Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Edward Verhovec filed a public-records mandamus action against the City of Marietta after the City failed to respond to Edward's public-records request. After the City provided Edward with the requested records, the trial court dismissed Edward's action. Meanwhile, Dorothy Verhovec also filed a public-records action to compel the City to release requested records. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City after the City provided her with the records. The City sought sanctions against both Edward and Dorothy for frivolous conduct. Before the trial court ruled on the motions, Dorothy and Edward petitioned for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition actions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that because the Verhovecs each had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge any erroneous ruling in the trial court, the court of appeals was correct to dismiss both actions for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Verhovec v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a police officer, was convicted of abduction and intimidation, each with an accompanying firearm specification. On appeal, the court of appeals partially reversed and remanded for a new trial on the abduction charges, holding that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction were fatally deficient. The court also reversed the gun specifications. At issue on appeal were the following issues: (1) whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to intimidate; and (2) what instructions a trial court must give to the jury on the definition of the "privilege" exception to the offense of abduction where the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest and detain. The Supreme Court partially reversed, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly upheld Defendant's intimidation conviction; but (2) incorrectly held that the definition of "privilege" provided by the trial court constituted plain error. View "State v. Steele" on Justia Law

In 1979, Appellant pled guilty to felonies and was sentenced to four to twenty-five years. In 1980, Appellant was paroled. In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to several more felonies and was sentenced to five to twenty-five more years. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentences imposed on him after he violated parole were to be served concurrently with his original 1979 sentence. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, warden of the Grafton Correctional Institution, concluding that former Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(3) required the sentences to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute at the time required that Appellant's sentences be served consecutively, and even if it did not, the judgment entries did not support Appellant's arguments. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellee was indicted on drug-related charges. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search, finding the search violated the Fourth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The State subsequently filed an application for en banc consideration and moved to have all eight judges of the court of appeals rule on its application. The three-judge panel that heard the State's original appeal denied the motion for participation of all eight judges and found that en banc consideration was unwarranted. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper for only the panel, and not the en banc court, to review and deny the State's application for en banc consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals' method of handling the State's application for en banc consideration was permissible under Ohio R. App. P. 26(A)(2). View "State v. Forrest" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to domestic violence. Defendant was later indicted on three counts of felony abduction and one count of domestic violence stemming from the same incident. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abduction. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's guilty plea. On remand, the case went to trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of one count of abduction. Once again, the court of appeals reversed, and Defendant was ordered discharged. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint requesting that he be declared a wrongfully imprisoned person, a declaration required by statute before damages may be sought against the State. The trial court found that Defendant's prior guilty plea did not disqualify him from recovery under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 and declared Defendant a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who has pled guilty to an offense is not eligible to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual for that offense, even if the plea is later vacated on appeal. Remanded. View "Dunbar v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants were five upper-level employees of the Ohio Department of Natural Resource's Division of Wildlife (DOW). The Ohio inspector general (OIG) asked a deputy inspector to investigate alleged misconduct of a DOW wildlife officer. The inspector interviewed Appellants. The OIG's subsequent investigative report concluded that Appellants failed to report the wildlife officer's criminal conduct to the appropriate authorities. A grand jury later indicted each appellant on obstructing justice and complicity in obstructing justice. Appellants filed motions to suppress or, alternatively, dismiss, on the ground that their statements to the investigator were coerced by threat of job loss and were therefore inadmissible under Garrity v. New Jersey. The trial court suppressed Appellants' statements as compelled and therefore inadmissible under Garrity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Appellants' statements during the OIG investigation required suppression because Appellants answered questions after receiving a warning that they could be fired for failing to do so, and statements extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary within the meaning of Garrity. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, speeding, and failing to reinstate his driver's license. Rather than participate in discovery pursuant to Ohio R. Crim. P. 16, Defendant submitted a public records request directly to the Highway Patrol. After the Highway Patrol provided Defendant with numerous records, the State successfully moved the trial court to compel Defendant to provide discovery, asserting that the public records request amounted to a demand for discovery and triggered a reciprocal duty of disclosure pursuant to Rule 16. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a public records request is not a demand for discovery, and therefore, Defendant owed no duty of reciprocal disclosure to the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an accused makes a public records request for information that could have been obtained from the State through discovery, that request is the equivalent of a demand for discovery, and a reciprocal duty of disclosure arises in accordance with Rule 16; and (2) because Defendant received evidence from the Highway Patrol that could have been obtained from the prosecutor through discovery, he had a reciprocal duty to provide discovery to the State. View "State v. Athon" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. In his first postconviction application, Defendant sought DNA testing of a cigarette butt. The trial court rejected the application because it found an earlier DNA test to be definitive. Defendant subsequently filed a second application for DNA testing of the cigarette butt based on newly discovered evidence he asserted identified other suspects in the murders. The trial court again rejected the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.73(E)(1) is constitutional in conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Court from a trial court's denial of postconviction DNA testing in a case in which the death penalty was imposed; and (2) before dismissing a subsequent application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.72(A), a trial court must apply the definition of "definitive DNA test" set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.71(U) and the criteria of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.74. Remanded to consider whether prior definitive DNA testing, as defined in section 2953.71(U), precluded Defendant's second application. View "State v. Noling" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several felonies and sentenced to an aggregate total of ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. When no decision was made on that motion for several months, Defendant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and procedendo in an attempt to get the trial judge to rule on his motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's complaint for the writs on the basis that he had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his postrelease claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a writ of procedendo was appropriate in this case because the trial judge failed to rule on an uncomplicated motion for over a year. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Court of Common Pleas (Collier)" on Justia Law