Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Defendant was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. At the time, Defendant was being held in a county jail in Maryland. In 2012, the State re-indicted Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that his speedy-trial rights were violated because the applicable time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - codified in Ohio Rev. Code 2963.30 - were exceeded without resolution of the charges. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limits under the IAD did not apply because Black was incarcerated in an out-of-state county jail and not in a state penal or correctional institution. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two misdemeanor counts of theft and one felony count of breaking and entering. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the IAD applied to Defendant even though he was incarcerated in an out-of-state county facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “penal or correctional institution of a party state,” as it is used in section 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

These three consolidated cases arose out of the same set of facts and raised identical issues. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a probate judge, which gave law enforcement permission to search a business for evidence of illegal gambling, more than thirty video slot machines were confiscated, giving rise to charges filed against Defendants, who were operating the business. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that the search warrant was void because probate judges do not have the statutory authority to issue a criminal search warrant. The trial court agreed with Defendants and granted the motions to suppress the evidence gathered to the tainted warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the probate judge did indeed lack authority to issue a search warrant; but (2) the police officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant under United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search warrants in criminal matters; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon applies in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer sought a warrant to search a house based on facts within the supporting affidavit. Among those facts were the results of a “trash pull” that detectives had conducted outside the house. Based on these facts, the officers obtained the search warrant and, upon executing the warrant, found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab. Defendant was indicted on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered through execution of the search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “one trash pull is not necessarily sufficient” to establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence seized from the single trash pull that corroborated tips and background information involving drug activity was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and having weapons under disability. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a suggestion of incompetence to stand trial and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A psychologist conducted a court-ordered evaluation on the issues of Defendant’s competency and sanity. Defendant later withdrew the defenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when it allowed the psychologist to testify during trial. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2945.371(J) prohibits the use of statements made by a defendant in a psychiatric evaluation against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant asserts a mental-capacity defense, resulting in the court ordering a psychiatric evaluation, but then the defendant wholly abandons the defense, a psychologist’s testimony regarding the defendant’s feigning of mental illness during the court-ordered evaluation is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to section 2945.371(J); and (2) the trial court’s admission of the psychologist’s testimony in this case was not harmless error. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Toledo enacted an ordinance authorizing an automated traffic-law-enforcement system that assesses civil penalties against a vehicle’s owner for speeding and red-light violations. The ordinance further provides that appeals are heard through an administrative process established by the Toledo police department. Appellee received a notice of liability for a traffic violation under the ordinance and paid the civil penalty without pursuing an administrative appeal. Appellee then filed a class-action complaint against the City for unjust enrichment, asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it usurped the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ohio Constitution and statutory law do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations; and (2) Ohio municipalities have home rule-authority to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system and to establish administrative proceedings that must be exhausted before offenders can pursue judicial remedies. View "Walker v. Toledo" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend and two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the prosecutor did not violate Batson v. Kentucky during voir dire; (2) while the prosecutor made improper comments, the improper comments were not prejudicial and did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting surveillance videos into evidence; (4) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during either phase of trial; and (6) the death penalty was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved in similar cases. View "State v. Pickens" on Justia Law

In 2008, A police detective placed a global-positioning-system (GPS) tracking device on Defendant’s vehicle without obtaining a search warrant. Based on information gathered using the GPS device, law enforcement officers indicted Defendant for drug-related charges. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless placement and monitoring of the GPS tracking device on his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for application of United States v. Jones, decided in 2012, which held that attaching a GPS tracking device to an individual’s vehicle is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the trial court found that placing the GPS device on Defendant’s van violated the Fourth Amendment but that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding because binding appellate precedent justified placing GPS tracking devices on suspects’ vehicles without obtaining a search warrant at the time of the facts giving rise to this case, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and exclusion of the evidence obtained by police in this case was not warranted. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested pursuant to three misdemeanor arrest warrants. Based on information collected upon the execution of the arrest warrants, Defendant was charged with aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence collected as a result of his arrest, contending that the arresting officers lacked a valid warrant to arrest him because no probable-cause determination was made before the warrants were issued and because the criminal complaints on which the warrants were based contained no information that would support a finding of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly determined that the warrants were issued improperly because there was no determination of probable cause; and (2) the remedy of suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the defective warrants was not available because the officers relied in good faith upon a procedure established in binding precedent. View "State v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of, inter alia, engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Appellee’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals reversed the conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, concluding that Appellee’s appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions defining the term “enterprise,” as the jury instructions had been inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions, when read and understood together, adequately conveyed the law regarding the term “enterprise” and that the jury was appropriately and adequately informed on the issue. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of a police officer. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the trial court did not err by overruling Appellant’s objection to the State’s peremptory challenge, and the court conducted an adequate voir dire; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion for a change of venue; (3) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury; (4) any questionable conduct that the prosecutor engaged in during the proceedings did not deprive Appellant of a fair trial; (5) Appellant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; and (6) Appellant’s challenges to the death penalty failed, and the death sentence was appropriate and proportionate in this case. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law