Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Pavan V. Parikh, the Hamilton County clerk of courts, who implemented a policy in May 2022 that eliminated remote online access to court records in residential-eviction cases older than three years from the date of judgment satisfaction. Parikh argued that this policy was to prevent misuse of court documents by the public, such as employers and landlords. The judges of the Hamilton County Municipal Court objected to this policy and issued Administrative Order No. 23-45 in October 2023, directing Parikh to rescind the policy and restore online access to the records. Parikh did not comply, leading to the judges threatening contempt proceedings.Parikh filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the First District Court of Appeals to prevent the judges from enforcing the administrative order and holding him in contempt. The judges counterclaimed, requesting a writ of mandamus to compel Parikh to comply with their order. The court of appeals, with visiting judges from the Twelfth District, ruled in favor of the judges, granting their motion for judgment on the pleadings on the prohibition claim and issuing a writ of mandamus ordering Parikh to rescind his policy and comply with the administrative order.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that Parikh had a clear legal duty under R.C. 1901.31(E) to comply with the judges' administrative order. The court also determined that Parikh had an adequate remedy through appeal if held in contempt, and the judges did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to hold him in contempt for noncompliance. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Parikh's request for a writ of prohibition and the granting of the judges' request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Parikh v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

Delanor L. Macksyn, an inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution, filed an original action against Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees Kenneth Spencer, LeAnn Walker-Williams, and Kelly Rose. Macksyn sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of records in response to multiple public-records requests and an award of statutory damages. His requests included emails, kites, grievances, and video footage.The lower court proceedings involved Spencer assuming responsibility for answering public-records requests and responding to Macksyn’s various requests. Spencer provided some of the requested records, including kites and grievances, and allowed Macksyn to view the requested video footage. However, there was a dispute over whether all requested records, particularly emails, had been produced.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that while Spencer had provided some records, there was insufficient evidence to confirm that all requested emails had been produced. The court issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the respondents to, within 21 days, either produce the requested emails and certify the date of production or certify that no responsive emails exist. The court deferred ruling on Macksyn’s request for statutory damages until the respondents complied with the limited writ. The court also denied several motions filed by Macksyn, including motions to strike respondents’ brief and for judicial notice. View "State ex rel. Macksyn v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Ronald Ayers, an inmate at the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Laura Sackett, the prison's records custodian, to produce public records. Ayers requested a copy of the Department of Administrative Services’ general retention schedule and video footage from a security search of his cell on August 31, 2023. Sackett denied the requests, claiming the retention schedule was not specific to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and that the video footage was not preserved as it did not document a "qualifying event."The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case after Ayers filed his petition. The court found that Ayers did not need to exhaust administrative remedies before filing for mandamus. The court determined that the requested video footage did not exist at the time of Ayers' request, as it had been recorded over, and thus Sackett correctly denied this request. However, the court found that the general retention schedule was a public record received and used by the prison, and Sackett's denial of this request was not justified.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted Ayers' writ of mandamus in part, ordering Sackett to produce the retention schedule. The court awarded Ayers $1,000 in statutory damages for the improper denial of the retention schedule but denied his request for court costs due to his affidavit of indigency. The court denied Ayers' motions for discovery as moot. View "State ex rel. Ayers v. Sackett" on Justia Law

Aramark Corporation provides food services to clients in various industries, purchasing food, labor, and materials from third-party vendors. Under management-fee contracts, clients reimburse Aramark for these purchases and pay a management fee. Aramark sought a refund for the commercial-activity tax (CAT) it paid on these reimbursements, arguing that it acted as an agent for its clients and thus the reimbursements should be excluded from gross receipts under the CAT statute.The Tax Commissioner denied Aramark's refund claim, determining that Aramark did not meet the requirements for the gross-receipts exclusion. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that Aramark failed to establish an agency relationship with its clients as required by the statute. The board found that Aramark did not have the authority to bind its clients to its activities with third-party vendors and that the reimbursements constituted gross receipts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals' decision. The court held that Aramark did not qualify for the gross-receipts exclusion under the CAT statute because it did not act as an agent for its clients. The court found that Aramark kept the reimbursements for itself and did not hold them on behalf of its clients. Additionally, the court disapproved of the approach used in a previous case, Willoughby Hills, which required a showing of actual authority to establish an agency relationship for CAT purposes. The court concluded that the reimbursements Aramark received from its clients were taxable gross receipts and rejected Aramark's alternative argument that the reimbursements did not contribute to the production of gross income. View "Aramark Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for an increase in natural gas distribution rates and approval of an alternative-rate plan. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO initially extended through a tolling order. However, following a decision in a related case, In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., it was determined that PUCO lacked the authority to issue such tolling orders, meaning the OCC’s application for rehearing was denied by operation of law after 30 days.The OCC did not appeal the denial by operation of law but instead filed a second application for rehearing challenging PUCO’s tolling order practice. After the Moraine Wind decision, PUCO journalized an entry on September 4, 2024, acknowledging the denial by operation of law and closing the case. The OCC then filed a third application for rehearing, which PUCO denied on October 2, 2024. The OCC subsequently filed a notice of appeal on October 25, 2024.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and denied Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under R.C. 4903.11, the OCC’s appeal was timely because it was filed within 60 days of PUCO’s journalized entry on September 4, 2024, which constituted an “entry upon the journal of the commission of the order denying an application for rehearing.” Thus, the OCC properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and the appeal was allowed to proceed. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Tony Fenstermaker, an inmate at the Southeastern Correctional Institution, requested public records from Union County Prosecuting Attorney David W. Phillips on March 20, 2024. Fenstermaker sought the records-retention schedule of the prosecutor’s office, certified statements prepared under former R.C. 309.161 for the years 2016 through 2022, and the cashbook/journal maintained under R.C. 2335.252 for the same period. Phillips acknowledged receipt of the request on March 22, 2024, but did not provide the requested records until June 28, 2024.Fenstermaker filed a mandamus action on June 10, 2024, seeking to compel Phillips to produce the records and to award statutory damages. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and referred the case to mediation, which was unsuccessful. The case was returned to the regular docket, and both parties submitted evidence and briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Phillips had provided the requested records, rendering the mandamus request moot. However, the court determined that Phillips had failed to produce the records within a reasonable period, as the delay exceeded three months without sufficient justification. Consequently, the court awarded Fenstermaker $1,000 in statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) for the delay. The court denied Fenstermaker’s request for prejudgment interest, as the case was not based on tortious conduct and there was no precedent for awarding prejudgment interest in public-records cases. View "State ex rel. Fenstermaker v. Phillips" on Justia Law

