Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a gun that was found in a search of a car legally parked on a public street that Defendant was sitting in just before his arrest on a warrant for domestic violence. After Defendant was arrested, an officer conducted an inventory search of the car, during which he found a handgun. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant based on the domestic-violence warrant and that, pursuant to that arrest, the inventory search of the car prior to towing was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless inventory search of the lawfully parked vehicle in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 14. View "State v. Leak" on Justia Law

The Ohio Republican Party (ORP) sent a public-records request to Cuyahoga County seeking the County’s key card swipe data for five individuals, including Edward FitzGerald, the County’s former county executive. At the time of the ORP’s request, the key-card-swipe data were security records exempted from release because FitzGerald had received threats and release of that data would have diminished the County’s ability to protect him and maintain the security of the office of the county executive. Subsequent to receipt of the public-records request, the County moved its administrative offices to a new building, FitzGerald’s term of office expired, and the County released the records to members of the media. The ORP filed this mandamus action alleging that the County had failed to respond to its public-record requests. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the release of the records, holding that FitzGerald’s key-card-swipe data were public records, and the County failed to demonstrate that they were exempt from disclosure. View "State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a public-records mandamus case in the court of appeals to obtain records she had requested from the City of South Euclid. During the litigation, the City and its employee (collectively, Appellees) produced all of the requested records. The court of appeals granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s request for statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was entitled to damages and remanded with instructions to determine damages. On remand, the court of appeals awarded damages. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for sanctions against Appellees and their counsel. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion for sanctions was untimely and that the actions of Appellees and their counsel in defending the case were not taken in bad faith or with the purpose of delay. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

Relator requested public records from the City of South Euclid and its employee (together, South Euclid) for, inter alia, financial records associated with several city-owned properties. South Euclid sent some, but not all, of the requested records. Relator later filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus and statutory damages under the public-records act, alleging that South Euclid only partially responded to her requests and did not produce the records that she did receive within a reasonable period of time. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering that responsive records be produced if they exist and have not yet been produced and awarded costs and statutory damages in the amount of $600 to Relator, holding that South Euclid took an unreasonable amount of time producing some records responsive to Relator’s request. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor who was over thirteen but less than sixteen years of age. Defendant, who was twenty-one years old when he committed the offense, was designated a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender and was required to register with the county sheriff and to verify his residence address every 180 days for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Tier II sex-offender requirements imposed upon him violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier II offenders under Ohio Rev. Code 2950 do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and six counts of attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. After a new jury was convened, Defendant was convicted on all charges and specifications and again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) no error occurred in the selection and removal of jury members; (2) the trial court did not make erroneous evidentiary rulings that denied him a fair trial; (3) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (5) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase; (6) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during either the guilt phase or penalty phase of trial; (7) Defendant’s counsel provided effective assistance during both phases of trial; and (8) Defendant’s death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Dean" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for aggravated murder but vacated the sentence of death, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its pretrial rulings or violate Appellant’s right to a speedy trial or fair trial; (2) there was no prejudicial error or violation of Appellant’s constitution rights regarding jury selection; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; (4) Appellant was not prejudiced by prospective juror misconduct, and the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial based on statements made by a witness; (5) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; (6) the jury was properly instructed; but (7) there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding on the capital specification, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the death sentence. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Appellee was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed. After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence. After a “long and complex history,” a federal district court ultimately granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Appellee was denied the right to due process as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland. New proceedings subsequently commenced in the trial court. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss, concluding that because of the prejudice suffered by Appellee in light of the State’s “egregious prosecutorial misconduct” and the Brady violations in his two prior trials, Appellee could not receive the fair trial he was entitled to. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court acted unreasonably, unconscionably, and arbitrarily when it found that it was impossible for Appellee to receive a fair trial without first giving the parties an opportunity to develop the record. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to proceed to trial. View "State v. Keenan" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a Lake Township patrol officer and canine handler for a marked lane violation on an interstate highway. The officer walked her dog around the vehicle Defendant was driving, leading to the discovery oxycodone tablets and a baggie of marijuana. It is undisputed that the township police officer exercised law-enforcement powers not granted to township police officers. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, but the court denied it, concluding that the officer had probable cause to stop Defendant for a marked lane violation. Defendant was subsequently convicted. Defendant appealed, asserting that the officer lacked statutory authority to stop him for a marked lane violation on an interstate highway, and therefore, the stop and subsequent arrest and search were unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the stop violated the Ohio Constitution because the marked lane violation occurred outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the officer acted without authority to stop Defendant for a minor misdemeanor traffic offense on an interstate highway, the traffic stop, the arrest, and the search were unreasonable and violated Ohio Const. art. I, 14. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of retaliation, criminal damaging, vandalism, criminal trespass, possessing criminal tools, and ten counts of pandering. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress information found on his computer. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of criminal activity would be found there. The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) the search warrant was not supported not supported by probable cause, and (2) the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity, thereby rendering invalid the search of Defendant’s computer. View "State v. Castagnola" on Justia Law