Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A roughly 600-space parking garage on the Scioto Peninsula in Columbus was owned by RiverSouth Authority, which is a “new community authority” and a “body corporate and politic.” RiverSouth owned the garage, which sat on city-owned land, and leased it to the City of Columbus under a long-term ground lease. The city then entered into a management agreement with Capitol South, a private nonprofit entity, to manage and operate the garage. Capitol South, in turn, hired LAZ Parking Midwest, a private for-profit operator, to handle day-to-day operations. The agreements required Capitol South to operate the garage in a manner consistent with city obligations, with many operational decisions ultimately subject to city oversight.The Ohio Tax Commissioner denied RiverSouth’s request for a real property tax exemption, concluding that the garage was not entitled to exemption because it was managed by a private, for-profit entity, LAZ. RiverSouth appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which affirmed the denial, but for a different reason: the Board found the garage was under the direction and control of Capitol South, the nonprofit manager, rather than the city. This basis for denial was raised by the Board on its own initiative, without prior notice to the parties.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Board of Tax Appeals erred by affirming the Tax Commissioner’s decision based on a new issue not raised below and without following statutory remand procedures. The Court further held that the city’s use of a management company to operate the garage did not deprive the city of direction or control over the property for exemption purposes. The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Tax Commissioner to grant the exemption and calculate the appropriate refund. View "RiverSouth Auth. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) in 2021 for authority to increase its distribution rates, modify its tariffs, and adjust certain accounting methods. The utility also sought approval for an alternative-rate plan and to continue demand-side management (DSM) programs for commercial and residential customers. Following an investigation and objections from various parties, a joint stipulation was reached among Columbia, the commission staff, and several intervening parties. This agreement included a rate increase, a substantial increase in the fixed monthly charge for residential customers, and the elimination of DSM programs for non-low-income customers. Several groups, including the Environmental Law & Policy Center (ELPC) and the Citizens’ Utility Board of Ohio (CUB), opposed the stipulation.PUCO conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately approved the stipulation with certain modifications, finding it satisfied the three-part test for reasonableness of contested stipulations: it was the result of serious bargaining, benefitted ratepayers and the public interest, and did not violate important regulatory principles or practices. ELPC and CUB separately applied for rehearing, but the commission denied these applications by operation of law after a related Supreme Court of Ohio decision clarified the process for rehearing requests.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case on appeal. The appellants argued that the commission’s approval was unsupported by evidence, particularly criticizing the fixed charge increase and elimination of DSM programs for most customers. The court held that the commission did not err in approving the increased fixed monthly charge or in eliminating the DSM programs for non-low-income customers. It found sufficient support in the record for PUCO’s decision and concluded that the commission’s actions did not violate regulatory principles or prior precedent. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the commission’s orders. View "In re Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Three Ohio electric-distribution utilities—Duke Energy Ohio, Dayton Power and Light (AES Ohio), and Ohio Power Company (AEP Ohio)—sought to recover from their retail customers the costs associated with their ownership interests in the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC), a “legacy-generation resource” under Ohio law. Following the repeal of prior cost-recovery mechanisms, a new nonbypassable-rate mechanism called the Legacy Generation Resource (LGR) Rider was established pursuant to R.C. 4928.148, effective in 2019, to allow recovery of “prudently incurred” OVEC-related costs from 2020 onward. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) ordered an audit of the companies’ LGR Riders for the year 2020, as required by statute.After the audits, PUCO conducted a hearing and approved the audit findings, except for a recommended cap on capital expenditures. PUCO found that all costs and sales flowing through the LGR Riders for the audit period were prudent and reasonable, and it declined to disallow any costs. The Ohio Environmental Council (OEC) and the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group (OMAEG) challenged these orders, arguing that the companies had recovered imprudent or unreasonable costs, that the Commission improperly excluded certain evidence, and that it did not apply the correct legal standards.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that the PUCO did not commit reversible error in approving the cost recovery. The court determined that PUCO provided sufficient record support and explanation for its decisions and did not violate statutory requirements. While the court found PUCO’s application of a presumption of prudence to be erroneous, it concluded that this did not result in reversible error, as the record showed the companies met their burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Commission’s orders. View "In re OVEC Generational Purchase Rider Audits Required by R.C. 4928.148" on Justia Law

