Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her daughter, filed a civil suit against Defendant for assault, false imprisonment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Plaintiff requested compensatory and punitive damages. After Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment against her. Before the damages hearing, Defendant died. The administrator of Defendant’s estate was substituted as a party. After a hearing, the trial court awarded compensatory damages to Plaintiff’s two daughters and concluded that punitive damages could not be properly awarded against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Ohio law permits an award of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a punitive damages award is available in the limited circumstances presented in this case. Remanded to the trial court for a hearing on punitive damages and attorney fees. View "Whetstone v. Binner" on Justia Law

Appellant was granted a default judgment against Bank of America and filed a praecipe for a writ of execution. BAC Field Services filed a motion to stay the execution of judgment and a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court granted the motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to clarify its reasoning. Thereafter, Appellant moved the trial court to reinstate the default judgment. When the court had not ruled on the motion, Appellant filed this action requesting writs of prohibition barring the trial court from vacating the default judgment and barring BAC from appearing in the case. The court of appeals denied the writs. After Appellant appealed, the trial court again vacated the default judgment and responded to the court of appeals’ instruction to clarify its reasoning. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) declared the petition for a writ of procedendo moot because the trial court had issued a decision clarifying its reasons for vacating the default judgment; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment denying Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition because the court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. Haley v. Davis" on Justia Law

Gabriella Moir was the plaintiff in the underlying divorce case. Judge Mary Kovack, the only judge in the Medina County Domestic Relations Court, recused herself from the case. Acting in her capacity as the administrative judge of that court, Judge Kovack subsequently issued orders assigning magistrates to the visiting judge, Judge Carol Dezso of Summit County Domestic Relations Court, for the purpose of presiding over the divorce. Moir brought this action for a writ of prohibition against Judge Kovack and Judge Dezso, as well as the two courts and one of the assigned magistrates, asserting that the two judges lacked jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ as to Judge Kovack, holding (1) because Judge Kovack recused herself based on a potential conflict of interest, she was without jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case; and (2) Judge Dezso as the appointed judge may assign magistrates to help her hear the case. View "State ex rel. Moir v. Kovack" on Justia Law

Craig Conley faxed a letter to Judge Dixie Park requesting full and legible copies of documents from the court’s electronic docket. Judge Park returned the request, stating that the court did not accept faxed filings without the court’s prior approval. Conley responded that his request was not a filing but a public-records request. Conley subsequently filed this action requesting a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus ordering Judge Park to provide the copies of the requested records. Before Judge Park responded to the complaint and before twenty-eight days had elapsed the court of appeals issued a peremptory writ and closed the case. Judge Park filed a motion for relief from judgment and then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The court of appeals concluded that, because of the appeal, it was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for relief from judgment unless the case was remanded. Conley moved the Supreme Court to remand the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals acted prematurely before allowing Judge Park to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Conley v. Park" on Justia Law

A landowner filed a complaint for breach of contract against the predecessor in interest to Huntington National Bank. The trial judge ruled in favor of the landowner and awarded damages. The court of appeals reversed on the issue of the proper standard for calculating damages and remanded the case for a recalculation. On remand, the trial judge ordered a new evidentiary hearing on damages, concluding that the court could not arrive at a proper measure of damages without additional testimony. Huntington filed this action in procedendo and prohibition in the court of appeals and filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals (1) dismissed the appeal on grounds that the order requiring a new hearing was not a final appealable order, and (2) dismissed the procedendo and prohibition petition, concluding that Huntington had an adequate remedy by way of appeal and that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by ordering an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Huntington had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and that the trial judge’s jurisdiction to order the evidentiary hearing and to determine damages based on new evidence was not patently and ambiguously lacking. View "State ex rel. Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Kontos" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Reeves, a federal inmate, sued in mandamus seeking a writ compelling the production of certain records. In his complaint, Reeves alleged that he made a public-records request of the chief of police of the Cedar Point Police Department. Along with his complaint, Reeves filed an affidavit of indigence. The court of appeals dismissed the case because Reeves’s affidavit of indigence was not notarized or accompanied by the certificate of a prison officer verifying Reeves’s lack of funds. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Reeves failed to file a notarized affidavit in support of his request for a waiver of fees and because his complaint for a writ of mandamus was not verified. View "State ex rel. Reeves v. Chief of Police" on Justia Law

In 1989, Petitioner, a prisoner at Grafton Correction Institution, was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes. After a hearing in 2005, the parole board denied Petitioner parole. The board later determined that it should not have held the parole hearing because Petitioner had not yet served his minimum sentence at that time. Therefore, the board vacated its 2005 decision and continued Petitioner’s parole eligibility to 2015. In 2014, Petitioner filed this original action against the warden, claiming that the parole board violated his due process rights by vacating its 2005 decision. The warden filed a motion for summary judgment under Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C). The court of appeals granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err by ruling on Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment under the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to the warden based on res judicata, as a habeas corpus action filed by Petitioner in 2013 was virtually identical to the complaint in this case. View "Brooks v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources. A magistrate with the Ohio Court of Claims recommended judgment in favor of the Department. Appellant filed objections to the factual findings in the magistrate’s report and recommendation, but his objections did not include a transcript or affidavit as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). The Court of Appeals entered judgment in favor of the Department. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and also filed a proposed Ohio R. App. P. 9(C) statement of facts in the court of claims. The court of claims rejected the proposed App.R. 9(C) statement and accepted the magistrate’s factual findings as the statement of the evidence. Appellant failed to file his brief in the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Appellant’s appeal. Appellant then commenced this mandamus action to compel the court of claims to settle and approve his Rule 9(C) statement and transmit it to the Court of Appeals as a supplemental record. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived his appeal as to the magistrate’s findings by failing to follow the procedures set forth in Rule 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). View "State ex rel. Pallone v. Ohio Court of Claims" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that he suffered from spinal injuries as a result of Defendants’ medical malpractice. During discovery, Plaintiff requested a recorded surveillance video that Defendants had created of him. Defendants refused to turn over the video, claiming that it was attorney work product that they intended to use only as impeachment evidence. The court of common pleas ordered Defendants to produce the tape. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the discovery order was final and appealable. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court’s discovery order was a final, appealable order, and therefore, neither this Court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the interlocutory order. View "Smith v. Chen" on Justia Law