Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision.View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were ProgressOhio.org, Inc., a member of the Ohio Senate, and a former member of the Ohio House of Representatives. Appellants brought a constitutional challenge to the JobsOhio Act, which created JobsOhio, a nonprofit corporation, and gave JobsOhio the right to purchase the state’s liquor distribution and merchandising operations. The trial court dismissed the case, concluding that Appellants lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants had no personal stake in the outcome of this litigation, they lacked common-law standing to challenge the JobsOhio Act.View "ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio" on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer filed two original actions in the Supreme Court seeking extraordinary writs. In the first case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county court judge to vacate his order sealing records relating to the prosecution of a defendant for a disorderly-conduct misdemeanor charge. In the second case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to produce criminal records for the past five years that had been incorrectly sealed and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from enforcing his orders to seal those records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ in the first case because the judge did not follow the proper statutory procedure in sealing the case; and (2) denied the writs in the second case because the Enquirer failed to establish a clear legal right to the records it requested.View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted requests for the personnel records of six employees of the West Licking Fire District to Appellee, the person responsible for public records for the district. Less than three business days after he had made the requests, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Appellee produced the documents two hours after the suit was filed. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, concluding that the records were produced in a reasonable amount of time and that Appellant had engaged in frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district responded to Appellant’s request in a reasonable amount of time, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint; and (2) the court of appeals must hold a hearing before awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Metzger" on Justia Law

Erin McCardle and Leatrice Tolls, protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement in the Public Square area of Cleveland, were arrested and charged with a curfew violation under Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. The ordinance prevents any person from remaining in the Public Square area between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. without a permit. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants subsequently pled no contest to the curfew violation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because Cleveland’s interests were insufficient to justify its limit on speech, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the United States Constitution, as it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allowed alternative channels of speech.View "City of Cleveland v. McCardle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his former mother-in-law, his five-year-old daughter, and his three-year-old son. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each of the three aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue did not violate Defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (2) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in seating two jurors that Defendant claimed were unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of autopsy photos; (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (6) Defendant’s challenges to the death penalty failed; and (7) there was no error in the sentences imposed.View "State v. Mammone" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to the murders of two women and to two counts of abuse of a corpse. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder with death specifications for the deaths of two girls. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that (1) the State’s closing remarks in the penalty phase were “improper and substantially prejudicial,” but the Court’s independent evaluation and approval of the capital sentence cured the errors in the penalty-phase proceedings; (2) the trial court did not violate Ohio R. Evid. 404(B) by allowing a witness to testify that when she was thirteen years old Defendant exposed himself to her and offered her five dollars to engage in oral sex; (3) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of attempted rape or robbery in connection the murder of one of the girls; and (5) the sentence was appropriate.View "State v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant to wear leg restraints in the courtroom, and even assuming that the order was an abuse of discretion, the error was harmless; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of weapons and ammunition not used in the murders, but the error was harmless; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in introducing the former testimony of Dr. Delaney Smith, a psychiatrist, during the penalty phase, as defense counsel had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Smith; and (5) the trial court’s sentencing opinion was adequate. View "State v. Neyland" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to multiple criminal offenses, both state and federal. Appellant sought release from prison, arguing that the sentencing entry was ambiguous regarding whether his state sentences were to be served concurrently or consecutively to his federal sentence, and as a result, the sentences must be concurrent. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) habeas corpus was inappropriate in this case because sentencing errors are not cognizable in habeas corpus; (2) the availability of other adequate remedies at law also precludes relief in habeas corpus; and (3) even if Appellant could overcome the problems with habeas in this case, his arguments were without merit because the sentencing entry was not ambiguous. View "State ex rel. O’'Neal v. Bunting" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he committed acts constituting aggravated robbery. After a mandatory bindover hearing, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the common pleas court. Defendant did not object to the mandatory bindover. Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, for the first time, that the statutory mandatory bindover procedures violated his constitutional rights and that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these claims in the lower courts. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, by pleading guilty, Defendant had waived his right to challenge either the mandatory bindover or his attorney’s failure to object to it and that Defendant had not demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant forfeited his challenge to the constitutionality of the mandatory bindover statutes by failing to present it to the lower courts. View "State v. Quarterman" on Justia Law