Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case regarding the removal of a prospective juror based solely on his or her gender the Supreme Court held that when a party objecting to a peremptory challenge offers a bare allegation of gender discrimination without offering other relevant circumstances to support an inference of gender discrimination, that party fails to establish a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the crime of sexual imposition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor sought to exclude male jurors because they would tend to sympathize with him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination when the state exercised its peremptory challenge on a prospective juror and did not provide a gender-neutral explanation for its challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to recognize that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied to Defendant's objections to the state's peremptory challenges, but the error was immaterial because Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "State v. Stalder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relators ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to remove a proposed constitutional amendment (SJR 2) from the August 8, 2023 special election ballot, holding that Ohio Const. art. XVI, 1 authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe a special election on a specific date by joint resolution.SJR 2 proposed to amend the Ohio Constitution to require a vote of at least sixty percent of Ohio electors to approve any constitutional amendment and to modify the procedures for an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment. The Secretary issued a directive to all county boards of elections instructing them to prepare to hold a special election on August 8. Thereafter, Relators brought this action opposing the constitutional amendment proposed in SJR 2. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the August 8, 2023 special election called in SJR 2 was authorized by Ohio Const. Art. XVI, 1. View "State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus challenging the decision of the Ohio General Assembly placing a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election to be held on August 8, 2023, holding that a writ was warranted in part.In May 2023, the Ohio General Assembly passed a joint resolution to place to placed a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election. Relators filed this original action against Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Ohio Ballot Board arguing that the ballot language and title of the proposed amendment were incomplete and misleading. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that LaRose's use of the word "any" in reference to "constitutional amendment" in the ballot title was likely to mislead voters, and the ballot board shall reconvene to adopt lawful ballot language that accurately characterizes and explains the definition of "electors" in reference to the petition signature requirements in the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

In this action arising from an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment entitled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety" the Supreme Court held that Relators, registered Ohio voters, were not entitled to a writ of mandamus.The Ohio Ballot Board and its members determined that the initiative petition proposed a single constitutional amendment to the Ohio Constitution that would protect an individual's "right to make and carry out one's own reproductive decisions." Relators commenced this action ordering the Board to issue a determination that the petition contained more than one amendment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the ballot board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in determining that petition at issue contained a single constitutional amendment. View "State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Trumbell Correctional Institution, where Appellant was serving a forty-year prison sentence, holding that there was no error.Appellant was serving his prison sentence for nine convictions for felonious assault, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2903.11(B)(3). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing, inter alia, that section 2903.11(B)(3) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitution. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a valid claim for habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that habeas corpus did not lie for Appellant's nonjurisdictional claims. View "Christian v. Davis" on Justia Law

An Ohio tax lien on real property is enforced through a foreclosure action, which may result in a sale of the property at auction. If such a sale occurs and the price exceeds the amount of the lien, the excess funds may go to junior lienholders or the owner. If the tax-delinquent property is abandoned, an auction may not be required; the property may be transferred directly to a land bank, free of liens. When that happens, the county gives up its right to collect the tax debt, and any junior lienholders and the owner get nothing. The properties at issue were transferred directly to county land banks. US Bank owned one foreclosed property and claims to have held mortgages on the other two. US Bank alleges that at the time of the transfers, the fair market value of each property was greater than the associated tax lien and that the transfers to the land banks constituted takings without just compensation.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissals of the suits. US Bank lacks standing in one case; it did not hold the mortgage at the time of the alleged taking. As to the other properties, US Bank had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law. It could have redeemed the properties by paying the taxes; it could have sought transfers of the foreclosure actions from the boards of revision to the common pleas courts; it could have appealed the foreclosure adjudications to those courts. View "US Bank Trust, National Association v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Defendant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 9 when he was convicted as a juvenile and the trial court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing.Defendant was charged with allegedly committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of complicity to aggravated murder and other crimes. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of several charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an indefinite life sentence in prison with parole eligible after thirty-eight to forty-three years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's sentence was unconstitutional because the court failed to consider Defendant's youth as a factor in sentencing. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered as a result of a constitutionally-defective search warrant, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to the search of cell phones in this case.At issue was a constitutionally-deficient search warrant authorizing the search of cell phones found at the scene of a car crash. Nothing in the affidavit connected the cell phones to the accident except a police officer's averment that evidence of how the accident occurred may be found on the phones. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress for lack of probable cause, upholding the cell-phone search under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the warrant was constitutionally defective for want of probable cause in the warrant's supporting affidavit; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. View "State v. Schubert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss in Ohio Rev. Code 2315.18 were unconstitutionally applied to Plaintiff, who was sexually abused by Defendant when she was a child.A jury found Defendant guilty of over ninety counts of, among other things, rape and kidnapping. Thirty-four of those counts involved acts against Plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed a tort action against Defendant and asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment holding that section 2315.18 was unconstitutional as applied to her case. The jury awarded Plaintiff, inter alia, $20 million in compensatory damages for the abuse she suffered after the damages caps went in effect. The trial court denied Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and reduced her $20 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000. The court reversed, holding that section 2315.18 is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff to the extent that it failed to include an exception to its compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss for plaintiffs who have suffered permanent and severe psychological injuries. View "Brandt v. Pompa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84(A)(2)(b) was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R., the juvenile in this case, and thus violated his right to procedural due process, holding that the court of appeals did not err.D.R. was adjudicated delinquent for sexually assaulting his friend when he was sixteen years old. The juvenile court suspended D.R.'s commitment and placed him on probation with conditions. The court classified D.R. as a Tier I offender and notified him that he had a duty to register as a sex offender. At the end of D.R.'s disposition, the magistrate terminated D.R.'s probation but continued his Tier I classification on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority the terminate the classification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R. and violated due process. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law