Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a motorcycle accident in 2018, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants in March 2020 in Franklin County, Ohio. He voluntarily dismissed the complaint on January 5, 2022, and, relying on Ohio’s saving statute (R.C. 2305.19), refiled the complaint on January 6, 2023. The saving statute allows a plaintiff whose claim failed otherwise than on the merits to commence a new action “within one year” of the dismissal.The defendants moved for summary judgment in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the refiled suit was outside the one-year period allowed by the saving statute. The trial court agreed, finding that the statutory one-year period ended on the anniversary of the dismissal—January 5, 2023—making the new filing on January 6, 2023, untimely. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decision in Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 2016-Ohio-5505. The appellate court essentially ruled that the statutory period lasted for a year plus a day, thus making the January 6, 2023 filing timely.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve whether “one year” under R.C. 2305.19 means a calendar year or a year plus an extra day. The court held that “one year” means exactly one year from the date of dismissal, not a year and a day. Therefore, the plaintiff’s refiled complaint had to be filed by January 5, 2023. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the refiled complaint as untimely. View "Sauter v. Integrity Cycles, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Three Ohio natural-gas producers filed a class-action lawsuit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against East Ohio Gas Company (Dominion Energy Ohio). They alleged that Dominion Energy sold or used natural gas delivered into its pipeline system without properly compensating them, despite tariff provisions requiring reconciliation of delivered gas volumes. The plaintiffs claimed conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of statutory provisions related to damages from criminal acts and theft. The class consisted of Ohio natural-gas producers participating in the Energy Choice Program whose wells were connected to Dominion Energy’s pipeline system.Judge Christine Croce partly granted Dominion Energy’s motion to dismiss by dismissing the conversion claim but allowed other claims to proceed. Dominion Energy appealed, but the Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that Judge Croce’s order was not a final, appealable order. Subsequently, Dominion Energy sought a writ of prohibition in the Ninth District against Judge Croce, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the class-action claims. The natural-gas producers intervened in the prohibition action.The Ninth District Court of Appeals applied the test from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and concluded that PUCO has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because the resolution of the dispute depended on the interpretation and application of PUCO-approved tariffs and practices normally authorized by public utilities. The court granted summary judgment for Dominion Energy and issued a writ of prohibition ordering Judge Croce to cease jurisdiction over the class action and vacate her prior orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The court held that PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the natural-gas producers, and the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. View "E. Ohio Gas Co v. Croce" on Justia Law

Jones Apparel, a company that designs and sells apparel, shoes, and accessories, sold merchandise to DSW, Inc. from 2010 through 2016. All merchandise was initially shipped to DSW’s distribution center in Columbus, Ohio. DSW subsequently transferred merchandise from the distribution center to its retail stores, many of which are located outside Ohio. Jones Apparel did not know at the time of sale or shipment how much merchandise would remain in Ohio or be sent elsewhere. After paying Ohio’s Commercial Activity Tax (CAT) on the gross receipts from these sales, Jones Apparel later claimed that much of the merchandise ultimately left Ohio and sought a refund for the portion of receipts it believed should not have been taxed.Jones Apparel filed CAT-refund claims with the Ohio Tax Commissioner, arguing that the relevant gross receipts lacked an Ohio situs. The Tax Commissioner denied the claim, reasoning that shipping labels and bills of lading showed delivery to Ohio and that accepting secondary evidence regarding subsequent shipment outside Ohio could create administrative problems. Jones Apparel appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which held a hearing. The BTA acknowledged that evidence obtained after initial delivery could theoretically establish that goods were ultimately received outside Ohio, but found that Jones Apparel had failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to establish the amount of gross receipts for merchandise transported out of Ohio. The BTA affirmed the denial of the refund claim.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the BTA’s decision for reasonableness and lawfulness. The court rejected the Tax Commissioner’s argument that only contemporaneous records should be considered in situsing determinations, finding no such statutory requirement. However, the court held that Jones Apparel did not meet its burden of providing documentary evidence to establish the amount of gross receipts that left Ohio, as required by statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the BTA’s decision denying the refund. View "Jones Apparel Group/Nine West Holdings v. Harris Tax Commr." on Justia Law

