that immediately before his murder, Harper was to have participated in a drug deal. Cellphone records led them to Gipson, who was in custody in Canton, Michigan for his alleged involvement in another crime. Steckel, a Canton police officer, later testified that during a driving tour of the neighborhood, Gipson identified Ricks, who he knew as “Peanut,” as the other man involved in the murder. The judge instructed the jury that the hearsay testimony was not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to describe the investigation. Neither Gipson nor Ricks testified. Ricks was convicted. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that admission of the alleged accomplice’s statements through an investigating officer’s testimony violated Ricks’s (the defendant’s) right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution. Gipson’s out-of-court statements connected Ricks to Gipson and to the crime. The danger of unfair prejudice was amplified by further testimony that Gipson was upset and scared by seeing Ricks, which encouraged the jury to misuse the content of the out-of-court statement for its truth. View "State v. Ricks" on Justia Law

Lowe sought, by writ of procedendo, to compel Judge Callahan, to issue a ruling on his motion in arrest of judgment, alleging that he filed his motion on August 10, 2012, and that Judge Callahan has not ruled on it. The court of appeals dismissed the matter as moot because the judge had ruled on Lowe’s motion on August 22, 2012. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Lowe’s argument was not that the judge failed to rule on his motion but that she addressed the wrong issue in her ruling, an argument that should have been raised in an appeal of the ruling. View "Lowe v. Callahan" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellee, who worked for the City of North Ridgeville, was assaulted and raped by a co-worker while at work. Appellee filed this action against the City for, among other causes of action, intentional, willful, and wanton disregard for the safety of others in selecting and controlling the co-worker, which was an employer intentional tort. The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because an intentional tort may arise out of the employment relationship between a political subdivision and its employee, the City did not establish that it was entitled to immunity as a matter of law on that claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a civil action by an employee of a political subdivision alleging an intentional tort against her employer may fall within the Ohio Rev. Code 2744.09(B) exception to political-subdivision immunity; and (2) the City did not establish that it was entitled to political-subdivision immunity on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim as a matter of law. View "Vacha v. City of N. Ridgeville" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a police officer, was convicted of abduction and intimidation, each with an accompanying firearm specification. On appeal, the court of appeals partially reversed and remanded for a new trial on the abduction charges, holding that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction were fatally deficient. The court also reversed the gun specifications. At issue on appeal were the following issues: (1) whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to intimidate; and (2) what instructions a trial court must give to the jury on the definition of the "privilege" exception to the offense of abduction where the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest and detain. The Supreme Court partially reversed, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly upheld Defendant's intimidation conviction; but (2) incorrectly held that the definition of "privilege" provided by the trial court constituted plain error. View "State v. Steele" on Justia Law

In 1979, Appellant pled guilty to felonies and was sentenced to four to twenty-five years. In 1980, Appellant was paroled. In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to several more felonies and was sentenced to five to twenty-five more years. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentences imposed on him after he violated parole were to be served concurrently with his original 1979 sentence. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, warden of the Grafton Correctional Institution, concluding that former Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(3) required the sentences to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute at the time required that Appellant's sentences be served consecutively, and even if it did not, the judgment entries did not support Appellant's arguments. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant was a political subdivision for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 2744. Appellee sued Appellant, asserting several claims. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming political-subdivision immunity. Appellant then unsuccessfully sought to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity as an affirmative offense. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant on two of Appellee's claims. After Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of leave to file an amended answer, the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on two of its remaining claims. Appellant filed a second appeal from the judgment. While Appellant's appeals were pending, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a trial of any claim subject to the political-subdivision immunity defense. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Appellant's appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for leave to file an amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity precluded Appellant from enjoying the benefits of the alleged immunity; and (2) the court of appeals therefore possessed jurisdiction to determine Appellant's appeal of that order. View "Supportive Solutions, LLC v. Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow" on Justia Law

Appellee was indicted on drug-related charges. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search, finding the search violated the Fourth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The State subsequently filed an application for en banc consideration and moved to have all eight judges of the court of appeals rule on its application. The three-judge panel that heard the State's original appeal denied the motion for participation of all eight judges and found that en banc consideration was unwarranted. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper for only the panel, and not the en banc court, to review and deny the State's application for en banc consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals' method of handling the State's application for en banc consideration was permissible under Ohio R. App. P. 26(A)(2). View "State v. Forrest" on Justia Law