Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

VVF Intervest, L.L.C., a contract manufacturer based in Kansas, produced bar soap for High Ridge Brands (HRB), the brand owner. HRB, an "asset light" entity, directed VVF to ship the soap from Kansas to a third-party distribution center in Columbus, Ohio. Subsequently, HRB resold most of the product to national retailers, and the soap was shipped out of Ohio to various locations. Between 2010 and 2014, VVF paid Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on its gross receipts from these sales to HRB.After making these payments, VVF sought a refund from the Ohio tax commissioner, arguing that its gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio since the products left the state soon after arrival. The tax commissioner denied the refund, emphasizing that the relevant sale for tax purposes was VVF’s sale to HRB, not HRB’s subsequent sales to retailers. VVF appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which held that the Columbus distribution center was merely an interim stop and that the gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio. The board also found that VVF had not adequately preserved an alternative statutory argument regarding services and declined to rule on constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the appeal and reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision. The court held that under R.C. 5751.033(E), VVF’s gross receipts from sales to HRB are properly sitused to Ohio because HRB, as the purchaser, received the goods in Ohio. The court dismissed VVF’s alternative statutory argument for lack of jurisdiction and rejected VVF’s constitutional challenges under the Due Process, Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses. Thus, VVF is not entitled to a refund of the CAT paid on these transactions. View "VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were previously connected by family ties but became estranged following personal conflicts. The petitioner and respondent had known each other for decades and attended the same church. Their relationship deteriorated after the respondent began an affair with the petitioner’s wife. This led to repeated confrontations, including provocative behavior at child exchanges, an incident where the respondent revved his motorcycle outside the petitioner’s home, and a public encounter in which insults were exchanged. The petitioner also retaliated by making accusatory statements about the respondent both in person and online.After these ongoing disputes, the petitioner sought and obtained an ex parte civil sexually-oriented-offense protection order against the respondent, covering himself and his children. Following a full hearing in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, the magistrate granted a civil stalking protection order only for the petitioner, finding insufficient evidence to include the children. The magistrate interpreted the relevant statute as requiring only that the petitioner believe the respondent intended to cause mental distress. The trial court adopted this interpretation and overruled most of the respondent’s objections, except for modifying the order to permit the respondent to attend church when the petitioner was not present.The respondent appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court relied on its previous decision that a petitioner need only believe that the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress, not that actual mental distress occurred. This interpretation conflicted with rulings from other Ohio appellate districts, which require proof of actual mental distress.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the certified conflict and held that, under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), it is sufficient for a petitioner to believe that the offender will cause mental distress in order to obtain a civil stalking protection order. The court affirmed the Fifth District’s judgment. View "Z.J. v. R.M." on Justia Law

An Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper, C.G., was directing traffic at an intersection where the traffic light was out, wearing a reflective vest and visible during daylight hours. Edward Balmert, while driving, struck C.G. as she was directing traffic, causing her serious injuries. At the scene, Balmert provided a urine sample, which showed marijuana metabolite levels far exceeding the legal limit. Balmert admitted regular use of hemp products, including that morning, and failed field sobriety tests administered by certified drug-recognition experts.The case proceeded as a bench trial in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. Balmert was charged with four counts, including aggravated vehicular assault and operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites. The trial court denied his motion for acquittal and found him guilty of aggravated vehicular assault and operating with a prohibited metabolite concentration but acquitted him on other charges. He was sentenced to prison. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated vehicular assault conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding of proximate causation between Balmert’s violation and C.G.’s injuries.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether proximate cause is a separate required element in aggravated vehicular assault cases based on driving with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites, and whether the evidence supported such a finding here. The court held that proximate cause is a distinct element that must be proven beyond a mere violation of the statute. Here, the evidence—viewed favorably to the prosecution—showed that causing injury was a foreseeable consequence of driving with excessive marijuana metabolites. Thus, the court affirmed the conviction and the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The appellant’s other propositions of law were dismissed as improvidently accepted. View "State v. Balmert" on Justia Law

A taxpayer in the City of Findlay filed a mandamus action against the city and various municipal officials, alleging that the city failed to comply with municipal income-tax statutes and initiated fraudulent tax collection efforts against him and other delinquent taxpayers. He sought to enjoin the city from engaging in these tax collection activities and to compel compliance with local tax ordinances. In his filings, the taxpayer did not claim that any tax complaint was currently pending against him or allege a specific, individualized injury. Instead, he asserted standing as a taxpayer and attempted to bring his action on behalf of all taxpayers, invoking the public right doctrine.Previously, this dispute had resulted in several adverse judgments against the taxpayer in both the Third District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, all relating to similar underlying facts concerning Findlay’s efforts to collect unpaid municipal taxes. In the present matter, the Third District Court of Appeals granted the city’s motion to dismiss the mandamus action under Civil Rule 12(B)(6). The appellate court found that the taxpayer lacked standing because he failed to allege a specific injury distinct from the general public and that his claims were not cognizable in mandamus. The court also denied his request for leave to file a third amended complaint, concluding that he had not demonstrated good cause to do so.On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue the mandamus action because he did not allege an actual injury personal to him that was fairly traceable to the city’s conduct, as required for individual standing. The Supreme Court also rejected reliance on the public right doctrine, reaffirming its prior decision that this doctrine had been overruled, and denied both the motion to supplement the record and the request for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay" on Justia Law

