Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Carl Morris was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape involving a minor. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, in violation of Ohio R. Evid. 404(B). A divided appellate court vacated the conviction, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted other-acts testimony, that the court's error was not harmless, and that the error materially prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an appellate court is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when considering an assignment of error that claims the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, in violation of Rule 404(B); and (2) the appellate court erred when it applied a de novo standard of review to this matter. Remanded. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Donald Eafford guilty of permitting drug abuse and possession of cocaine. The court of appeals vacated Eafford's felony sentence for possession of cocaine and remanded for resentencing, holding that Eafford was convicted only of misdemeanor possession of drugs because the jury-verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in imposing sentence, as (1) the indictment charged Eafford with possession of cocaine, and the least degree of that offense is a felony of the fifth degree; (2) the evidence presented at trial proved Eafford possessed cocaine; (3) the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Eafford guilty only if it found the drug involved to be cocaine; and (4) the jury, which found Eafford guilty as charged in the indictment, thus found him guilty of possession of cocaine as a felony. . View "State v. Eafford" on Justia Law

Reporters for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested that the Cincinnati police department provide the newspaper with certain records related to a shootout at a local bar, including the names of the two police officers shot, their personnel files, and an unredacted copy of the incident report of the shootout. The Cincinnati police chief denied the requests insofar as the newspaper sought names and identifying information regarding the officers involved in the shootout. The Enquirer subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the police chief to make the requested records available for inspection and copying and seeking attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ and the request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not in denying the writ and request for attorney fees, as the requested identifying information of the police officers wounded in the shooting was exempted from disclosure under the Public Records Act by the constitutional right of privacy. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Craig" on Justia Law

Appellant Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of aggravated sexual assault. Lloyd subsequently moved to Ohio. Lloyd was later convicted of several charges relating to his failure to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense for which Appellant was convicted in Texas was a sexually oriented offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio offense, and therefore, Appellant's offense triggered a duty to register in Ohio; but (2) because the State failed to prove that at the time Appellant moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, Appellant's convictions must be vacated. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two criminal cases against Mario Harris. In Harris I, Harris pleaded guilty to two offenses with forfeiture specifications. After the trial court imposed a sentence, Harris filed a motion for resentencing, which the court denied. The appellate court held that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion was not a final, appealable order because the sentencing court had failed to include the terms of forfeiture in the judgment of conviction. In Harris II, Harris pled guilty to an offense with an automobile-forfeiture specification. The trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered the forfeiture. The court denied Harris's subsequent motion for resentencing. The appellate court held that the sentence was void because the trial court had failed to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of Harris's sentence. The Supreme Court consdoliated the cases and held (1) a journal entry of conviction need not include a related forfeiture in order to be a final appealable order; and (2) when a trial court fails to impose a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of an offender's sentence, that part of the sentence is void, and resentencing is limited to the imposition of the statutorily mandated term. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellee Tracy Davis was indicted under Ohio Rev. Code 2921.04(B) for witness intimidation based on a threat he made to his ex-wife after police began investigating the underlying crime but before any charges had been filed. Section 2921.04(B) prohibits the intimidation of a person who observes a crime after the initiation of proceedings flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice. The trial court convicted Davis for witness intimidation. The court of appeals reversed, finding that no "action or proceeding" existed at the time of the threat, and therefore, the victim of the threat was not a witness under section 2921.04(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that insufficient evidence existed to convict Davis for witness intimidation based on his threat to his ex-wife because a police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice and does not invoke the protection of section 2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

C.P. was fifteen years old when he was charged with two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation. The juvenile court found C.P. to be a delinquent child and designated him a serious youthful offender in relation to each offense. Further, the court classified C.P. a public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant (PRQJOR) and a Tier III sex-offender/child-victim offender pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2152.86. At issue on appeal was the constitutionality of section 2152.86, which created the new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants, PRQJORs, who are automatically subject to mandatory, lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements without the participation of a juvenile judge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to the extent that it imposes such requirements on juvenile offenders tried with the juvenile system, section 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

Appellant Roland Nickleson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) notwithstanding Nickleson's claims, his sentencing entry was a final, appealable order because it contained a full resolution of all the counts of his indictment for which there were convictions; and (2) Nickleson had an adequate remedy by appeal from his sentencing entry to raise his other claims contesting the validity of the indictment, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. View "State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and kidnapping. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant was notified of postrelease control, but the language indicating notification had been made was inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry that resulted from that hearing. When the omission came to light, the trial court corrected the sentencing entry through a nunc pro tunc entry that stated that the notification had been made and denied Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court upheld the trial court's actions as a permissible use of a nunc pro tunc entry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's use of a nun pro tunc entry was appropriate in the specific circumstances of this case. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

Gerald Strothers requested that East Cleveland Mayor Gary Norton provide access to review, inspect, and copy at cost various public records. A week after Strothers's public-records request was received by Norton, Strothers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Norton to provide access to the requested records. Norton subsequently made available to Strothers all of the requested records. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus but awarded Strothers $1,000 in statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment denying the writ of mandamus and reversed the portion awarding statutory damages, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Norton's evidence established that Strothers had been given access to all of the requested records, which rendered his mandamus claim moot; and (2) abused its discretion in granting statutory damages to Strothers, as Norton produced the records within a reasonable period of time. View "Strothers v. Norton" on Justia Law