Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. At the time, Defendant was being held in a county jail in Maryland. In 2012, the State re-indicted Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that his speedy-trial rights were violated because the applicable time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - codified in Ohio Rev. Code 2963.30 - were exceeded without resolution of the charges. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limits under the IAD did not apply because Black was incarcerated in an out-of-state county jail and not in a state penal or correctional institution. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two misdemeanor counts of theft and one felony count of breaking and entering. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the IAD applied to Defendant even though he was incarcerated in an out-of-state county facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “penal or correctional institution of a party state,” as it is used in section 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

These three consolidated cases arose out of the same set of facts and raised identical issues. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a probate judge, which gave law enforcement permission to search a business for evidence of illegal gambling, more than thirty video slot machines were confiscated, giving rise to charges filed against Defendants, who were operating the business. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that the search warrant was void because probate judges do not have the statutory authority to issue a criminal search warrant. The trial court agreed with Defendants and granted the motions to suppress the evidence gathered to the tainted warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the probate judge did indeed lack authority to issue a search warrant; but (2) the police officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant under United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search warrants in criminal matters; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon applies in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(C)(2)(a), which defines “gross sexual imposition” and subjects an offender to a mandatory term of imprisonment when evidence other than the victim’s testimony is admitted corroborating the violation. Appellant in this case pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State introduced testimony regarding Appellant’s alleged confession to the offenses and argued that the confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required. The trial court concluded that application of section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated Appellant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2907.05(C)(2)(a)’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime’s activity; and (2) in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial. View "State v. Bevly" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer sought a warrant to search a house based on facts within the supporting affidavit. Among those facts were the results of a “trash pull” that detectives had conducted outside the house. Based on these facts, the officers obtained the search warrant and, upon executing the warrant, found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab. Defendant was indicted on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered through execution of the search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “one trash pull is not necessarily sufficient” to establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence seized from the single trash pull that corroborated tips and background information involving drug activity was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend and two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the prosecutor did not violate Batson v. Kentucky during voir dire; (2) while the prosecutor made improper comments, the improper comments were not prejudicial and did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting surveillance videos into evidence; (4) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during either phase of trial; and (6) the death penalty was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved in similar cases. View "State v. Pickens" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of complicity to commit aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, and related crimes. After a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended death for the three aggravated murders. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation prior to his mitigation hearing. The trial court denied Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing, concluding that trial counsel’s decision to present only positive mitigation evidence was unreasonable, and undiscovered mitigating evidence might have influenced the jury’s appraisal of Defendant’s culpability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel were deficient by failing to conduct a thorough and adequate investigation into Defendant’s background before his mitigation hearing; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in determining that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial under Strickland. View "State v. Herring" on Justia Law

In 2008, A police detective placed a global-positioning-system (GPS) tracking device on Defendant’s vehicle without obtaining a search warrant. Based on information gathered using the GPS device, law enforcement officers indicted Defendant for drug-related charges. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless placement and monitoring of the GPS tracking device on his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for application of United States v. Jones, decided in 2012, which held that attaching a GPS tracking device to an individual’s vehicle is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the trial court found that placing the GPS device on Defendant’s van violated the Fourth Amendment but that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding because binding appellate precedent justified placing GPS tracking devices on suspects’ vehicles without obtaining a search warrant at the time of the facts giving rise to this case, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and exclusion of the evidence obtained by police in this case was not warranted. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested pursuant to three misdemeanor arrest warrants. Based on information collected upon the execution of the arrest warrants, Defendant was charged with aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence collected as a result of his arrest, contending that the arresting officers lacked a valid warrant to arrest him because no probable-cause determination was made before the warrants were issued and because the criminal complaints on which the warrants were based contained no information that would support a finding of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly determined that the warrants were issued improperly because there was no determination of probable cause; and (2) the remedy of suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the defective warrants was not available because the officers relied in good faith upon a procedure established in binding precedent. View "State v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of, inter alia, engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Appellee’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals reversed the conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, concluding that Appellee’s appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions defining the term “enterprise,” as the jury instructions had been inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions, when read and understood together, adequately conveyed the law regarding the term “enterprise” and that the jury was appropriately and adequately informed on the issue. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law