Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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This case involves an appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellant is the State of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General, and the appellees are FirstEnergy Corporation, Samuel Randazzo, and a consulting company controlled by Randazzo. Randazzo, the former chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), allegedly received a $4.3 million bribe from FirstEnergy Corporation. The state of Ohio filed a civil action against Randazzo and his consulting company to recover the proceeds of the bribe. The state sought attachment orders to prevent Randazzo from draining his bank and brokerage accounts. The trial court granted the state’s motion ex parte, without notice to Randazzo and his attorneys. After learning about the court's decision, Randazzo requested a hearing and moved to vacate the orders. The court held a hearing with both sides present and declined to discharge the orders of attachment. Randazzo appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found the orders of attachment had been improperly granted. The Court of Appeals determined that the state had failed to meet its burden at the ex parte hearing to establish the irreparable injury requirement.Upon appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by basing its decision on the ex parte requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the attachment rather than the irreparable injury requirement for an ex parte order. The Supreme Court concluded that the proper remedy for a party dissatisfied with an ex parte attachment order is to request a hearing on the order at which both parties may be heard. It also concluded that Randazzo failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the use of improper garnishment forms. View "State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the main issue was whether the four-year medical-claims statute of repose, set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), applies to wrongful-death claims based on medical care. The facts of the case involved Todd Everhart, who had been involved in a car accident in 2003 and was subsequently transferred to Coshocton County Memorial Hospital. Despite finding an abnormality in his chest x-rays, the doctors did not inform him about it. Nearly three years later, Everhart was diagnosed with advanced-stage lung cancer and died two months later. His wife, Machelle Everhart, filed a lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors involved, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death due to their failure to inform Mr. Everhart of his lung condition.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the broad definition of "medical claim" clearly and unambiguously includes wrongful-death claims based on medical care. Therefore, the four-year medical-claims statute of repose applies to such claims. The court ruled that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erroneously held otherwise and thus reversed its decision. The court remanded the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to address Mrs. Everhart's remaining assignment of error. View "Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard. View "In re Z.C." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Petitioner's mandamus action after recognizing his status as a vexatious litigator as declared in an earlier, separate matter, holding that Petitioner did not "continue" his proceeding as a vexatious litigator in this case.Appellant filed a mandamus action against the Franklin County Board of Commissioners and mailed his objections to a magistrate's decision to the court of appeals. The court in a separate matter subsequently declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator. Upon filing Appellant's objections in this case, the court of appeals recognized Appellant's status as a vexatious litigator and sua sponte dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when Appellant mailed his objections and filed his motion for leave, he did not "continue" the proceeding as a vexatious litigator under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals' dismissal was incorrect. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin County Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals rejecting Charles Simpson's peremptory prohibition claim and mandamus claim, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying the prohibition claim and that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for mandamus relief.Grande Voiture in a separate case filed a motion for an order finding Simpson, the defendant in that case, in contempt of the trial court's order granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Grande Voiture. Common Pleas Court Judge Kimberly Melnick granted Grande Voiture's motion to strike Simpson's answer and counterclaim on the grounds that Grande Voiture's contempt motion was not a pleading. Simpson then filed an original action seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition forbidding the judge from proceeding with the contempt hearing without allowing a jury trial and without considering the answer and counterclaim. Simpson also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to proceed by jury trial on the issues before her. The court of appeals granted the judge's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Simpson failed to state a valid claim for the writs. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case. As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellants' action for a writ of prohibition against Appellees - Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas Judge Marianne Sezon and Clerk of Court April Daniels - and denied Appellants' motion for oral argument, holding that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which a writ of prohibition could be granted.In a forcible entry and detainer action Judge Sezon ordered Appellants to vacate the premises at issue. The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement, but Appellants did not vacate the premises by the agreed-upon date. The underlying plaintiff subsequently moved for a writ of restitution. Appellants filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied and dismissed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Sezon did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings before her. View "State ex rel. Allenbaugh v. Sezon" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's claims seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus against Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Judge Kimberly A. Melnick, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on its claims of error.Appellant had been declared a vexatious litigator by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant and its co-relator filed an original action seeking writs of prohibition preventing Judge Melnick from ruling on a motion for contempt and sanctions and a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Melnick to hold a jury trial in a case in which Judge Melnick was presiding. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's claims on the action for failure to seek leave to proceed as a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments on appeal lacked merit. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering Judge John P. O'Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and to dismiss the underlying case, holding that the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation was entitled to the writs.The City of Cleveland and the City of Parma sued the Bureau in separate actions. The Supreme Court held that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland's action. Judge O'Donnell then dismissed Parma's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, Parma filed the underlying lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment. Judge O'Donnell denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss. Parma also filed an action against the Bureau in the court of claims, which dismissed the complaint on limitations grounds. The Bureau then brought this action against Judge O'Donnell, arguing that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the underlying case. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding that the Court of Claims Act, Ohio Rev. Code 2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

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In this civil suit against Ottawa County, an uncharted county, the Supreme Court held that the County was not sui juris and therefore must be sued in the name of its board of commissioners.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ottawa County for negligence, wrongful death, and violation of a nursing home resident's rights. As defendant, Plaintiff named "County of Ottawa d/b/a Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home" but did not name the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners. Riverview was owned and run by the County, and its employees were employees of the County. Riverview moved for summary judgment, arguing that the County may be sued only by naming its board of commissioners as the defendant because an uncharted county is not sui juris. The trial court granted summary judgment without addressing the sui juris issue. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Riverview's sui juris argument. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Ottawa County is not sui juris, and the court of appeals erred in determining otherwise. View "Estate of Fleenor v. Ottawa County" on Justia Law