After a prolonged labor, a mother delivered her son at a hospital, with the child experiencing respiratory distress requiring intubation shortly after birth. The mother alleged that the child’s injuries resulted from medical malpractice by the hospital and two physicians involved in her care during labor and delivery. One physician initially managed her labor, then transferred care to another physician, and later resumed care the following morning, at which point he ordered an emergency cesarean section after being notified of fetal distress.During the litigation, the mother’s medical expert provided a report stating that all involved providers, including both physicians and the nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section on the evening prior to delivery, a time when the physician in question was not present. The physician moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert's report did not implicate him in the alleged malpractice. In response, the mother submitted an affidavit from the same expert, which incorporated the prior report but added a new opinion that the physician breached the standard of care by not performing a cesarean within thirty minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress on the morning of delivery. The physician moved to strike this affidavit, arguing it contradicted the prior expert report and was submitted only to create an issue of fact.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to strike the affidavit and entered summary judgment for the physician. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit’s new opinion was contradictory and could be disregarded under the sham-affidavit rule.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment. It held that when an expert incorporates an earlier report into a sworn affidavit, the court may consider both documents together for summary judgment purposes. If the affidavit contradicts the report without sufficient explanation, the trial court acts within its discretion to strike it under the sham-affidavit rule. View "Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a motorist who was driving a light blue Chrysler minivan with dark tinted windows. The officer had knowledge of an armed robbery that had occurred two days earlier, where the suspect’s vehicle was described as a gold or tan Dodge or Chrysler minivan with a license plate possibly beginning with “TWL.” As the officer approached the vehicle, he realized its color and license plate did not exactly match the suspect description but continued the stop, noticing illegal window tint and the smell of burnt marijuana. A search revealed the motorist possessed a loaded firearm despite being a convicted felon.The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas held a suppression hearing and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the officer should have ended the stop once he determined the vehicle did not match the robbery suspect’s description. The Eighth District Court of Appeals remanded for findings of fact, after which the trial court stated the stop was initiated to investigate the robbery, not the window tint. The trial court again ruled for suppression, and the Eighth District affirmed, finding the police improperly extended the stop after losing reasonable suspicion related to the robbery.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and applied Fourth Amendment standards, emphasizing that reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop is an objective inquiry and does not depend on an officer’s subjective intent. The court held that when an officer initiates a traffic stop with multiple independent reasonable suspicion bases, the stop remains lawful as long as at least one basis persists, even if others are extinguished. The judgment of the Eighth District was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. Mathis" on Justia Law

A group of investors lost money after purchasing interests in a hedge fund operated by Constantine Antonas between 2015 and 2021. Antonas was not a registered investment adviser and did not qualify for an exemption from registration. He solicited investments using a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) that identified a brokerage firm as the fund’s broker, which the investors claimed gave legitimacy to the scheme. After collecting approximately $25 million, Antonas lost nearly all the funds through speculative trades and died in 2021, leaving the investors without recourse against him.The investors filed suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against the brokerage firm, alleging that it had participated in or aided Antonas's unlawful sale of securities in violation of Ohio law, specifically R.C. 1707.43(A). They argued that because the brokerage firm reviewed the PPM and performed routine account setup and compliance procedures before and after the fund’s account was opened, it should be liable for their losses. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the investors' allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under R.C. 1707.43(A).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 1707.43(A) does not impose liability on a brokerage firm for routine business activities performed after an unlawful sale of securities has occurred. The Court found no nexus between the brokerage firm's conduct and the solicitation, negotiation, or execution of the specific securities sales to the investors. As a result, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint. View "Bitounis v. Interactive Brokers, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A minor child was injured when a dog bit him at a playground within a manufactured-home community. The dog belonged to a resident, and at the time of the incident, the resident’s son had tied the dog by its leash to a swing set. The child suffered serious injuries requiring extensive stitches. The owner of the manufactured-home community permitted residents to keep dogs in their homes and allowed leashed dogs in common areas, subject to community rules requiring control over pets.Following the incident, the child, through his mother and legal guardian, filed suit against both the dog’s owner and the owner of the manufactured-home community, alleging that the community owner was a “harborer” of the dog under Ohio law and thus strictly liable for the injuries. The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the community owner, finding it was not a harborer. