Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Cincinnati charged Daniel Ilg with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and related offenses. Ilg moved to suppress the results of his breath test taken from an Intoxilyzer 8000 machine. During discovery, Ilg sought computerized online breath archives data consisting of information transmitted by the specific machine used to test him to the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) for each breath test it performed. Ilg sought the data to challenge whether the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine operated properly on the day of his arrest. When the information was not forthcoming, the trial court ordered ODH to disclose the records. The ODH failed to comply with the discovery order, and the trial court ordered as a sanction that the evidence obtained from the Intoxilyzer 8000 be excluded from trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction was warranted in this case because Ilg was entitled to discovery of relevant evidence to support his claim that the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine used to test him failed to operate properly. View "City of Cincinnati v. Ilg" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, each of which carried three death specifications. Defendant waived a jury and was tried by a three-judge panel. The panel found Defendant guilty of felony murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s jury waiver and voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (2) the procedure whereby the judges were appointed to the panel was not plain error; (3) Defendant’s confession was voluntary; (4) Defendant’s claim that the State violated his Sixth Amendment rights by seizing “attorney work product” during a search of his jail cell was waived at trial; (5) prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (6) the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors in this case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentence in this case was appropriate and proportionate.View "State v. Osie" on Justia Law

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman are the successors in interest to an easement created in 1915 for the purpose of draining what is now their farmland over land now owned by the City of Freemont. After the City unilaterally replaced plastic drainage tiles across the easement with a single drainage pipe and rerouted the drainage pathway, the Wassermans sued in mandamus, alleging an unconstitutional taking. The court of appeals concluded that the City violated the easement and that the Wassermans were entitled to a determination of whether a taking had actually occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the express easement language gave the owner of the original servient estate the right to determine the lines by which the drainage system should run through the land, and as the current owner of the servient estate, the City retained the right to change the route of the drainage tile as long as it continued to drain the Wassermans’ land; and (2) under the facts of this case, the City did not violate the easement.View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.” Under Crim.R. 46(A)(2), however, a court may require a defendant to post ten percent of the bail amount in cash. Relators in these consolidated cases were bail bond agents and companies seeking writs of mandamus to compel the clerk and judges of county courts to accept surety bonds in all cases where bail is set by the court. Relator Woody Fox Bail Bonds also requested damages. The Supreme Court granted the requested writs of mandamus but denied damages, holding (1) Crim.R. 46(A)(2) is unconstitutional insofar as it permits a court to require a bond secured by a ten percent cash deposit as the only option, to the exclusion of a surety bond, because it denies the constitutional rights of defendants to be “bailable by sufficient sureties”; and (2) the clerk of courts and judges have political-subdivision immunity.View "State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal" on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision.View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were ProgressOhio.org, Inc., a member of the Ohio Senate, and a former member of the Ohio House of Representatives. Appellants brought a constitutional challenge to the JobsOhio Act, which created JobsOhio, a nonprofit corporation, and gave JobsOhio the right to purchase the state’s liquor distribution and merchandising operations. The trial court dismissed the case, concluding that Appellants lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants had no personal stake in the outcome of this litigation, they lacked common-law standing to challenge the JobsOhio Act.View "ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio" on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer filed two original actions in the Supreme Court seeking extraordinary writs. In the first case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county court judge to vacate his order sealing records relating to the prosecution of a defendant for a disorderly-conduct misdemeanor charge. In the second case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to produce criminal records for the past five years that had been incorrectly sealed and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from enforcing his orders to seal those records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ in the first case because the judge did not follow the proper statutory procedure in sealing the case; and (2) denied the writs in the second case because the Enquirer failed to establish a clear legal right to the records it requested.View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted requests for the personnel records of six employees of the West Licking Fire District to Appellee, the person responsible for public records for the district. Less than three business days after he had made the requests, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Appellee produced the documents two hours after the suit was filed. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, concluding that the records were produced in a reasonable amount of time and that Appellant had engaged in frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district responded to Appellant’s request in a reasonable amount of time, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint; and (2) the court of appeals must hold a hearing before awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Metzger" on Justia Law

Erin McCardle and Leatrice Tolls, protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement in the Public Square area of Cleveland, were arrested and charged with a curfew violation under Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. The ordinance prevents any person from remaining in the Public Square area between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. without a permit. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants subsequently pled no contest to the curfew violation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because Cleveland’s interests were insufficient to justify its limit on speech, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the United States Constitution, as it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allowed alternative channels of speech.View "City of Cleveland v. McCardle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his former mother-in-law, his five-year-old daughter, and his three-year-old son. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each of the three aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue did not violate Defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (2) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in seating two jurors that Defendant claimed were unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of autopsy photos; (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (6) Defendant’s challenges to the death penalty failed; and (7) there was no error in the sentences imposed.View "State v. Mammone" on Justia Law