VVF Intervest, L.L.C., a contract manufacturer based in Kansas, produced bar soap for High Ridge Brands (HRB), the brand owner. HRB, an "asset light" entity, directed VVF to ship the soap from Kansas to a third-party distribution center in Columbus, Ohio. Subsequently, HRB resold most of the product to national retailers, and the soap was shipped out of Ohio to various locations. Between 2010 and 2014, VVF paid Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on its gross receipts from these sales to HRB.After making these payments, VVF sought a refund from the Ohio tax commissioner, arguing that its gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio since the products left the state soon after arrival. The tax commissioner denied the refund, emphasizing that the relevant sale for tax purposes was VVF’s sale to HRB, not HRB’s subsequent sales to retailers. VVF appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which held that the Columbus distribution center was merely an interim stop and that the gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio. The board also found that VVF had not adequately preserved an alternative statutory argument regarding services and declined to rule on constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the appeal and reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision. The court held that under R.C. 5751.033(E), VVF’s gross receipts from sales to HRB are properly sitused to Ohio because HRB, as the purchaser, received the goods in Ohio. The court dismissed VVF’s alternative statutory argument for lack of jurisdiction and rejected VVF’s constitutional challenges under the Due Process, Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses. Thus, VVF is not entitled to a refund of the CAT paid on these transactions. View "VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were previously connected by family ties but became estranged following personal conflicts. The petitioner and respondent had known each other for decades and attended the same church. Their relationship deteriorated after the respondent began an affair with the petitioner’s wife. This led to repeated confrontations, including provocative behavior at child exchanges, an incident where the respondent revved his motorcycle outside the petitioner’s home, and a public encounter in which insults were exchanged. The petitioner also retaliated by making accusatory statements about the respondent both in person and online.After these ongoing disputes, the petitioner sought and obtained an ex parte civil sexually-oriented-offense protection order against the respondent, covering himself and his children. Following a full hearing in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, the magistrate granted a civil stalking protection order only for the petitioner, finding insufficient evidence to include the children. The magistrate interpreted the relevant statute as requiring only that the petitioner believe the respondent intended to cause mental distress. The trial court adopted this interpretation and overruled most of the respondent’s objections, except for modifying the order to permit the respondent to attend church when the petitioner was not present.The respondent appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court relied on its previous decision that a petitioner need only believe that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress, not that actual mental distress occurred. This interpretation conflicted with rulings from other Ohio appellate districts, which require proof of actual mental distress.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the certified conflict and held that, under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), it is sufficient for a petitioner to believe that the offender will cause mental distress in order to obtain a civil stalking protection order. The court affirmed the Fifth District’s judgment. View "Z.J. v. R.M." on Justia Law

An Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper, C.G., was directing traffic at an intersection where the traffic light was out, wearing a reflective vest and visible during daylight hours. Edward Balmert, while driving, struck C.G. as she was directing traffic, causing her serious injuries. At the scene, Balmert provided a urine sample, which showed marijuana metabolite levels far exceeding the legal limit. Balmert admitted regular use of hemp products, including that morning, and failed field sobriety tests administered by certified drug-recognition experts.The case proceeded as a bench trial in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. Balmert was charged with four counts, including aggravated vehicular assault and operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites. The trial court denied his motion for acquittal and found him guilty of aggravated vehicular assault and operating with a prohibited metabolite concentration but acquitted him on other charges. He was sentenced to prison. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated vehicular assault conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding of proximate causation between Balmert’s violation and C.G.’s injuries.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether proximate cause is a separate required element in aggravated vehicular assault cases based on driving with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites, and whether the evidence supported such a finding here. The court held that proximate cause is a distinct element that must be proven beyond a mere violation of the statute. Here, the evidence—viewed favorably to the prosecution—showed that causing injury was a foreseeable consequence of driving with excessive marijuana metabolites. Thus, the court affirmed the conviction and the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The appellant’s other propositions of law were dismissed as improvidently accepted. View "State v. Balmert" on Justia Law