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the community owner was a harborer and could be strictly liable under R.C. 955.28(B), and ordered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, to be a “harborer” under R.C. 955.28(B), one must shelter, protect, or exercise control over the dog. The court determined that the owner of the manufactured-home community, by merely allowing residents to keep dogs and permitting leashed dogs in common areas, did not shelter, protect, or exercise control over the dog that caused the injury. Thus, the community owner was not a harborer and was not strictly liable. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the community owner. View "L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A public utility that provides natural gas service to approximately 450,000 customers in southwestern Ohio had long relied on propane caverns as a seasonal gas supply. After constructing a new pipeline, the utility retired the caverns and sought to recover the costs associated with their retirement—such as the remaining undepreciated value, decommissioning expenses, and the value of the remaining propane inventory—from customers through increased rates. The company had previously obtained approval to abandon the caverns and defer these costs as a regulatory asset, with the understanding that it would seek their recovery in its next base-rate case.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio reviewed the utility’s application to increase rates. After a hearing, the commission approved an agreement allowing the company to recover the full deferred amount, amortized over ten years as an operating expense. The commission determined that these costs were recoverable under Ohio Revised Code section 4909.15(A)(4) as a cost of rendering public-utility service, and not subject to the “used and useful” standard under section 4909.15(A)(1). The commission also found that, even if the latter standard applied, the costs would still be recoverable.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the commission’s order. The court held that the commission did not act unlawfully or unreasonably in permitting the utility to treat the deferred costs related to the retirement of the propane caverns as operating expenses recoverable under R.C. 4909.15(A)(4). The court further found that these costs were properly considered as current expenses necessary for the provision of utility service, distinguishing them from investment losses in facilities never placed into service. The court dismissed as moot arguments regarding alternative findings and rejected the request to make related rates subject to refund. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in 2008 of several sex offenses and robbery, having committed the crimes prior to May 14, 2007. His original sentencing entry did not include advisements regarding postrelease control or a sex-offender classification. He appealed his conviction, but the absence of these advisements was not raised. Years later, following a new conviction for an offense committed in prison, the trial court, presided over by a new judge, held a hearing in 2018 and issued a journal entry providing postrelease control advisements and classifying him as an aggravated sexually oriented offender under Ohio’s Megan’s Law. The appellant appealed only the imposition of postrelease control, not the sex-offender classification. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the postrelease control portion but left the sex-offender classification undisturbed, as it had not been challenged.Subsequently, the appellant filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial judge had lacked jurisdiction to classify him as a sex offender years after his sentence and final judgment. The Eighth District dismissed his complaint, finding that the judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to conduct the classification and that the appellant could have challenged the classification by direct appeal.On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eighth District’s dismissal. The court held that because the offenses predated the effective date of Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act, Megan’s Law applied, and the trial judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to classify the appellant under Megan’s Law after sentencing. The court further held that the appellant had an adequate remedy at law through direct appeal to challenge his classification, precluding extraordinary relief in prohibition. View "State ex rel. Bates v. Clancy" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted in 2008 of multiple felonious assault charges and carrying a concealed weapon after a bar fight that resulted in two people being seriously injured. The trial court merged certain counts for sentencing, found the individual to be a repeat violent offender based on stipulations, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 37 years and 6 months, including additional prison terms for repeat violent offender specifications. The individual later argued that his sentence should have expired and that it was unlawfully enhanced based on improper judicial factfinding, and also challenged the sentencing entry’s accuracy and the denial of a motion to correct the record.After conviction, the individual appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the sentence, finding that the trial court properly imposed the additional terms under mandatory statutory provisions and did not engage in impermissible factfinding. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case. Many years later, the individual filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc order in the trial court, claiming a discrepancy between the sentencing hearing and the written entry, but the motion was denied without a substantive ruling. He did not appeal this denial. Subsequently, he petitioned the Fifth District Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus, raising claims about his sentence, the sentencing entry, and denial of due process; the court granted the warden’s motion to dismiss, ruling that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus because he had or could have pursued adequate remedies through direct appeal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The court held that the individual's claims challenging his sentence, the sentencing entry, and the denial of due process were not cognizable in habeas corpus, as any errors would render the sentence voidable, not void, and the individual had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Krug v. Stuff" on Justia Law