Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this civil suit against Ottawa County, an uncharted county, the Supreme Court held that the County was not sui juris and therefore must be sued in the name of its board of commissioners.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ottawa County for negligence, wrongful death, and violation of a nursing home resident's rights. As defendant, Plaintiff named "County of Ottawa d/b/a Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home" but did not name the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners. Riverview was owned and run by the County, and its employees were employees of the County. Riverview moved for summary judgment, arguing that the County may be sued only by naming its board of commissioners as the defendant because an uncharted county is not sui juris. The trial court granted summary judgment without addressing the sui juris issue. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Riverview's sui juris argument. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Ottawa County is not sui juris, and the court of appeals erred in determining otherwise. View "Estate of Fleenor v. Ottawa County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio's antiblocking statute, Ohio Rev. Code 5589.21, which prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes, is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., and that the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., does not exempt section 5589.21 from the Termination Act's preemptive force.The State charged CSX Transportation, Inc. with violating section 5589.21 on five occasions. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted section 5589.21. The court of appeals reversed, holding that federal law did not preempt the antiblocking statute. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the charges brought against CSX, holding that section 5589.21 is preempted by federal law and therefore may not be enforced against CSX. View "State v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In these two original actions the Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt certain paragraphs of its order.Two brothers, who were coexecutors of their deceased father's estate, sought writs of prohibition to prevent the judge of the general division from enforcing her order memorializing a settlement in a judicial-dissolution action, arguing that they were not bound by the order because the general division lacked both subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the general division patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt the paragraphs of its order directing the brothers to take actions as coexecutors. View "Neiman v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition against Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).Appellant, a defendant in a divorce case pending before Judge Paschke, brought this petition alleging that Judge Paschke's procedure for issuing orders in his case violated Civ.R. 53 and seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the judge from issuing entires in violation of Civ.R. 53. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a valid claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the petition was based on an alleged error in Judge Paschke's exercise of jurisdiction and not a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, prohibition was not an appropriate remedy. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide certain records that Relator requested under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling DRC to produce inmate master file documents.After Relator's request for documents was denied he commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling DRC to provide a copy of his inmate master file and all kites, grievances and appeals filed by him through the electronic-kite system. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relator failed to show a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to compel the produce of the grievance-related records; (2) the DRC must produce the requested records; and (3) Relator was entitled to an award of the statutory maximum of $1,000 in damages. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Beachwood to terminate special prosecutor Stephanie Scalise, holding that this case was moot.Burkons was charged with one count of interfering with civil rights. City Prosecutor Nathalie Supler moved for leave to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict of interest because Burkons was a city council member. Supler asked the trial court to appoint Scalise as special prosecutor in this case. The municipal court judge granted the motion. Burkons eventually filed a complaint in mandamus against the City challenging Scalise's "unauthorized representation of the City." The court of appeals dismissed the mandamus action. The days earlier, a writ of prohibition was issued halting the criminal case against Burkons based on improper venue. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's mandamus complaint, holding that this action was moot. View "State ex rel. Burkons v. Beachwood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a member of the original panel of the court of appeals leaves the bench the departing judge may be replaced by a new judge on the panel that reconsiders its original decision.In this litigation centering around a soured business relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant the trial court issued a decision appointing a receiver to manage the dissolution of the business and ordering that the business be sold to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the receiver to entertain offers from all interested bidders. After the case was argued but before the decision issued, Judge Horton announced his impending resignation, which became effective before Defendant filed his application for reconsideration. Judge Frederick Nelson was appointed to fill Judge Horton's seat. Defendant opposed reconsideration, arguing that Judge Nelson should not participate in the reconsideration decision because he did not sit on the original panel. The court of appeals disagreed and entered a new decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals acted within the bounds of the law when Judge Nelson replaced Judge Horton on the panel considering Plaintiff's application for reconsideration. View "Jezerinac v. Dioun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of mandamus and/or a writ of procedendo to compel Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Alison Hatheway to rule on Petitioner's jurisdictional motion, holding that there was no error.Petitioner filed a "Motion Challenging Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Trial Judge Pursuant to Sup.R. 4, Sup.R. 36, Hamilton County Local Rule 7(E), O.R.C. 2701.031" and then later filed his petition seeking to compel Judge Hatheway to rule on his motion. Eight days after Petitioner filed his petition Judge Heathway issued an entry dismissing Petitioner's motion on res judicata grounds. In dismissing Petitioner's petition, the court of appeals determined that the procedendo claim was moot and that a writ of mandamus was not the proper remedy to redress Petitioner's alleged injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the procedendo claim as moot and that mandamus could not lie. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Hatheway" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge John O'Donnell from exercising jurisdiction over a civil action that was transferred from the Lyndhurst Municipal Court but denied the writ of mandamus ordering Lyndhurst Municipal Court Judge Dominic Coletta to dismiss the case upon its return from the common pleas court.Plaintiff filed a complaint against State Farm Mutual Insurance Company in the small claims division of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court. Judge Coletta granted Plaintiff's subsequent motion to transfer the case to Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, where it was assigned to Judge O'Donnell. State Farm filed a motion to return the case to the municipal court, but Judge O'Donnell denied the motion. State Farm then brought this action. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge O'Donnell from hearing the case in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and granted a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering Judge O'Donnell to return the matter to the Lyndhurst Municipal Court, holding the peremptory writ was appropriate. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Relators, who owned property over which Ohio Power Company sought to take easements by eminent domain, holding that Relators were entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Washington County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Halliday from proceeding with a compensation trial during the pendency of Relators' appeal.After Judge Halliday ruled that Ohio Power's takings were necessary for a public use Relators appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the appeal, Judge Halliday scheduled a trial on the issue of compensation. Relators commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Halliday from holding the compensation trial while their appeal was pending. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the appropriations in this case did not fall under any of the exceptions to the owner's right to immediate appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(3); and (2) a compensation trial during the pendency of a section 163.09(B)(3) appeal is inconsistent with the court of appeals' jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday" on Justia Law