A taxpayer in the City of Findlay filed a mandamus action against the city and various municipal officials, alleging that the city failed to comply with municipal income-tax statutes and initiated fraudulent tax collection efforts against him and other delinquent taxpayers. He sought to enjoin the city from engaging in these tax collection activities and to compel compliance with local tax ordinances. In his filings, the taxpayer did not claim that any tax complaint was currently pending against him or allege a specific, individualized injury. Instead, he asserted standing as a taxpayer and attempted to bring his action on behalf of all taxpayers, invoking the public right doctrine.Previously, this dispute had resulted in several adverse judgments against the taxpayer in both the Third District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, all relating to similar underlying facts concerning Findlay’s efforts to collect unpaid municipal taxes. In the present matter, the Third District Court of Appeals granted the city’s motion to dismiss the mandamus action under Civil Rule 12(B)(6). The appellate court found that the taxpayer lacked standing because he failed to allege a specific injury distinct from the general public and that his claims were not cognizable in mandamus. The court also denied his request for leave to file a third amended complaint, concluding that he had not demonstrated good cause to do so.On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue the mandamus action because he did not allege an actual injury personal to him that was fairly traceable to the city’s conduct, as required for individual standing. The Supreme Court also rejected reliance on the public right doctrine, reaffirming its prior decision that this doctrine had been overruled, and denied both the motion to supplement the record and the request for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay" on Justia Law

A man was involved in an altercation in a McDonald’s parking lot, during which he struck and shot another individual. Surveillance footage captured the incident, and the state charged him with two counts of felonious assault, each carrying firearm specifications. Prior to trial, his attorney requested a jury instruction on self-defense. The trial judge, after viewing the video, indicated skepticism about granting the instruction, telling the defendant that he likely would not qualify for a self-defense instruction because the evidence suggested he may have initiated the altercation. The defendant expressed concern that without the instruction, a fair trial would not be possible, but the judge repeatedly allowed him opportunities to consult with counsel and emphasized that the decision to plead guilty was his alone.Subsequently, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of aggravated assault with a firearm specification, in exchange for dismissal of the second count and a recommended aggregate sentence of four years. During the plea colloquy, the defendant again voiced his desire for the self-defense instruction and his sense of being “put in a box,” but ultimately confirmed to the court that his plea was voluntary.The First District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s misstatements regarding Ohio’s self-defense statute and its premature indication it would not give the self-defense instruction rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. The appellate court held that these errors did not invalidate an otherwise valid plea.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that when a trial court complies with Ohio Criminal Rule 11 requirements, even erroneous legal statements or pretrial rulings on ancillary matters do not render a guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. The court found no violation of Rule 11 and thus upheld the conviction. View "State v. Gowdy" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident outside a restaurant in 2003, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses, as well as having weapons while under disability. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. The defense suggested that another individual, who was at the scene and arrested shortly after the shooting, was the actual perpetrator. The defendant was found guilty on all counts and received consecutive prison sentences.The defendant’s convictions were affirmed by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, although the case was remanded for resentencing due to the trial court’s failure to state facts supporting the consecutive sentences. Nearly two decades later, the defendant discovered a previously undisclosed police report indicating that the victim initially identified the other individual as the shooter. The defendant filed for leave to move for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The trial court granted leave, but ultimately denied the motion for a new trial without holding an oral hearing. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without an oral hearing.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a trial court must conduct an oral hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The court held that while an evidentiary hearing is required—meaning the court must consider affidavits or sworn statements—there is no requirement that this hearing be oral. The decision to hold an oral hearing is left to the trial court’s discretion. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Bostick" on Justia Law