An inmate, Edward Brown, filed a mandamus action against Laura Sackett, an employee at the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, for allegedly failing to respond to his public-records requests. Brown requested access to a media report and video footage of an alleged assault against him in March 2022 and a copy of the contract between CoreCivic, Inc. and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) regarding the management of the institution.The lower court initially dismissed Brown's complaint, but upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Sackett responded to Brown's requests by stating that no records of the alleged assault existed and that the contract would require redaction, costing $206.05, including labor costs for redaction. Brown did not pay the fee, and the contract was not provided.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Sackett complied with her duties regarding the February 16 request by asking Brown for more specific information, which he did not provide. Therefore, the court denied the writ of mandamus and statutory damages for this request. However, the court found that Sackett improperly included labor costs in the fee for the contract requested on February 20, as public offices can only charge actual copying costs and postage. The court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Sackett to provide the contract upon Brown's payment of $158.05 for copying and postage. Additionally, the court awarded Brown $1,000 in statutory damages for Sackett's failure to make the contract available at cost and within a reasonable time. Brown's request for court costs was denied due to his indigency affidavit. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Sackett" on Justia Law

In December 2023, Mary McDonald filed a petition to run as a Republican candidate for a seat on the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners. A protest was filed against her candidacy by Mohamed Al-Hamdani and Brenda Blausser, alleging she was not qualified due to her position in the Democratic Party and other statutory non-compliances. During the protest hearing, it was revealed that a confidential legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office had been leaked to the protesters. An investigation found that the board’s deputy director, Russell M. Joseph, had forwarded the memo from his board email to his personal email and then to Al-Hamdani.The Montgomery County Board of Elections initially denied a public-records request for emails related to the memo, citing attorney-client privilege and lack of access to the records. After further clarification, the board maintained its position, leading Joseph J. Platt to file an original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board to produce the emails and to organize and maintain public records properly.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the email from the prosecutor’s office to the board and the email Joseph sent from his board email to his personal email were public records and not protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the email Joseph sent from his personal email to Al-Hamdani was not considered a public record. The court granted the writ in part, ordering the board to produce the two emails, awarded Platt $1,000 in statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees subject to an itemized application. The court denied the writ regarding the organization and maintenance of records. View "State ex rel. Platt v Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Michael Satink, an employee of the City of Lakewood's Department of Public Works, was terminated for alleged insubordinate and inappropriate behavior. The union representing Satink, Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, filed a grievance, leading to a last-chance agreement (LCA) that reinstated Satink with the condition that any further misconduct would result in immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Satink was terminated again for workplace misconduct, and the union filed another grievance. The city refused to arbitrate, citing the LCA, prompting the union to seek arbitration through the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.The common pleas court denied the city's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted the union's motion to compel arbitration. The city appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because the union's claims were dependent on collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the union's claims did not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11. Therefore, SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the right to arbitrate is a contractual right derived from the CBA, independent of R.C. Chapter 4117. The court also noted that R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) allows a party to bring a suit for a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement in a court of common pleas. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood" on Justia Law

A husband and wife met at a religious conference, began a relationship, and married after the wife made clear she would not have sex before marriage. After moving to Ohio, the husband began demanding sex more frequently than the wife desired, insisting she submit regardless of her wishes. The wife described a recurring pattern during their marriage in which “date nights” would end with consensual sex, followed by the husband engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse or oral sex while she was asleep or otherwise unwilling. This pattern continued for several years, leading to the wife’s departure, her obtaining a protection order, and the husband’s indictment on three counts of rape, each tied to specific time periods.The case was tried before a jury in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted the husband on all three counts. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and vacated them, finding the evidence insufficient to prove “sexual conduct” as defined by Ohio law for the charged periods. The appellate court reasoned that while the wife’s testimony about “date nights” included explicit descriptions of penetration, her testimony regarding the specific periods in the indictment did not explicitly describe penetration, and the use of phrases like “have sex” was deemed too vague to establish the statutory element.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the wife’s testimony, including her explicit descriptions of vaginal intercourse and her use of the phrase “have sex,” was sufficient to support the element of “sexual conduct” under Ohio’s rape statute when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by refusing to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the State and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for consideration of the husband’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Coker" on Justia Law