A man was involved in an altercation in a McDonald’s parking lot, during which he struck and shot another individual. Surveillance footage captured the incident, and the state charged him with two counts of felonious assault, each carrying firearm specifications. Prior to trial, his attorney requested a jury instruction on self-defense. The trial judge, after viewing the video, indicated skepticism about granting the instruction, telling the defendant that he likely would not qualify for a self-defense instruction because the evidence suggested he may have initiated the altercation. The defendant expressed concern that without the instruction, a fair trial would not be possible, but the judge repeatedly allowed him opportunities to consult with counsel and emphasized that the decision to plead guilty was his alone.Subsequently, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of aggravated assault with a firearm specification, in exchange for dismissal of the second count and a recommended aggregate sentence of four years. During the plea colloquy, the defendant again voiced his desire for the self-defense instruction and his sense of being “put in a box,” but ultimately confirmed to the court that his plea was voluntary.The First District Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s misstatements regarding Ohio’s self-defense statute and its premature indication it would not give the self-defense instruction rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. The appellate court held that these errors did not invalidate an otherwise valid plea.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that when a trial court complies with Ohio Criminal Rule 11 requirements, even erroneous legal statements or pretrial rulings on ancillary matters do not render a guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. The court found no violation of Rule 11 and thus upheld the conviction. View "State v. Gowdy" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident outside a restaurant in 2003, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses, as well as having weapons while under disability. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. The defense suggested that another individual, who was at the scene and arrested shortly after the shooting, was the actual perpetrator. The defendant was found guilty on all counts and received consecutive prison sentences.The defendant’s convictions were affirmed by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, although the case was remanded for resentencing due to the trial court’s failure to state facts supporting the consecutive sentences. Nearly two decades later, the defendant discovered a previously undisclosed police report indicating that the victim initially identified the other individual as the shooter. The defendant filed for leave to move for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The trial court granted leave, but ultimately denied the motion for a new trial without holding an oral hearing. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without an oral hearing.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a trial court must conduct an oral hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The court held that while an evidentiary hearing is required—meaning the court must consider affidavits or sworn statements—there is no requirement that this hearing be oral. The decision to hold an oral hearing is left to the trial court’s discretion. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Elwood Jones was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of the aggravated felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery of Rhoda Nathan, and sentenced to death. At trial, evidence included the discovery of a pendant similar to Nathan’s in Jones’s vehicle and a hand injury Jones sustained on the day of the murder, which became infected with a bacteria consistent with a fist-to-mouth injury. Nathan’s tooth had been knocked out during the assault. Jones’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and postconviction relief was denied, including claims that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Subsequent efforts for federal habeas corpus relief were also unsuccessful.In 2019, Jones moved for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court granted him leave and, after an evidentiary hearing, concluded that the State had suppressed material evidence about an alternate suspect and about the uniqueness of Nathan’s pendant. The court also found newly discovered scientific evidence warranted a new trial. The State sought leave to appeal this decision to the First District Court of Appeals, challenging only the Brady violation findings. The appellate court denied leave, reasoning that because the State did not challenge the independent ground of newly discovered scientific evidence, any appeal would be futile.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the appellate court applied the correct legal standard in ruling on the State’s motion for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred by failing to determine whether the State had shown a high enough probability of trial-court error to warrant a discretionary appeal, as required by App.R. 5(C). The judgment denying leave to appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the appellate court to apply the proper standard. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

An individual incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution requested various records from the sheriff relating to the operation and administration of the county jail, including policies on inmate intake and booking, personnel employed during a specified period, and records-retention policies. When his attempts to submit the requests by hand delivery and certified mail failed—one being refused and the other returned as undeliverable—he sent the requests by fax. Additionally, a third party, claiming to be his agent, submitted similar requests via email. The sheriff provided some records, stated that others had already been given, and explained that many requested records were maintained by private entities that had operated the jail under contract during relevant periods.The inmate subsequently filed a mandamus action against the sheriff and the jail, but not against the private jail administrators. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed the claim against the jail as a non-legal entity, and granted a limited writ requiring the sheriff to obtain and provide certain records from the private entities or certify their nonexistence. The court deferred the issue of statutory damages until the sheriff complied. The sheriff requested the records from the private entities, forwarded what was provided to the inmate, and filed a notice of compliance.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requests for statutory damages and for contempt and sanctions. The court held that the inmate had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his records requests by hand delivery or certified mail, nor that he authorized the third party to submit requests as his agent by email. The court further found no evidence that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the court’s prior order, noting that the sheriff acted to comply with the writ by seeking records from the private entities and forwarding their responses. The motions for statutory damages, contempt, and sanctions were therefore denied. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail" on Justia Law

In this case, two police officers responded to a robbery at a car dealership and pursued the suspects on the highway. During the chase, one officer was shot multiple times by a hidden suspect, and both officers exchanged gunfire with the perpetrator, who was ultimately killed. One officer suffered serious injuries and required extensive medical care. Following the incident, a newspaper reporter requested public records from the Columbus Police Department, including body camera and dash camera footage of the shootout. The police department denied the request for unredacted video footage, citing statutory provisions that protect the privacy of crime victims, specifically Marsy's Law and related Ohio statutes.The Columbus Police Department eventually released redacted versions of the body camera footage, concealing the identities of the two officers and ending the video before the shooting. The newspaper maintained that, as public officials acting in the line of duty, the officers could not be considered "victims" under Marsy's Law and filed an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production of the unredacted footage.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the officers were "victims" under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution (Marsy's Law), and thus entitled to privacy protections under the Victim Privacy Law and the Public Records Act. The court held that police officers are "persons against whom crimes can be committed" and therefore qualify as victims under Marsy's Law. As a result, the statutory provisions apply, and the redaction of identifying information from the footage was proper. The court denied the newspaper's request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the newspaper was not entitled to unredacted body camera and dash camera footage identifying the officers. View "State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept." on Justia Law